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Abstract 
 
 
 
Scholars and practitioners of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies tend 
to ignore religion in their analyses due to the considerable influence of the secularist paradigm 
within these fields. Religion tends to be perceived as a cause of violent conflict, and hence as a 
phenomenon that must be relegated to the private sphere. However, against these more conventional 
approaches, some scholars and practitioners have begun to approach religion as a factor that can 
potentially shape peace and security in positive ways. Within this context, the aim of this thesis is to 
investigate, as its core question, how Muslims and Christians use religious resources to contribute to 
peacebuilding in conflict-torn societies in Southeast Asia. 
To answer the research question, the notions of the ambivalence of the sacred (AoS) and the 
hermeneutics of peace (HoP) are employed as theoretical frames for moving beyond both the core 
assumptions of the secularist paradigm and analysing local dynamics in the field. These local 
dynamics are accessed through a qualitative case study methodology with particular reference to the 
conflicts in Maluku (Indonesia) and Mindanao (the Philippines).  
This thesis includes the argument that religion is a resource for peacebuilding through the 
complex process of the HoP: the process of rereading sacred texts, religious doctrines, and 
narratives in order to create new, inclusive, and peaceful religious meanings and practices to 
overcome violent conflicts. The evidence obtained through fieldwork amply demonstrated that 
religion played pivotal roles in peacebuilding in the two cases that were considered. The HoP 
process led religious peacebuilders in Maluku and Mindanao to perceive religiously grounded 
peacebuilding as more than simply another tactic to resolve conflict. Rather, peacebuilders in these 
conflicts became deeply committed to attain peace because for them peacebuilding was a religious 
conviction, a sacred duty, and a vocation that deserves reward and redemption.  
Furthermore, this thesis found that religion could not always be cast as violent, dogmatic, 
rigid, and inflexible, as the secular perspective has often prescribed. Religion, in fact, inspired and 
motivated religious adherents to contribute to peacebuilding fluidly, flexibly, and dynamically at 
local, national, and international levels. Religious peacebuilders worked through official and 
unofficial religious structures, but they also worked with and drew upon diverse and pluralistic 
resources of the society, including feminism, nationalism, customary tradition, and the approaches 
of contemporary civil society organisations. Thus, this thesis demonstrates how religion positively 
influences peacebuilding in conflict-torn societies in Southeast Asia.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The 9/11 tragedy has, for numerous people, symbolized the emergence of a new form of religious 
revivalism and extremism at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It has been extremely 
difficult, especially from a Western point of view, to explain how such barbaric action could 
occur in a world that was apparently on a path to modernisation and secularization. However, the 
9/11 tragedy should not come as a complete surprise if we follow numerous scholars, such as 
Toft at al., who argued that the twenty-first century is “God’s Century.”1 The tragedy was only a 
manifestation of numerous tragedies that were linked to an instrumentalisation of religion that 
was connected to the re-emergence of religion in public life, which had been predicted by 
numerous social sciences scholars in the last two decades.2 These scholars have questioned the 
secularization paradigm by which it was suggested that religions would become entirely 
privatised and disappear from the public sphere.3  
Despite the dramatic social and political changes that secularism generated, today’s world 
is not necessarily fully secularized.4 Berger eloquently stated the following: 
[t]he assumption that we live in a secularized world is false. The world today… is as 
furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means 
that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labelled 
“secularization theory” is essentially mistaken.5  
 
Arguably, the strong claims of the secularisation paradigm are not even true for Europe, the 
birthplace of secularism. For example, some of the EU’s 15 member states (Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) have so-called “established churches.”6 In numerous 
European countries, donations to the churches are tax deductible. Even France, the country that 
has the extremely strong secular tradition of laïcité, despite the current debate on the burqa, has 
                                                          
1 Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics  
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2011). 
2 See, for example, Peter Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Gobal Overview in the Desecularization of the 
World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics  (Washington, D.C: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999); Jose Casanova, 
Public Religions in the Modern World  (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Charles Taylor, A Secular Age  
(USA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Craig Calhoun, ed. Rethinking Secularism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Gobal Overview in the Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion 
and World Politics, 2. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Afred Stepan, "Religion, Democracy and the "Twin Tolerations"," Journal of Democracy Volume 11, no. 4 (October 
2000): 41. 
2 
 
implemented policies that are friendly toward religion,7 such as the provision of state funds for 
building mosques.8 
Furthermore, religion has long been influential and central in the daily life of numerous 
societies. In the last two decades, some academics have begun to reassess the role of religion in 
the public sphere. The sociologist Jose Casanova warned of the emergence of “public religions” 
in the modern world. This notion derives from four developments in the 1980s: (1) the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran; (2) the Solidarity movement in Poland; (3) the influence of the Catholic 
Church in the Sandinista Revolution and other political developments in Latin America; and (4) 
the strong influence of Protestant fundamentalism in US political life.9  
Throughout Southeast Asian countries, which are the focus of this thesis, a series of 
developments also demonstrated that religions are not limited to private spiritual matters, as 
secular theorists had predicted. Religion “went public” and contributed substantially to violent 
conflicts, as well as to political and structural transformations. The conflicts in Southern 
Thailand, the Southern Philippines (Mindanao), and Eastern Indonesia (Poso and Ambon), for 
example, are widely perceived by observers as religious conflicts.  
In other instances, religion has been deployed for peaceful purposes. The Buddhist monk 
Somdet Phra Maha Ghosananda, for example, worked for peace in Cambodia, especially through 
his renowned “pilgrimage of truth” or Dhammayietra.10 In 1986, Jaime Cardinal Sin, a Catholic 
Archbishop of Manila led a “People Power Revolution” that forced the President of the 
Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, to resign.11 In 1998, Muhammad Amien Rais, Chairperson of 
Muhammadiyah, (the largest modernist Muslim mass organisation in Indonesia with about 25 
million members), successfully led reformasi rallies to topple President Soeharto who had ruled 
for 32 years.12 Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the Catholic Bishop in Dili (1983–2002) who 
received the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize, became prominent as a leader who strove for peace and 
justice for the East Timorese, who suffered from brutal military operations.13 Even in the context 
of internal political impasses and the ineffective pressure of the international community, 
Buddhist monks have been among the effectively organised groups that have frequently stood up 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 See, for example, http://www.observatoiredessubventions.com/2009/les-nouvelles-mosquees-sont-financees-a-30-
par-les-pouvoirs-publics, (accessed on 20 November 2010). 
9 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 3. 
10 Jeffrey Haynes, "Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and 
Cambodia," Commonwealth & Comparative Politics Vol. 47, no. 1 (2009): 68-71. 
11The Economist; 7 February 2005, Vol. 376 Issue 8433, 77. 
12 Adam Schwarz, "A Sense of Disgust," Far Eastern For Economic Review 1998. 
13 Anthony Spaeth  and Michael Creadon, "Prize before Peace," Time International (South Pacific Edition) 10 December 
1996. 
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to the military junta in Burma.14 In other words, religions have played both meaningful negative 
and positive roles in the public and political affairs in the Southeast Asian region.  
 
1.1  Research Problem and Question 
Despite acknowledging the rise of religion in public life, the social science scholars’ engagement 
with religion remains relatively limited because of the influence of the secular paradigm. Yet, 
secularization is a contested and ambiguous concept in the social sciences.15 According to Peter 
L. Berger, the secularization paradigm refers to the intellectual endeavours in the 1950s and 
1960s that originated from the Enlightenment. Berger explained that the essence of the theory of 
secularization is that ‘modernization necessarily leads to the decline of religion, both in society 
and in the mind of individuals.’16  
Jose Casanova elaborated this notion further:  
[t]he core and the central thesis of the theory of secularization is the 
conceptualisation of the process of societal modernisation as a process of 
functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres—primarily the 
state, economy and science—from the religious sphere and the concomitant 
differentiation and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious 
sphere.17 
 
This manner of thinking became particularly dominant in social and political analysis. 
Moreover, in numerous respects, it has come to be seen as the universal and linear path of 
tradition moving toward modern society and development; from superstition to reason, from 
beliefs to unbelief, and from religion to science.18  
Consequently, “the theory of secularization,” according to Casanova, ‘may be the only 
theory which was able to attain truly paradigmatic status within modern social science.’19 The 
secularist paradigm has influenced both “everyday politics” and academia. In the context of 
                                                          
14 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7010839.stm (accessed on 10 December 2010). Ironically, the Buddhist monks in 
Burma were recently involved in igniting violence against the Muslim minority. In July 2013, Time magazine used the 
picture of Bikkhu Ashin Wirathu, one of the Buddhist leaders in Burma, as the Face of Buddhist Terror for its cover 
story.  
15 In his recent article, Nader Hashemi emphasized this point by describing three different, but not mutually exclusive 
approaches to the secularization concept, namely, the philosophical, sociological, and political science approaches. 
Hashemi also highlighted that, because the concept of secularization has multiple histories, the concept is ambiguous 
and contested. See Nader Hashemi, "The Multiple Histories of Secularism: Muslim Societies in Comparison," 
Philosophy and Social Criticism 36, no. 3-4 (2010).   
16 Peter Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Gobal Overview in the Desecularization of the Wolrd: Resurgent 
Religion and World Politics  (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), 2. 
17 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 19. 
18 Ibid., 17. 
19 Ibid., 17  
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international relations, for example, scholarly attempts to consider religion properly as a critical 
factor in their analysis, have been, until recently, considerably scant.20  
The secular paradigm continues to contribute to understanding political dynamics, 
including those relating to conflict and its management or resolution in numerous parts of the 
world. However, as I demonstrate in the literature review in Chapter 2, the tendency in 
International Relations (IR) and the early development of peace and conflict resolution studies 
(PCRS) fields has been to neglect religion. Such a tendency has been caused by the extremely 
strong secular tradition in IR and PCRS, in which states are perceived as key actors in managing 
and resolving conflicts.21 The recognition of the critical role of non-state actors, such as non-
government organisations, civil society groups, local communities, and religious leaders in 
conflict resolution, has been very slow. Consequently, roles that non-state actors, including 
religious actors, might play have not been properly considered22 and intellectual attempts to 
include religion in IR and PCRS analysis have been limited.  
However, in the last two decades, some IR and PCRS scholars and practitioners have 
increasingly turned their attention to the question of religion. In general, a growing number of 
intellectual works have tried to include religion and offer analysis of its relation with violence.23 
This constitutes as a remarkable development; yet, the ongoing and generalised persistence of 
the secularist paradigm confirms that developing more complex and nuanced analyses of religion 
is a challenge.  
To some extent, the negative view of religion is understandable. Over the past three 
millennia, as Judy Carter and Gordon S. Smith noted, millions have been assassinated in the 
name of gods.24 However, two arguments could provide a more balanced and comprehensive 
perspective on religion. First, one could counter by pointing to destructive “secular” wars and 
conflicts, including to the millions of people who were killed in secular wars in the last two 
millennia, and by questioning the effectiveness of secular regimes in preventing genocide, 
atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and other human rights violations. At least, one could argue that 
religious factors are not solely responsible for large-scale violence. Second, during the last two 
decades, attempts have been made to record the positive roles that religious actors played in 
contemporary peacebuilding and conflict resolution. These attempts, although still limited, have 
                                                          
20 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations  (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University 
Press, 2008), 13. 
21 Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution  (Washington D.C.: USIP, 2004), 26-29. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Actually, there has been already significant works on 'religion and violance' even before the 9/11 tragedy and has 
been  substantial increase since then. See Charles K. Bellinger, "Religion and Violence: Bibliography " The Hedgehog 
Review Spring(2004): 111-17. 
24 Judy Carter and Gordon S. Smith, "Religious Peacebuilding: From Potential to Action," in Religion and Peacebuilding, 
ed. Coward and Gordon S. Smith (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), 279. 
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shown that religion and religious actors in some circumstances and contexts could be effective 
peacemakers and peacebuilders.25  
Despite the recognition of the positive contribution of religions in recent literature, 
significant research gaps remain. Some of the existing academic works tend to celebrate religion, 
instead of examining, in depth and detail, how and why religion is crucial for peacebuilding. In 
addition, scholars tend to make sweeping generalisations by claiming, for example, that 
‘individuals operating on a religious or spiritual basis are often more appropriately equipped to 
reach people at the level of the individual and sub-national group than political leaders.’26 
Therefore, I do not want to, and should not, deny the role that religion has in conflict. However, 
religion should not be naturally associated with conflict. Research is required that provides case 
studies that include a direct exploration of the local contexts to examine how religion can play 
positive roles in peacebuilding.  
As discussed earlier, Southeast Asia is a “research laboratory” that provides various types of 
evidence on religion as a public religion. Southeast Asia is also among the homes of religious 
conflict, extremism, and terrorism. Because public religions and an increase in conflicts that are 
tinged by religions are presently emerging in Southeast Asia, understanding the role of religion in 
contemporary peacebuilding and conflict resolution is a critical intellectual challenge. Page: 5 
The following question emerges in light of the foregoing discussion: How do Muslims and 
Christians use religious resources to contribute to peacebuilding in conflict-torn societies in 
Southeast Asia?  
 
1.2  Theoretical Approach  
Research on religion in peacebuilding is relatively new. Consequently, on the one hand, research, to 
date, suffers from a relative absence of adequate theoretical approaches. On the other hand, the 
current shortfall in theoretical approaches opens opportunities to improve the understanding of the 
perspectives and practices of religious peacebuilders. As I demonstrate in the next chapter, most 
secular work in the social sciences tends to approach religion as a negative influence in conflict. In 
such discourses, religion tends to be perceived as superstitious, irrational or magical, absolutist and 
inflexible, traditional and conservative, but also extremist and dangerous. Samuel Huntington 
                                                          
25 Among others see Muhammad Abu-Nimer, "A Framework for Non-Violance and Peacebuilding in Islam," Journal of 
Law and Religion 15, no. No 1/2 (2000-2001); Harold Coward and Gordon S. Smith, ed. Religion and Peacebuilding 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2004); David R. Smock, Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When 
Religion Brings Peace, Not War  (Washington D.C.: USIP, 2006); "Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding," ed. David R. 
Smock (Washington D.C.: USIP, 2007). 
26 Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Samson, Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft  (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 4. 
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stridently asserted that religion is rigid and inflexible by saying ‘Even more than ethnicity, religion 
discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arabic 
and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-
Muslim.’27 As such, religion has more propensity, in Huntington’s view, to ignite a “clash of 
civilizations” than secular ideologies and institutions do.  
In his landmark book, William T. Cavanaugh eloquently criticised these conventional 
approaches as the product of the ‘Enlightenment narrative that has invented a dichotomy between 
the religious and the secular and constructed the former as an irrational and dangerous impulse that 
must give way in public to rational, secular forms of power.’28 This manner of thinking presents 
considerable problems for how one perceives the legitimate and justifiable use of violence. In line 
with Cavanaugh’s argument, one might ask whether, after the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648), which began to facilitate secularism as a new chapter in European history, people really did 
begin to live in a more peaceful and just world. History demonstrates that secular institutions and 
ideologies are accompanied by unprecedented violence, atrocities, genocides, and other forms of 
gross human rights violations—from slavery and colonialism, the First and Second World Wars, to 
the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
I do not want to be an apologist for religion, which, in human history and in numerous parts 
of the world, has been associated with significant violence and human suffering. However, I suggest 
that a new understanding of religion in social science research must be developed, especially in IR 
and PCRS, to grasp religion as a “normal” social and political phenomenon, rather than an 
anachronistic phenomenon that will be forgotten.  
In this context, Scott Appleby’s approach to religion offered a valuable avenue for shaping 
my theoretical approach because he perceived religion as having two faces: one positive and one 
negative. Appleby termed this phenomenon “the ambivalence of the sacred.”29 According to this 
perspective, religious violence is only one face of religion. The goal of the theoretical approach in 
this research is to reveal the other face of religion to understand the role that religious peacebuilders 
and religious peacemakers play in resolving deadly conflict. Using this perspective, religious 
peacebuilders perceive the ambivalence of the sacred more as an opportunity than as a liability.30 
Unlike Appleby, scholars such Jurgensmeyer believed that religion could only (1) personalize 
conflict by making it a type of personal obligation that affords personal rewards and redemption. 
                                                          
27 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate  (New York: Council of Foreign Affairs 1993). Can be 
accessed on http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations (accessed 
on 1 December 2013).  
28 William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence  (New York: Oxford University, 2009), 4. 
29 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation  (Boston: Rowman & 
Litttlefield Publishers, 2000). 
30 Ibid., 281-307. 
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They also believed that religion could (2) provide a vehicle for social mobilization as well as 
organisational networks to sustain the conflict, and that (3) it could legitimise moral righteousness 
and justify violence. Finally, they argued that religion would (4) absolutize the conflict into 
diametrically opposed positions and help to demonize opponents.31 The notion of the ambivalence 
of the sacred provides an avenue to examine religion by taking an approach that contrasts that 
which Jurgensmeyer outlined. This research includes exploring the potential ability of religion to 
personalise the process of pursuing peace as a moral and social obligation, because religious 
adherents often perceived conflict resolution as their sacred duty. Similarly, this research includes 
an investigation of whether and how religion could be a vehicle for mobilizing people on the path to 
non-violent coexistence and a tool for demolishing the barriers that stereotypes and prejudices 
produce during war and conflict. 
David Little’s hermeneutics of peace (HoP) is helpful in pursuing the reversal that Appleby 
facilitated. The term hermeneutics is taken from the classical Greek word hermeneus, which means 
an interpreter or expounder,32 and refers to Hermes, the messenger of the gods of Greek mythology. 
Hermes ‘had to understand and interpret for himself what the gods wanted to convey before he 
could proceed to translate, articulate, and explicate their intention to mortals.’33 Historically, 
hermeneutics was widely used by theologians in the Christian tradition to (re)understand the “real” 
meaning of the Bible. However, later, scholars began to use hermeneutics as theory and 
methodological approach in philology, jurisprudence, and philosophy.34 There has been a heated 
debate about hermeneutics among scholars of “modern hermeneutics” from Schleiermacher (1768-
1834), Dilthey (1833-1911), Heidegger (1889-1976), Gadamer (b.1900) to Habermas (b.1929) and 
Karl-Otto (b.1922).35 While I value the work of these hermeneutics scholars, I leave the 
philosophical debate aside in this thesis to focus, through the HoP, on how and why sacred texts 
could be used to organise and mobilize for peace.   
Learning from twelve case studies of religious peacemakers from numerous parts of the 
world, Little concluded that the HoP is crucial in determining peacemakers’ orientations and 
activities. He defined the HoP as 
                                                          
31 Mark Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al-
Qaedah.  (London: University of California Press, 2008), 255. 
32 David Jasper, A Short Introduction to Hermeneutics  (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 7. 
Porter and Robinson explains the term hermeneutics is from the Greek verb hermeneuein means to interpret or to 
translate, see Stanley Porter and Jason Robinson, Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Interpetive Theory  (Michigan: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2011), 2. 
33 Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ed. Texst of German Tradition from Enlightement to the Present (New York: Continuum, 
1990), 1. 
34 Ibid., 2. See also Josef Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy, and Critique  
(London ; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 1. See Robinson, Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Interpetive 
Theory, 2. 
35 Mueller-Vollmer, Texst of German Tradition from Enlightement to the Present. 
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[a]n interpretive framework that begins with the conviction that the pursuit of 
justice and peace by peaceful means is a sacred priority… Within this framework, 
particular texts, doctrines and practices contained in one’s own tradition—and 
often in traditions of others—are examined for guidance in the process of 
elaborating and implementing the fundamental commitment to peace and 
justice. 36   
 
One of Little’s central points is that sacred texts, doctrines, and practices are crucial for 
developing the conviction that pursuing peace is central to religion and spirituality. In other words, 
the HoP process, speaks directly to the ambivalence of the sacred. The case could be, then, that the 
question about whether religion could be used for peacebuilding depends largely on the HoP 
process. The HoP concept can be developed further, based on the foundation that Little provided. In 
this research, Little’s broad definition of the HoP provides a guide to investigate the process that 
underpins how peacebuilders use religious resources, including how they mobilize multiple and 
sometimes competing readings of Biblical and Qur’anic texts for peacebuilding initiatives. I argue 
that the process of interpreting religion is dynamic and often involves a creative tension when 
attempting to comprehend religion within a specific cultural and political context.  
Furthermore, I utilise Cecelia Lynch’s neo-Weberian approach to religion in international 
politics to develop Little’s notion of the HoP further. Lynch approached religion as an interpretive 
community. In opposing mainstream scholars who see religious doctrines as dogmatic and rigid 
(unchanging), Lynch suggested looking closely at how religious communities approach doctrines 
and interpret sacred texts both in normal situations and in the context of violence and crisis.37 
Weber is widely recognised to be a strong advocate of secularism, but, for Lynch, Weber suggested 
that religious doctrines and actions must be understood in (a) specific context(s) to prevent 
generalisations and oversimplification.38  
 Similarly to Lynch, William Cavanaugh suggested approaching religion, in his case 
Christianity, as ‘not simply a set of doctrines immune to historical circumstance, but a lived 
historical experience embodied and shaped by the empirically observable action of Christians.’39 
Following this approach, this thesis employs a HoP approach to investigate the dynamics and 
process of religious doctrine in action: specifically by exploring how ‘religious agents employ 
ethical constructs to determine how to act.’40 I also examine how Muslims and Christians in Maluku 
and Mindanao use religious resources (sacred texts, personal faith, religious networks, system of 
                                                          
36 David Little, Peacemakers in Action: Profile of Religion in Conflict Resolution  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 438. 
37 Cecelia Lynch, "A Neo-Weberian Aproach to Religon in International Politics," International Theory 1, no. 3 (2009): 
382. 
38 Ibid., 383. 
39 Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, 5. 
40 Lynch, "A Neo-Weberian Aproach to Religon in International Politics," 383-84. 
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communications, education and training, schools or madrasah, and other religious institutions) 
through concrete actions to initiate local ceasefires, undertake reconciliation, run peace education 
training, organise interfaith dialogues, and provide trauma healing.  
I should highlight that reversing the secular position of scholars such as Jurgensmeyer does 
not mean that I argue that religion is wholly positive concerning its effects on conflict. Rather than 
attempt to engage such a debate, this thesis aims to increase our understanding of religion though 
the development and application of an interpretive and analytical framework to examine the 
activities of religious peacebuilders. Through this approach, this project can enhance the 
understanding of the role of religion in peacebuilding processes.  
 
1.3  Why Maluku and Mindanao?  
As I discuss in detail in Chapter Three (Methods and Cases), in order to answer the question that is 
posited in this research, I employ two case studies: Maluku (Indonesia) and Mindanao (the 
Philippines). Although the conflicts in Maluku and Mindanao are different in nature, where the 
people in Maluku suffer because of a conflict that is primarily ethno-religious, whereas Mindanao is 
affected by a secessionist conflict, one cannot deny that religion has played a significant role in both 
conflicts. Because the principal objective of this research is to understand the role of religion in 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes, the different nature of the two conflicts might help 
to understand the similarities and dissimilarities of the actions and activities that religious 
peacebuilders’ have undertaken to deal with these dissimilar contexts.  
Secondly, both conflicts are at different stages of ‘conflict escalation and de-escalation’.41 In 
broad terms, the conflict in Mindanao is situated between the peacekeeping and the peacemaking 
phases,42 whereas the conflict in Maluku is in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase. This fact 
enriches the prospects for building an understanding of the role of religious peacebuilders in 
different conflict settings and dynamics.    
Thirdly, both conflicts are occuring in Southeast Asia, a region that is more violent, more 
potentially fragmented, and more prone to political and religious violence than at any time in its 
post-colonial era.43 In order words, understanding the two case studies is central to peace and 
security discussions in the Southeast Asia region.  
 
                                                          
41 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution  (Cambirdge: Polity, 2005), 
11. 
42 When I was in the process of submitting this thesis, GPH and MILF signed the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Bangsamoro. Mindanao, therefore, case can be included in post conflict peacebuilding phase.  
43Damien Kingsbury, "Introduction," in Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, ed. 
Damien Kingsbury (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2005).  
10 
 
1.4  Thesis Outline  
I structure this thesis into eight chapters. This first chapter is devoted to introducing this research by 
outlining the research problem and question, discussing the theoretical framework, including the use 
of the concepts of ambivalence of the sacred and the hermeneutic of peace, and briefly introducing 
the cases.  
 Chapter 2 includes an assessment and review of the prevailing research that is related to this 
thesis. First, I discuss the complex relation between International Relations (IR), peace and conflict 
resolution studies (PCRS) and religion. I demonstrate that IR and PCRS scholars began to criticize 
the traditional theories in IR and PCRS for their inadequacy to explain the re-emergence of religion 
in public life. In the second part of Chapter 2, I identify and discuss three dominant perspectives on 
religion, peace, and conflict: the secular-atheist, religious conflict, and religion and peacebuilding 
perspectives. Finally, I assess the current research on the conflicts in Maluku and Mindanao. In 
post-conflict Maluku, scholars have begun to consider the role of culture, emotion, and subjectivity 
including religion in peacebuilding. In Mindanao research on the role of religion in peacebuilding, 
in contrast to Maluku, has been substantial. Nonetheless, I found that the analysis in the existing 
research of how religious resources could be used to contribute to peacebuilding is not fully 
developed.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss the methods and cases that I employed in this research. Briefly, the 
thesis is methodologically qualitative. Library research, in-depth interviews, and participant 
observation are its foundation; and the multiple case studies approach is employed. In the second 
section of Chapter 3, I also introduce the Maluku and Mindanao cases. The two conflicts have been 
extremely complex; they include a deep process of instrumentalising religion that, in turn, provides 
an opportunity to investigate how Muslims and Christians use their religion to contribute to 
peacebuilding.  
Chapter 4 includes an analysis of the role of official religious institutions in Maluku 
representing Protestants, specifically, the Protestant Church of Maluku or Gereja Protestan in 
Maluku (GPM), and Muslims, namely, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU), and Muhammadiyah. Whereas, in the existing literature, scholars tend to either blame the 
official religious institutions for their involvement in stirring conflict or overlook the roles that 
religious institutions play in conflict, my research found that both Muslims and Christians played 
pivotal roles in peacebuilding. They became involved in the process of the HoP, which consists of 
efforts to identify theological arguments and commitment from the sacred texts and religious 
narratives to engage in peacebuilding. Christians pursued a formal approach of theological reform 
to justify theologically their engagement in peacebuilding through the hierarchical and structural 
religious institution of the GPM. In contrast, Muslims did not have a unified religious institution 
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and pursued the HoP through a less formal approach. Religious leaders of Muslim organisations 
engaged in the process of the hermeneutic of peace where they found theological justification to 
terminate the conflict and become involved in peacebuilding processes.  
In Chapter 5, I investigate three micro-cases that demonstrate how unofficial religious 
institutions in Maluku contributed to peacebuilding. In contrast to the secularist perspectives, which 
include a portrayal of religion as rigid, doctrinarian, and inflexible, the case studies revealed that the 
unofficial religious institutions in Maluku worked for peace in pluralistic ways. For example, they 
engaged in peacebuilding through different institutions (e.g., interfaith organisations and the 
women’s movement). The unofficial religious organisations were also extremely flexible in 
adopting a secular perspective and the techniques that are commonly used in secular NGOs. 
Moreover, religions offered a religious understanding that operated in tandem with local custom 
(adat) to promote peaceful coexistence between people across religious lines.  
Chapter 6 is devoted to analysing the contribution of religion to peacebuilding in the 
intractable conflict in Mindanao. In that chapter, I present three micro-cases, namely the Silsilah 
Dialogue Movement (SDM), the Nalapaan Space for Peace, and the religious discourse of peace in 
a rebel movement, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The three micro-cases demonstrated 
how, in the middle of a “religious conflict,” religion could become part of the HoP to motivate and 
energise its adherents to identify possible avenues to engage in peacebuilding. The religious 
communities in Mindanao could re-diagnose the prevalent problem of the conflict, which is mutual 
distrust and animosity between Christians and Muslims. They worked tirelessly to fix broken 
relationships and break the barriers of segregation at the grassroots level as fundamental 
requirements to build a sustainable peace.  
In Chapter 7, I present the possible theoretical contributions to understand religion and 
peacebuilding and specifically develop further David Little’s HoP theory, which demonstrates how 
religion could be used for peacebuilding. This involves dealing with internal struggles and creative 
tensions within religious communities (comprising persons or organisations) in the discovery of 
religious justifications from sacred texts, rituals, and traditions, to support their involvement in 
peacebuilding activities. In that chapter, I also demonstrate that developing further John Paul 
Lederach’s pyramid of leadership to identify “a new place” for religion in peacebuilding among the 
various actors and levels of local, national, and international is part of the process of the HoP.  
I conclude the thesis in Chapter 8 by outlining the principal arguments and the significant 
findings of the research that demonstrate the substantial contribution of religion to peacebuilding in 
Maluku and Mindanao. I end that chapter by identifying the limitations of this research and making 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Religious Peacebuildrs: Review and Assessment 
 
 
This chapter includes an assessment of the relevant political science literature, theoretical 
frameworks, and methodological approaches that scholars have deployed to understand the place of 
religion in peace and conflict. Such an assessment helps to define the position of this research 
within the existing academic work and identifies “academic lacunas” as a point of departure for this 
research. In turn, it helps to further contextualise the research question for this research: how 
Muslims and Christians use religious resources to contribute to peacebuilding in conflict-torn 
societies in Southeast Asia.  
The chapter consists of two parts. The first part consists of a general overview of the existing 
literature on the position of religion in peace and conflict discourses. I divide the first part of this 
chapter into two sections. Section 1 includes an overview of the complexity of the relationship 
between religion and international relations (IR) and peace and conflict resolution studies (PCRS). 
Religion has long been part of IR and PCRS. Yet, several factors in IR and PCRS have beeb 
undermining the recognition of religion in these fields. I reveal the reasons why mainstream IR and 
PCRS tend to ignored religion. Subsequently, I investigate relatively new and critical academic 
developments within IR and PCRS that present the opportunity to consider religion as a force in 
resolving conflicts. In Section 2, I examine three perspectives on the relationship between religion, 
violence, and peace. Identifying those perspectives is crucial to position this research within the 
broader ambit of the prevailing direction of IR and PCRS research. 
 In the second part, I turn to assess the existing academic works on the conflicts in Maluku and 
Mindanao. I investigate how studies in the literature position religion in their analysis. I divide the 
second part of the literature review into two sections, based on my case studies on Maluku and 
Mindanao. In general, I found that a secular paradigm provides critical manners of understanding 
the complex reality of the conflict in Maluku and Mindanao. Yet, the secular paradigm, which still 
influences scholarly work on Maluku and Mindanao, tends to approach religion only as a negative 
factor in peace and conflict. However, in the case of Maluku, the changing dynamics of conflict 
allowed some scholars to begin to perceive the potential contribution of religion to peacebuilding, 
although the research on this issue is still underdeveloped. The amount of research that has been 
conducted to examine the contribution of religion to peacebuilding in Mindanao exceeds that which 
has been conducted on the same topic in Maluku. Yet, as I explain in detail in that section, this 
research could contribute to overcoming the shortfalls of the existing research.  
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2.1  Multiple Perspectives on Religion, Peace, and Violence 
2.1.1 Religion in International Relations and Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies  
International Relations (IR), as a distinct academic discipline, is generally understood to have been 
formally institutionalised in 1919 with the establishment of the Department of International Politics 
in Aberystwyth University in Wales.44 However, Thomas and Lynch have suggested that, along 
with much conventional IR theory, the formative period of IR is traceable to the much earlier post-
Westphalia and Enlightenment periods.45 During those periods, IR’s relationship with religion was 
complex. On the one hand, theological reflection contributed to the development of IR through 
Christian ethics by, for example, shaping IR’s discourse on “just war,” pacifism, and the 
development of international law.46 In addition, the construction of (classical) realism, a 
mainstream perspective in IR, was influenced by St. Augustine, a pivotal Christian thinker.47 In the 
contemporary history of IR, scholars claimed that the principal thinkers of the English School in 
IR,48 such as Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, belong to the Christian realists49 grouping that 
partly contributed to developing an alternative theory of IR, linking metaphysics and international 
theory, thereby synthesizing faith and reason.50  
On the other hand, history has shown that dominant discourses and perspectives within IR 
have routinely suppressed religion. According to Fox and Sandler, IR scholars have shown greater 
reluctance to consider religion in their analysis than other social scientists have.51 The other social 
science disciplines, they have argued further, began to reconsider religion in their approaches much 
                                                          
44 Andrew J William, Amelia Hafield, and Simon Rofe, International History and International Relations  (New York and 
London: Routledge 2012), 10; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 34. 
45 See Scott M. Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously," in Religion in International Relations: The 
Return to Exile, ed. Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Cecelia Lynch, 
"Dogma, Praxis and Religious Perspectives on Multiculturalism," in Religion in International Relations: The Return from 
Exile, ed. Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
46 Harriet A. Harris, "Theological Reflections on Religious Resurgence and International Stability: A Look at Protestant 
Evangelicalism," in Religion and International Relations, ed. K. R. Dark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 24. 
47 St. Augustine’s thoughts were introduced into IR by a Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, who greatly 
contributed to development of realism in the twentieth century. See Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgance of 
Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century  (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 57. 
48 For further reading on the English School, see, for example, Timothy Dunne, Inventing International Society: A 
History of the English School  (New York: St. Martin's Press in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1998); 
Barry Buzan, "The English School: An Underexploited Resource in Ir," Review of International Studies 27, no. 3 (2001). 
49See Eric Patterson, Christianity and Power Politics Today: Christian Realism and Contemporary Political Dilemmas  
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2008).  
50Adrian Pabst, "The Secularism of Post-Secularity: Religion, Realism, and the Revival of Grand Theory in Ir," Review of 
International Studies 38, no. 5 (2012).  
51 Jonathan Fox and Scmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006), 11. 
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earlier than IR.52 Dominant and conventional understandings in IR cannot explain the fact that 
religion has become increasingly prominent in international politics and national security in recent 
years.53 Rather, innovators such as Thomas,54 Fox and Sandler,55 Dick,56 Lynch,57 Harris,58 Petito 
and Hatzopoulus,59 Pettman,60 Hurd,61 and Haynes62 have begun to engage religion in IR with 
greater seriousness.  
At least four inter-connected explanations are available for the reluctance in the IR field to 
consider religion. First, the initial history of IR was accompanied by, to borrow Thomas’s term, a 
political myth of the Westphalia settlement.63 According to the political myth, religion clearly 
brought intolerance, cruelty, hatred, and political turmoil into international public life.64 Thomas 
argued that ‘the establishment of the modern state, the privatisation of religion and secularisation of 
politics arose to limit religion’s domestic influence… and end the bloody and destructive role of 
religion in international relations.’65 Furthermore, religion, ‘must be disciplined by the state—
privatized, marginalized, and nationalized—as a form of order and social cohesion, or religion must 
be overcome by a global or cosmopolitan ethic as the basis of the international order.’66 Joining 
Thomas’s critique, Lynch proposed the idea of the Enlightenment’s presumption to explain the 
rejection of religion in IR. The intellectual development during the Enlightenment, according to 
Lynch, included the assumptions that religion promoted romanticism, ignorance, and backwardness, 
that it was dogmatic, intolerant, and unchanging, and that it potentially promoted inferiority, 
coercion, and violence. Consequently, in the post-Westphalia settlement and during the 
                                                          
52 Ibid. 
53 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations  (Princeton, N.J. ; Woodstock :: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 1. 
54 Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously; The Global Resurgance of Religion and the 
Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century. 
55Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations.  
56 K. R Dark, "Large-Scale Religious Change and World Politics," in Religion and International Relations, ed. K. R Dark 
(New York: Palgrave, 2000). 
57 Lynch, "Dogma, Praxis and Religious Perspectives on Multiculturalism; "A Neo-Weberian Aproach to Religon in 
International Politics." 
58Harris, "Theological Reflections on Religious Resurgence and International Stability: A Look at Protestant 
Evangelicalism."  
59 Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, "The Return from Exile: An Introduction," in Religion in International Relations, 
ed. Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003). 
60 Ralph Pettman, "In Pursuit of World Peace: Modernism, Sacralism, and Cosmopiety " Global Change, Peace and 
Security 22, no. 2 (2010). 
61 Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations. 
62Jeffrey Haynes, "Religion and International Relations in the 21st Century: Conflict or Co-Operation?," Third World 
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2006); "Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, 
Nigeria and Cambodia."  
63 Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously," 24. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid.  
66The Global Resurgance of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the 
Twenty-First Century, 54. 
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Enlightenment, religion lost its political authority in international politics.67 The Westphalia 
settlement changed the international political landscape, and, arguably, produced a political 
theology that influenced IR considerably.68 In such circumstances, imagining that religion would be 
properly taken into account within IR scholarship is extremely difficult. 
The second reason for the marginalisation of religion in IR is that, like other social sciences, 
IR has been influenced by modernization and secularization theories that overlook the role of 
religion in public and political life.69 The rejection of religion in IR, according to Harzopoulos and 
Petito, is embedded in IR’s genetic code, because IR was constructed during a period of European 
history that was marked by the end of the Wars of Religion.70 The secularization paradigm has 
become a central epistemological ingredient of the modernist-rationalist tradition of knowledge that 
strongly rejects knowing by believing. Consequently, it includes the view that the religious 
narrative is unscientific, metaphysical, or even superstitious71 and that the world will be ‘controlled 
through reason, science, technology and bureaucratic rationality… [This] leaves out considerations 
of the religious, the spiritual or the sacred.’72  
The third explanation for the strong rejection of religion in IR is the fact that realist, neo-
realist, or structural-realist perspectives have dominated IR.73 Those perspectives focus on material 
power capabilities, economics, and strategic interaction, and leave little room for religion as a 
possible organizing power in international circumstances.74 Fox and Sandler add that IR is perhaps 
the most Western-centric of the social science disciplines in which religious discourse is considered 
inappropriate.75  
Lastly, behaviourism and the use of quantitative methodology have greatly influenced the 
study of IR, leading to the strong rejection of religion in that field.76 In this context, because it is 
                                                          
67 The Treaty of Westphalia changed the medieval universalism that regulated intra-state and inter-state affairs into 
the “modern diplomacy” that was marked by the monopoly of the nation-state for conducting inter-state affairs. See 
Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian, ed. Sustainable Diplomacies, Sustaining Global Hope: Sovereignty, 
Power and Transformation of Diplomacy (England: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), 6.   
68Thomas, The Global Resurgance of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the 
Soul of the Twenty-First Century, 55.  
69 The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the 
Twenty-First Century  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 50. 
70 Fabio Petito and Hatzopoulos, "The Return from Exile: An Introduction," 1. 
71 Pettman, "In Pursuit of World Peace: Modernism, Sacralism, and Cosmopiety " 198. 
72 Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously," 22. 
73 The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the 
Twenty-First Century, 55-56; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 10. 
74 Thomas, The Global Resurgance of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the 
Soul of the Twenty-First Century, 55; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 10. 
75 Bringing Religion into International Relations, 9. 
76 Ibid; Thomas, The Global Resurgance of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for 
the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, 59-60. 
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almost impossible to quantify religion, most IR academics have tended to exclude religion from 
consideration.  
To some extent, the relative neglect of religion also applies to PCRS. One of the principal 
reasons for the establishment of PCRS as a special field of studies was the critique of the inability 
of IR and of international mechanisms to prevent the eruption of the Second World War. However, 
the “founding fathers” of PCRS77 could not entirely escape from the established paradigm of IR. 
Whereas figures such as Kenneth Boulding and Elise Bjorn-Hansen came from a religious 
tradition,78 which had a considerable influence on their decision to become involved in PCRS, they 
often did not fully integrate religion into PCRS as an academic discipline. Scholars also viewed 
PCRS as a product of the secular tradition of modernist social scientific knowledge, which has 
tended to overlook religion. In addition, as Ramsbotham et al. noted, the founders of PCRS 
assumed the Western-centric view that conflict resolution was a universal, one-size-fits-all approach 
that applies across cultures and societies.79  
Peace and conflict resolution scholars and practitioners have only turned their attention to the 
question of religion during the past two decades or so. Ramsbotham proposed four historical stages 
of the development of conflict resolution and peace studies: precursors (1918–1945), foundations 
(1945–1965), consolidation (1965–1985), and reconstruction (1985–2005).80 The question of the 
possible roles that religion might play only emerged “implicitly” during the last stage 
(reconstruction). This is called “an implicit development,” because the academic debates, as I 
illustrate below, did not addressed directly and explicitly the role of religion in conflict resolution. 
Rather, the debates simply helped to create opportunities to include possible roles for religion in 
issues relating to conflict resolution.  
At least three pivotal intellectual developments have helped to create room for discussing 
religion in IR and PCRS. The first is “Track Two diplomacy”; the second, is the idea of 
“peacebuilding from below”; and the third is the discussion of the role of culture in conflict 
resolution. 
 
(1) From Track-Two to Faith-Based Diplomacy  
For an extremely extended period, the state and its associated institutions have been regarded as the 
only authentic institution for maintaining and guaranteeing peace and order. This position has been 
                                                          
77 Kenneth Boulding, Elise Bjorn-Hansen, Johan Galtung and John Burton are among the scholars who laid down the 
foundation for PCRS, see Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 39-47. 
78 They were members of the Society of Friend (Quakers). See ibid., 40. 
79 Ibid., 302. 
80 Ibid., 34-35. 
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justified by mainstream orthodox international scholarship.81 Consequently, formal approaches to 
maintaining national and international peace and order have become a widely accepted norm.  
However, in the last three decades, scholars and practitioners began to advocate the 
importance of the informal processes of diplomacy because states could not guarantee peace and 
order. In the name of the monopoly on legitimate force, states often became the source of violent 
conflicts, mass atrocities, and human rights violations. As a result, some academics began to offer 
new avenues to address the limitations of the state. One of the examples on this endeavour is the 
introduction of the concept of “Track Two diplomacy” by Joseph Montville and William D. 
Davidson in 1981, as an alternative to “Track One diplomacy.”82 
The concept of Track-Two diplomacy includes the assumption that diplomacy should not be 
monopolized by state-officials only (Track One diplomacy), but should also be extended to 
unofficial diplomacy (Track Two), which is conducted by non-state actors, such as professional and 
non-governmental organisations.83 Following Montville and Davidson’s publication, a substantial 
number of scholarly works have developed the idea of Track Two.84 Diamond and McDonald 
elaborated the idea of Track Two diplomacy further by outlining multi-track diplomacy: nine 
separate tracks of diplomacy, including religion.85  
While scholars developed the notions of Tracks One and Two, major political upheavals 
with religious dimensions occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. This provoked IR scholars and 
professional diplomats to consider religion as one of the missing factors of statecraft.86 The 
advocacy for the critical role of religion in politics and diplomacy eventually led to creating the 
concept of faith-based diplomacy, which incorporated the concept of Track Two diplomacy.87  
                                                          
81 Vanessa Wyeth and Charles Call, Building States to Build Peace  (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008). 
82Joseph V. Montville and William D. Davidson, "Foreign Policy According to Freud," Foreign Policy 1981.  
83 It should be noted here that diplomacy was commonly practiced long before the establishment of the modern 
diplomatic system. Even during the modern diplomatic system era, non-state, or sub-state actors have been able to 
practice diplomacy despite serious attempts by nation-states to eliminate them. These attempts may be called 
paradiplomacy. For further explanation, see Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian, "Sustaining Global Hope: 
Sovereignty, Power and the Transformaton of Diplomacy," in Sustainable Diplomacy: Studies in Diplomacy and 
International Relations, ed. Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 12.   
84 John W. McDonald Jr and Diane B. Bendahmane, eds., Conflict Resolution: Tract Two Diplomacy (Washington, DC: 
Foriegn Service Institute, 1987); Josesp V Montville, ed. Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Book, 1989). John Burton, a founding father of PCRS, is one of the contributors of the book. See John 
W. Burton, "Track-Two Diplomacy: An Alternative to Power Politics," in Conflict Resolution: Track-Two Diplomacy, ed. 
John W.  McDonald Jr and Diane B. Bendahmane (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, 1987); Shai Feldman and 
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The conceptualisation of faith-based diplomacy was strengthened by successful cases where 
religious actors showed that they could prevent and resolve conflict. Some noticeable achievements 
of faith-based diplomacy were the role of the Vatican in mediating the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
196288 and in preventing war between Chile and Argentina over the 1978 Beagle Channel dispute.89 
Another successful case of faith-based diplomacy was the role of the Catholic lay community called 
Sant’Egidio, which played critical roles in mediating conflict in Mozambique, Uganda, Burundi, 
Algeria, and Guatemala.90  
In short, the concepts of Track Two and multi-track diplomacy might be seen as a 
complementary rather than truly alternative to Track-One because states and their associated 
institutions are still regarded as the most important agents in pursuing peace and maintaining world 
order. Yet, this is a significant development in IR, where the concept of faith-based diplomacy can 
be subsumed under the concept of Track Two diplomacy.  
 
(2) Peacebuilding from Below 
As was discussed above, states and their associated institutions have acted as central players in 
pursuing peace, order, and security. Although the UN’s An Agenda for Peace includes the 
recognition of the role that non-governmental organisations might play,91 it seems reasonable to 
argue that the big players in New York and Geneva make most decisions about peace and security.  
The formal state-centric approach to peacebuilding could be called “top-down peacebuilding” 
because everything is discussed, designed, and even implemented by the state apparatus and 
international and regional organisations, which have shown limited consideration for input by the 
people who are involved in the conflict. In numerous cases, the manner in which formal 
peacebuilding programmes are conducted tends to lead disputants to perceive resolving conflict and 
building peace as the business of outsiders, rather than their own. The idea of “peacebuilding from 
below” has emerged in response to this situation. 
One of the most prominent scholars to champion the idea of peacebuilding from below is John 
Paul Lederach. Working as a scholar-practitioner within the Mennonite tradition, which shares 
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many of the values and ideas of the Quakers, Lederach emphasized the importance of engaging and 
respecting local and indigenous cultures and considering them as critical peacebuilding resources. 
Thus, Lederach stated the following:  
The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation 
must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural 
resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through 
which we do not primarily ‘see’ the setting and the people in it as the ‘problem’ 
and the outsider as the ‘answer’. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of 
transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the 
setting.92 
 
Peacebuilding from below implies fostering a bottom up approach to peacebuilding by 
involving disputants in all peacebuilding processes and using local resources from within conflict 
settings.  
Lederach expanded his ideas of “peacebuilding from below” by identifying three levels of 
leadership: (1) top-level leadership, (2) middle-range leadership, and (3) grassroots leadership. 
Leaders from each level should work hand-in-hand, comprehensively and continuously aware of 
their strengths and weaknesses. Lederach included religious leaders together with political and 
military leaders at the top-level of leadership. They are high profile public figures who have 
substantial power in conflict settings.93 In short, the discourse of “peacebuilding from below” 
presents an opportunity for discussing the possible role that religious actors and institutions might 
play.  
 
(3) The Question of Culture 
Another critical development that helps to reveal the potential contribution of religion in conflict 
resolution is the recent discussion about the importance of culture in conflict resolution. Religion, in 
this context, is seen as part of local culture, which can be used as a resource to resolve conflict. For 
a long period, cultural considerations were marginalized, if not perceived as an irrelevant factor in 
peace and conflict resolution discourses. For example, Burton, one of the founders of conflict 
resolution, highlighted the importance of a “universal human needs approach,” which tends to 
ignore the central role of culture in resolving conflict. Burton argued that  
[c]onflict resolution has a focus on frustrated human needs. Such needs are a part of 
human inheritance and common to all people, regardless of culture. It must be 
assumed, therefore, that analytical processes, which seek to reveal those needs that 
are held in common, are applicable to all cultures.94  
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The new generation of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners have criticized Burton’s 
approach to conflict.95 The questions of culture or difference partly emerged as a critique of 
Burton’s argument, which is rooted in a Western tradition of knowledge, whereby conflict 
resolution is treated as a universal panacea and a one-size-fits-all solution. This new stream in 
conflict resolution thought includes the argument that a universal framework for resolving conflict 
does not exist. Different people from different cultural backgrounds perceive conflict differently. 
This, in turn, leads to different avenues in which people might resolve conflicts. Culture leads to the 
construction of worldviews that shape the meaning, ideas, thoughts, behaviours, attitudes, actions, 
and reactions towards conflict. Recognising and considering different socio-cultural contexts, 
therefore, becomes critical in conflict resolution.96  
Nowadays, numerous scholars argue that in conflict resolution culture ‘is in the end the most 
important issue of all.’97 This recognition, however, is not as simple as that statement. As Brigg 
noted, the acceptance of culture in conflict resolution results from a long historical process—a 
combination of bitter practical experiences and intellectual arguments to convince academia and 
policy makers that culture is a considerable factor that should be accounted for in this field.98  
In this regard, the recognition of the pivotal role of culture in conflict resolution has presented 
an opportunity for discussing the role of religion in peacebuilding. Religion can be a central part of 
culture in many contexts. In numerous societies, culture blends with religious beliefs and rituals that 
constitute local custom. Some scholars have discussed culture and religion as inseparable resources 
for resolving conflict and building trust and reconciliation.99 In other words, the discussion of the 
critical role of culture in conflict resolution contributes to opening a larger space to discuss the 
potential role that religion might play in peacebuilding. 
 
2.1.2 Perspectives on Religion, Violence, and Peace 
Having discussed the indirect academic developments of religion within IR and PCRS, I now turn 
to the contemporary scholarly debate on religion, violence, and peace. The literature on religion and 
violence is not a new topic in social research. However, after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent 
“war on terror” in Iraq and Afghanistan, the literature on religion, peace, and violence increased 
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considerably.100 For the purposes of this project, these academic endeavours can be grouped into 
three broad categories: the secularist-atheist perspective, the religious violence perspective, and the 
religious peacebuilding perspective. 
The rise of (ethno-) religious conflicts after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, together with the 
re-emergence of religious radical fundamentalism in several parts of the world has led the so-called 
new atheists to produce scholarly works on the role of religion in public life.101 Sam Harris102, 
Richard Dawkins,103 and Christopher Hitchens104 are major public figures within this group. With 
somewhat different emphases, these authors promoted not only the separation of church and state 
but also, and more importantly, regarded religion as a real threat for the future of human civilization 
and argued, therefore, that it should be overcome.  
Harris, for example, began his book by describing what he took to be the irony of a suicide 
terrorist bomber killing innocent people without feeling guilty. Moreover, his family is even proud 
of his accomplishment and believes that he has gone to paradise, while also sending all the victims 
to Hell for eternity.105 Harris explained how dangerous religion is in the current situation:  
There seems, however, to be a problem with some of our most cherished beliefs 
about the world: they are leading us, inexorably, to kill one another. A glance at 
history, or at the pages of any newspaper, reveals that the ideas which divide one 
group of human beings from another, only unite them in slaughter, generally 
have their root in religions. It seems that if our species ever eradicates itself 
through war, it will not be because it was written in the stars but because it was 
written in our books; it is what we do with words like “God” “paradise” and 
“sin” in the present that will determine our future.106  
 
Furthermore, Harris argued that intolerance is intrinsic to all religious traditions, which cause 
war, torture, killing, and human rights abuses, and that, therefore, there should be no room for 
religion among future generations.107  
In addition to Harris, Hitchens offered the very bold conclusion, which is reflected in the title 
of his book, that religion is dangerous because it “poisons everything.” To support his argument 
Hitchens even asserted that Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., one of the leaders of civil rights movement 
in the United States, is not a Christian. Hitchens argued that Rev. King was not a pious Christian 
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because his civil rights advocacy through non-violence contradicts the basic teachings of 
Christianity in the Bible, which contains violence from cover to cover.108 Conversely, in Chapter 
17, Hitchens argued that Hitler and Stalin are religious simply because they preach totalitarianism 
and absolutism. The two ideas, according to Hitchens, are rooted in religion; therefore, the political 
catastrophes that were caused by Hitler and Stalin derived from religious conceptions.109  
In short, the secular-atheist perspective presents arguments by referring to contemporary 
evidence of religious violence, which occur in almost every corner of the world. This leads 
contributors to this perspective to conclude that religions are dangerous and the future of humanity 
depends on serious efforts to eliminate religion from social and political agendas.  
This perspective is seriously mistaken in two respects. First, it is undoubtedly true that 
religion causes a number of problems for humanity, as I discussed above. However, those holding 
this perspective should not so easily neglect the fact that religion has also contributed substantially 
to peaceful and non-violent coexistence in numerous communities worldwide. Second, the focus of 
the secular-atheist perspective is to criticize religion by showing that it is the most dangerous factor 
in human history. This perspective ignores the fact that secular-atheist leaders and regimes 
contributed to generate major destructive world events, such as wars, famines, and poverty.  
The second perspective is the religious violence perspective. The academic works of scholars 
such as McTernan,110 May,111 Ross,112 Clayton,113 Selengut,114 Al-Rasheed and Shterin,115 
Gluck,116 Kimball,117 and Juergensmeyer,118 can be grouped into this category. Unlike the secular-
atheist perspective, which includes the perception of religion as the principal source of world 
problems, this group carefully examines the role of religion in social and political life by combining 
theological, political, and sociological approaches. The principal research concern of this group is to 
seek a rational explanation as to why the followers of the major religions engage in violence. 
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Kimball, for example, argued that five serious problems in the major religions lead to violence and 
destruction: (1) absolute truth claims; (2) blind obedience; (3) establishing an “ideal” time; (4) the 
end justifies any means; and (5) declaring a holy war. Kimball argued the following:  
In every religion, truth claims constitute the foundation on which the entire 
structure rests. However, when particular interpretations of these claims become 
propositions requiring uniform assent and are treated as rigid doctrines, the 
likelihood of corruption in that tradition rises exponentially. Such tendencies are 
the first harbingers of the evil that may follow.119  
Throughout his book, Kimball made the point that that religious believers should avoid these 
“five warning signs” by as an avenue to prevent religion from leading to destructive conditions in 
society.  
Another scholar in this group, Juergensmeyer, argued that religions have their own inherent 
problem, that is, a propensity to violence, leading him to present the concept of “cosmic war.”120 He 
calls it cosmic because it is “larger than life.”121 Cosmic war evokes “great battles in the past” and it 
relates to the “metaphysical conflict between good and evil.”122 Before discussing contemporary 
forms of religious violence, he argues for the need to recognize violence in religious symbolism and 
tradition.123 Jurgensmayer gives convincing examples. The brutal martyrdom of Hussain in the 
Shi’ite tradition, the death of Jesus Christ, the sacrifice of Guru Tegh Bahadur in Sikhism, and the 
wars in the Hindu Epic are among numerous examples that are used to justify contemporary acts of 
religious violence as just wars, to destroy evil, to or to uphold the dhumma (order). Juergensmayer 
goes further to state that ‘they have been justified and thereby exonerated as part of a religious 
template that is even larger than myth and history. They are elements of a ritual scenario that makes 
it possible for the people involved to experience safely the drama of cosmic war.’124 
 
This second group of scholars has made considerable efforts to challenge the atheist 
perspective, which very often makes sweeping generalizations about all religions, without making 
any qualifications or highlighting any exceptions, as the one and only source of political turmoil in 
the world. Kimball’s approach to the warning signs of religious violence, for example, has helped to 
challenge the oversimplifications about religion that the first group had proposed. Setting up criteria 
(five warning signs) makes distinguishing between “bad” and “good” religion possible, rather than 
simply assuming that all religion is bad. 
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 In other parts of his book, Juergensmeyer also identified that one of the root causes of 
religious violence in numerous parts of the world is the serious problem of the loss of faith in 
secular nationalism. After the Second World War, many newly independent countries subscribed to 
the secular nationalist ideology because secular nationalism included the promise to people that 
they would enjoy political freedom, social justice, equality, and prosperity. However, in numerous 
cases the government of the new emerging states failed to deliver that promise; numerous people 
even perceived governments as “morally vacuous and politically corrupt.”125 This type of argument 
also helps to identify reasons why in specific contexts, religion can be used to mobilise violence. 
However, I argue that the second group of scholars’ works show that the issue of religion and 
violence remains their focus: they have not yet directly touched upon the roles that religion and 
peacebuilding might play.  
The third grouping of academic endeavour centres on the religious peacebuilding perspective. 
For the last 10 years, research interest about religion, peacebuilding, and peacemakers has grown. 
These intellectual endeavours have challenged both the secular perspective, in which religion is 
seen as always having affected humanity negatively, and the religious-violence perspective, which 
has not yet included fully the possibility that religion might play constructive roles in peacemaking. 
Scholars such as Gopin,126 Abu-Nimer,127 Appleby,128 Smock,129 Coward and Smith,130 
David Little,131 Johnston,132 Jeffrey Haynes133 might be included into this group. Most of their 
contributions appear in “edited books” instead of single-authored works, except for the work of 
Gopin, Appleby, and Abu-Nimer—perhaps providing an indication that this type of research is still 
in its formative stage.  
One of the best contributions in this endeavour is Appleby’s book, the Ambivalence of the 
Sacred,134 which offered a valuable framework for thinking about religion and peacebuilding. In his 
seminal book, for example, unlike the first and the second perspectives, Appleby gave a balanced 
perspective on the relation between religion, violence, and peace. Appleby considered religion as a 
double-edged sword, evoking this through what he terms “the ambivalence of the sacred.”  
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Appleby gave ample evidence that religion plays a pivotal function in societies. On the one 
hand, notorious catastrophes have occurred in every corner of the world where religions are used to 
justify torture, genocide, and other human rights violations. On the other hand, in numerous cases, 
religions have greatly contributed to resolving and mediating protracted conflicts. The Community 
of Sant’Egidio,135 for example, played a critical role in mediating violent conflicts in Mozambique, 
Uganda, Burundi, Algeria, and Guatemala.136 Another noticeable example of positive religious 
work in conflict resolution was the essential engagement of the African Churches in the process that 
was set up by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa. Furthermore, 
Samdech Gosanda, who belongs to the Buddhist tradition in Southeast Asia, has also influenced 
conflict resolution work in Cambodia.137  
Appleby suggested using the ambivalence of religion as an opportunity for religious 
peacebuilding. Efforts to utilise ambivalence as a source of peacebuilding, according to Appleby, 
largely rely on the quality of the leadership of religious leaders to interpret religious texts, precepts, 
rituals and ethics in contextual hermeneutics, so they can be used to mobilise the religious 
community for peacebuilding.138  
In short, Appleby’s work is an excellent illustration of how analyses in PCRS are becoming 
nuanced by linking the ambivalence of religion to the potential role of religion for peacebuilding. 
Arguably, although the religious peacebuilding perspective is a relatively new development in 
social science, the existing literature has begun, to some extent, to provoke new debates among 
conflict resolution scholars and practitioners to engage seriously with the significant contribution of 
religion in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.  
This literature of the third group, however, suffers from two problems. Firstly, within the 
international political context (the end of the Cold War, followed by a sharp increase of ethno-
religious conflict, and the 9/11 attacks), people have tended to make sweeping generalisations and 
celebrate the importance of religion’s role as a newly identified source of peacebuilding. 
Unfortunately, theoretical explanations, classifications, and clarifications of the context, scope, 
scale, and types of conflict are inadequate and were not offered to demonstrate how religion can be 
used as a valuable asset for peacebuilding. The academic works on religious peacebuilding would 
also benefit from case studies that can offer greater detail and that can supply further and deeper 
analysis.139  
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Secondly, the research on religion and peacebuilding tends to focus heavily on the normative 
values of religion that can be utilised for conflict resolution. Of course, sacred texts are the most 
influential resource within the traditions of most world religions. Therefore, hermeneutic exercises 
to contextualise and rejuvenate the understanding of religious texts in accordance with the newest 
challenges are crucial. The contextualised interpretation of sacred texts also plays a central role in 
shaping new and peace-oriented understandings of religions for their younger adherents. However, 
emphasising only the textual dimension of religion (what is written in the sacred texts) while 
ignoring how the texts are interpreted and practiced cannot adequately capture the place and 
possibilities of religion in peacebuilding.  
To adequately understand the role of religion as a peacebuilding resource, and, indeed, to 
expand the understanding of the accompanying challenges and possibilities, examining the textual 
aspect of religion (what is written in the sacred texts) and its historical dimensions (what religious 
followers practice) becomes a critical necessity. In particular, understanding how religious 
adherents interpret, contextualise, link, and use religious resources as a concrete foundation for 
peacebuilding activities in local contexts is critical.  
 
2.2  Religion in “Religious Conflict” in Maluku and Mindanao 
2.2.1 Research on Conflict in Maluku: An Overview and Assessment  
In this section, I demonstrate that changes in conflict dynamics allow scholars to shift their 
focus, approach, and perspective to produce different understandings of conflict. I have found that 
different scholars who are studying different conflict phases represent the position of religion in 
conflict and peace differently. Specifically, the research focus on Maluku has shifted from scholars 
who focused their research on the early phase of conflict to those who conducted research in a post-
conflict situation. Based on the groupings that I outlined in the last section, the mainstream 
scholarly works on conflict can be grouped into the religion and violence perspective. The scholars 
who subscribed to it tended to denounce (the politicisation of) religion as one the primary factors 
that contributes the conflict, while they ignored the role of religion in peacebuilding. In contrast, the 
academic work on post-conflict situations can be partly subsumed under the religion and 
peacebuilding perspective. It has begun to include an appreciation of the role of culture, identity, 
emotion, and religion in its analysis. However, I found that the secular paradigm, which includes 
the presumption that religion has always negatively influenced public life, continues to overshadow 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
details see Little, Peacemakers in Action: Profile of Religion in Conflict Resolution. and  David R. Smock, Religious 
Contributions to Peacemaking  (Washington, DC USIP, 2006). 
27 
 
the research on Maluku. Consequently, the role of religion in peacebuilding, as the primary focus of 
this research, is still underdeveloped. 
 
(1) Research on the Maluku Conflict 
Since the Maluku conflict erupted in 1999, Maluku has become a social science research laboratory 
that has produced a wide range of scholarly works.140 In this section, I examine three influential 
scholarly works that constitute a considerable attempt to understand conflict in Maluku. The first is 
the work of Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, which was published 
in 2004.141 The second is John T Sidel’s book, entitled Riots, Pogroms and Jihad: Religious 
Violence in Indonesia, which was published in 2006.142 Lastly is Gerry van Klinken’s book, 
Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars.143 I found these three 
books are among the most thoughtful scholarly works that have been written in an effort to 
understand conflict in Maluku. Therefore, other scholars have widely cited and referred to them. 
Although the three books introduced different theoretical arguments and methodological 
approaches, I found that they represent the conventionally accepted wisdom in the social sciences, 
which has displayed a tendency to ignore the role of religion in conflict resolution processes or even 
simply blame religion as a (significant) factor that contributes to initiating and prolonging the 
conflict.  
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia is among the first books to be published in an 
attempt to explain ethno-religious conflict that has been sparked in specific locations in Indonesia, 
including Maluku. Using a historical institutional perspective, Bertrand identified what he termed 
critical junctures in Indonesian history.144 These include president Soeharto’s policies in the late 
1990s and his forced resignation in 1998, which presented the opportunity for renegotiating the 
relationship between political powers and ethnic groups in Indonesia.145 In the context of local 
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politics in Maluku, Bertrand saw the combination of several factors as the root cause of the conflict. 
Firstly, because Maluku is one of the provinces in Indonesia where Muslims and Christians were 
almost equal in number, an open political conflict between Muslims and Christians ensued.146 
Second, Maluku provides an example where patrimonial networks, which are based on religious 
affiliation, were used to attain positions in governmental structures as the principal resources for 
achieving social and economic purposes.147 Consequently, “religious identity played a strong role in 
the competition for positions in Maluku.”148 Bertrand explained this further:  
The Islamization of the Suharto regime in the 1990s disrupted the fragile balance 
in Maluku. Muslims gained a new sense of confidence to challenge the 
longstanding Christian dominance. Christians concomitantly felt threatened. With 
a growing fear that the government was becoming Islamized, they worried about 
losing the positions of power that ensured the security of their community.149  
 
Thus, the early stage of the transition to democracy allowed the possibility for power 
competitions between Christians and Muslims to evolve into ‘religious conflict’. 
The use of a historical institutional perspective as a theoretical approach enabled Bertrand to 
capture the development of macro-level political events during a critical time in the Indonesia’s 
transition to democracy. However, this perspective cannot allow the voices from the ground or, to 
borrow Aspinall’s term, the “foot soldiers”150 to emerge and be heard and, thus, explain why 
ordinary Muslims and Christians who were not (substantially) interested in politics became 
involved in the bloody conflict that risked their lives.  
Secondly, still regarding the first point, Bertrand’s theoretical approach might be appropriate 
for analysing the process of the instrumentalisation of religion for political purposes as the principal 
cause of the conflict. However, it fails to capture the local dynamics on the ground, where religion 
was used not only to mobilise conflict but also to organise peace, even from the very beginning of 
the conflict. In other words, Bertrand, like other scholars who are informed by the secular tradition 
of knowledge, tended to ignore the power of religion that was used for peacebuilding. 
Approximately two years after Bertrand published his book, John T. Sidel published a seminal 
book that was crucial for the understanding religious violence in Indonesia. Sidel’s work was more 
complicated than that of other scholars because it constituted an attempt to explain and identify the 
changing patterns of religious violence by analysing violent episodes in Indonesia involving riots, 
pogroms, and jihads. The term “riots” was a reference to the social unrest that occurred between 
1995–1997 in specific provincial towns and cities in Indonesia, whereas “pogroms” was a reference 
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to the religious conflict in Central Sulawesi and Maluku that occurred around 1998–2001. Finally, 
the term “Jihad” referred to the mobilisation of paramilitary forces and terrorist attacks that 
occurred from 2000 to 2005.151 Sidel attempted to explain the timing, location, protagonists, targets, 
mobilisational processes, and outcomes of those episodes of violence.152  
Sidel built his theoretical framework on the uncertainty and ambiguity of religious identity. 
He argued that “violence erupts amid heightened states of uncertainty and anxiety as to religious 
identities and their boundaries, and attendant efforts toward the (re)definition of the self and the 
(re)articulation of claims of authority.”153 Through this framework, he concluded that the changing 
place of Islam within the dynamics of structural and political power contestation in Indonesia 
produced an uncertain and ambiguous position for Islamic identity, which implied changes in how 
violence was expressed. In this regard, Sidel held that the uncertainty and ambiguity of Islamic 
identity of Muslim communities within the context of power struggles among Muslim political 
elites at the national level was the principal cause of violence and of the change from one form of 
violence to another.  
Sidel’s detailed explanation of each episode of violence in Indonesia substantially contributed 
to understanding those episodes. Yet, his thesis has limitations. His own theoretical framework 
seems to force his conclusions. In this context, he blamed only Islam, and failed, therefore, to see 
Muslims in Indonesia as constituting a complex and dynamic community rather than a monolithic 
one, where Muslims leaders and organisations played a crucial role in combating religious violence, 
radicalism, and terrorism. Sidel also overlooked the powerful movements within the Muslim 
community that promote Islamic understandings that suit national identity building under the 
“secular principle” of Pancasila (five principles), which promote equality for all Indonesian citizens 
regardless of their religious and ethnic affiliations. Sidel tended to “essentialise” religion, which in 
this context is Islam, as a monolithic community that is responsible for the riots, pogroms, and the 
jihads that occurred in Indonesia. 
Perhaps Sidel’s analysis falls short because he entirely relied on secondary data or resources. 
His macro-structural analysis prevented him from adequately reading what exactly occurred on the 
ground. In the case of Maluku, for example, blaming Muslims as the only perpetrators of conflict 
and portraying Christians as the victims does not account for critical information regarding the 
nature of the conflict. As I demonstrate in the chapter of Maluku, local Muslim leaders strived to 
find a peaceful resolution to the conflict even during its early stages. My fieldwork in Maluku also 
shows that radical Christian groups in Maluku had links to military intelligence, and that they 
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actually acted to provoke and ignite the conflict. A more balanced account might be to suggest that 
that both Muslims and Christians were perpetrators and victims at the same time. His approach also 
included an inadequate analysis of the local dynamics of religious leaders and institutions, which, to 
some degree, might have gotten involved in the conflict. However, as I demonstrate in this thesis, 
they also contributed to build peace in Maluku in numerous ways.  
In 2007, the year after Sidel published his book, Gerry van Klinken’s seminal book on 
communal violence in Indonesia was released. Informed by the dynamics of contention (DoC) 
theory, which is a new stream in the social movement tradition, Klinken sought to explain the 
episodes of communal conflicts that accompanied political change in Indonesia.154  
Using DoC theory, Klinken argued that the communal violence in Indonesia, including in 
Maluku, was part of a rational-calculative choice of political actors. This approach contrasted the 
more “traditional” approaches to collective violence, which included the argument that violence is 
irrational and emotional collective behaviour.155 Furthermore, the DoC identifies five “rational” 
processes in contentious politics: (1) identity formation; (2) escalation; (3) polarization; (4) 
mobilization; and (5) actor constitution. Klinken used the five processes not only as his theoretical 
framework but also as the structure for his book.156  
In the case of the Maluku conflict, Klinken used the “mobilization approach” to explain and 
rationalise how people were mobilised to participate in conflict in Maluku.157 Using this approach, 
Klinken concluded that a certain calculative rationality on the part of the key actors was a driving 
force in the Maluku conflict. Therefore, Klinken focused his investigations on “organisational 
activities rather than on disembodied emotions such as pride and grievance.”158 With this approach, 
Klinken pinpointed the blame on local rather than national actors as perpetrators of the conflict. 
Specifically, Klinken foregrounded the political interests of the Protestant elites in the Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) (PDI-P) and the Gereja 
Protestan in Maluku (Maluku Protestant Church) (GPM), which sought to retain political power and 
resources in a bureaucratic competition that had seemingly “been stolen” by Muslims in Maluku. 
For Klinken, this provided the rational basis for the mobilisation that led to the conflict.159 In other 
words, the violence was explained as local politics by other means.  
Klinken’s book substantially contributed to understanding why the conflict erupted in 
Maluku. However, casting local actors (the PDIP and the GPM) as key agents of the conflict came 
at a cost. Klinken tended to make sweeping generalisations by framing the GPM as a monolithic 
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religious structure. Whereas the GPM is a highly structured and hierarchical religious institution, 
this does not mean that the entire GPM structure supported the conflict. As I describe in the Chapter 
3, the different political and theological perspectives that exist within the GPM led to different 
attitudes and actions toward conflict. Klinken did not capture the internal dynamics of the GPM 
and, as a result, missed the opportunity to consider the extent to which elements of the GPM could 
act as resources to support peacebuilding. My research fills this gap by providing evidence that 
religious institutions, including the GPM, have contributed to the peacebuilding process in Maluku. 
In conclusion, the three books on conflict that I reviewed above contributed to understanding 
the conflict in Maluku. They nevertheless bear the secular paradigm biases that include an approach 
to religion as, primarily, a problem and as a monolithic phenomenon that the elites were involved in 
the Maluku conflict for political and economic purposes.  
The three research books are also helpful because they included an explanation of the conflict 
using logical and rational terms; however, this does not facilitate a full understanding of the 
conflict. The dynamics of conflict, according to my fieldwork in Maluku, shows that factors such as 
emotion, subjectivity, and religious sentiments are, in fact, critical for understanding the conflict. 
Rather than simply playing out conflict as “politics by other means,” religious emotions and 
sentiments played a critical part in igniting and prolonging the conflict that caused a substantial 
level of mutual distrust, prejudices, and stigmas among Muslims and Christians at the grassroots 
level. The secular paradigm biases also led to ignore the crucial realities on the ground, where 
religion was used to resolve outstanding tensions and provide resources to contribute towards 
relations that were more peaceful. As I observed in my fieldwork, the violence in Maluku could not 
be explained only in terms of political problems among the elites in Maluku. It was far more 
complex than that.  
I now turn present three sets of literature that included an attempt to explain Maluku’s 
situation in the post-conflict period. A group of scholars who focused on post-conflict Maluku has 
begun to develop a more nuanced analysis of the issues than that of scholars who had focused their 
research on conflict in Maluku, by including subjectivity, emotion, and religion in their analysis.  
 
(2) Religion in Post-conflict Maluku 
As I have argued, changes in conflict dynamics have affected how scholars have interpreted the role 
of religion in Maluku. Scholars investigating the conflict in Maluku focused on the role of political 
institutions and structures and the elites’ interests as rational actors in mobilising conflicts. In 
addition, they regarded (the politicisation of) religion as one of the principal causes of the conflict 
and tended to ignore the capability of religion as an agent for peace. In contrast, scholars 
researching post-conflict Maluku moved beyond those issues and approaches by including a range 
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of issues, such as culture and local customs (adat),160 dialogue and interfaith dialogue,161 and 
peacebuilding and reconciliation.162  
However, in this subsection, I only review and assess three key studies that revealed the 
emergence of a new trend in the research on Maluku’s post-conflict situation. The authors of these 
studies specifically advocate engaging with “non-rational” factors in conflict and conflict 
resolution, such as emotion, identity, subjectivity, culture, and even religion. I choose the three 
scholarly works because of their merit in terms of their theoretical and methodological approaches. 
They are, first, Muhammad Nazib Azca’s PhD thesis on After Jihad: The Biographical Approach to 
Passionate Politics in Indonesia;163 second, Alpha Amirrachman’s PhD thesis entitled Peace 
Education in Moluccas, Indonesia: Between Global Models and Local Interests164; and, finally, 
Sumanto’s PhD dissertation entitled Inter-religious Violence, Civic Peace and Citizenship: 
Christians and Muslims in Maluku, Eastern Indonesia.165  
To the best of my knowledge Azca’s work is the first piece of academic research where the 
task of accounting for emotion and subjectivity is advocated as crucial in understanding Maluku in 
the conflict and post-conflict periods. Azca’s research marked the shift from research that sought to 
analyse conflict in Maluku in terms of objective-rational factors to research on post-conflict Maluku 
that accounted for “subjective-irrational factors” in its analysis.  
In particular, Azca investigated the status of non-local religious fighters after their 
involvement in the conflicts in Maluku and Poso (Central Sulawesi).166 In doing so, Azca developed 
his theoretical framework from the social movement tradition. Unlike Klinken, who followed 
McAdam, Tarraow, and Tilly’s DoC theory of social movements, which includes a focus on 
investigating the logical reasons of the political processes behind communal conflicts in Indonesia, 
Azca followed Goodwin, Jasper, and Poletta’s “passionate politics”, a stream within the social 
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movement tradition with a focus on understanding the links between identity, narrative, and 
emotions in social-religious movement.167  
Azca chose a biographical approach as his research method. Through extremely intensive 
fieldwork in numerous Indonesian cities, Azca wrote 10 “jihadist biographies” from 21 core 
informants.168 Azca found that every informant had different motivations to join jihad in Ambon 
and Poso. In addition, different experiences during the jihad led to different life trajectories and to 
the Islamic activism of the “jihadists ‘alumni.”  
The rich empirical data that Azca produced was only possible through intensive and 
challenging fieldwork research. The use of a cultural approach to study the new social movements 
made a substantial theoretical contribution to a broad debate about the place of emotion, 
subjectivity, identity, and culture in the social sciences. In general, by drawing from the secular 
paradigm, the social sciences have tended to separate emotion and reason. Such separation is 
evident in Western approaches that scholars and conflict resolution practitioners adopted when they 
postulated that conflict could only be resolved by separating “the people from the problems” 
because this approach allowed people to resolve conflict rationally.169 Azca convincingly 
demonstrated that he obtained his data from the grassroots to show that social scientists should not 
exclude emotion and subjectivity from their analysis.  
In short, Azca’s work exemplifies the current trend in research on Maluku that has started 
accounting for emotion and subjectivity, as opposed to the “rational” and “objective” approaches 
that were adopted in the scholarly works that I reviewed in previous section. Azca’s research 
demonstrates how social scientific understandings are unduly constrained by the insistence on 
“rational” and “objective” approaches. As Azca showed, emotion and subjectivity played critical 
roles in the lives of Muslims who were engaged in the conflict and in post-conflict periods in 
Maluku. However, Azca did not consider the critical role of religion in the peacebuilding process in 
Maluku. Azca’s theoretical approach could be extended to consider religion as essential in the 
peacebuilding process in Maluku.  
Adopting them as the central focus of my research, I examine how culture, subjectivity, and 
emotion influence the interpretation of religious texts, and how they are used to contribute to 
peacebuiliding. As I demonstrate in Chapters 3 and 4, the personal “subjectivity” of religious 
believers plays critical roles in using sacred texts, traditions, and culture in the process of the 
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hermeneutics of peace: the efforts to find justification and motivation to engage in peacebuilding as 
part of religious spirituality and conviction.  
Raden Alpha Amirrachman initiated another research trajectory in the post-conflict Maluku 
era and is among scholars who promote culture and local custom (adat) as an essential tool that can 
be used for peace education.170 Specifically, his research has enriched the understanding of the 
complexity of Maluku’s problems in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase in Maluku by 
introducing local adat (pela gandong –orang basodara) as a critical factor in promoting peaceful 
coexistence through peace education. Amirrachman wrote his PhD dissertation entitled Peace 
Education in Moluccas, Indonesia: Between Global Models and Local Interests. Amirrachman 
considered the work of Herrera, Clarke-Habibi, and Danesh who pointed to peace education as a 
crucial aspect of democracy and citizenship education, which included the assumption that 
increasing the understanding of peace education would help to decrease violence and consolidate 
peace.171  
Amirrachman scrutinised the work of UNICEF, UNDP, and JICA, which are three key 
international peace education organisations that promote peace education in Maluku, to question 
whether the international modules that the three agencies adopted suited the needs of the local 
community in Maluku.172 The peace education module aimed to marry the peace education 
curriculum that was commonly practiced in numerous parts of the world with a local awareness of 
peace that could be taken from local custom, such as pela-gandong and baku bae. In attempting to 
answer his research questions, Amirrachman conducted fieldwork in Ambon City and Central 
Maluku. Through an ethnographic methodology, Amirrachman observed four schools where 
UNICEF, UNDP, and JICA peace education projects were implemented.173  
Although Amirrachman did not consider the role of religion in his research, at the beginning 
of his thesis, he did acknowledge that the network of the Gereja Protestant Maluku (GPM) is 
extremely influential at the provincial level and has a reach at the community levels.174 
Unfortunately, he did not elaborate further on whether the GPM structure, which he recognised as 
extremely powerful, influenced the implementation of the peace education programme. 
Amirrachman was not alone. Some scholars, such as Brauchler,175 who emphasized the importance 
of adat for peacebuilding in post-conflict Maluku, also overlooked the contribution of religion.  
My thesis, in this context, is particularly relevant because it includes an examination of an 
area (religion) that has been neglected, but that has been acknowledged by other scholars as critical. 
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In particular, in the chapter on the Maluku case study, I demonstrate how official and unofficial 
religious organisations have promoted the revitalisation of local wisdom, such as pela and gandong, 
as part of the response to the post-conflict peacebuilding situation.  
Whereas Azca promoted subjectivity and emotion as critical notions in research on Maluku, 
Amirrachman highlighted the significance of local adat in peacebuilding efforts, and Sumanto 
directly accounted for religion in his research to understand conflict in Maluku. The aim of 
Sumanto’s book, Inter-religious Violence, Civic Peace and Citizenship: Christians and Muslims in 
Maluku, Eastern Indonesia,176 was to answer a range of questions by adopting an anthropological 
approach. Sumanto endeavoured to identify at least the following three roles: (1) the roles of 
religion in mobilising conflict and peace in Maluku; (2) the roles of civil society groups in the peace 
and reconciliation process; and (3) the roles of government in the peace process. 
In this research, Sumanto did not choose to follow strictly either a historical, a sociological, or 
an anthropological perspective in developing his arguments. Rather, he borrowed renowned 
anthropologist Robert Hefner’s “total approach.”177 By adopting the total approach, Sumanto aimed 
to understand multiple aspects of the conflict and post-conflict periods in Maluku. This included the 
social history and politics of the society that affected the conflict, the human agency, and structure 
(individuals or social groupings) that caused the violence, rationality, and emotions that, in turn, 
drove conflict and peace, as well as the role of elites and grassroots movements as agents for peace 
and conflict.  
Sumanto’s findings can be summarised as follows. Firstly, he drew conclusions that are 
similar to those of scholars from Maluku, such as Abidin Wakano,178 who, in linking the Maluku 
conflict to its historical context, traced it to the colonial era.179 For example, Muslims and 
Christians have been living in villages that have been segregated along religious lines since the 
Dutch era and often distrusted and expressed animosity towards each other. Secondly, according to 
Sumanto, it is extremely clear that religious motivation greatly contributed to the escalation of 
conflict. Thirdly, religious discourses and actors also contributed to peacebuilding and 
reconciliation. Fourth, Sumanto credited the government for re-establishing peace and order in 
Maluku, something that, he claimed, was overlooked by numerous researchers.  
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Sumanto’ research generated rich data and findings. However, his total approach, by 
combining a range of social science perspectives, made his research rather broad and less focused. 
In some ways, Sumanto’s research overlapped with this work (including sometimes interviewing 
the same people); however, both the focus of the research and the approach that he took were 
different. Whereas Sumanto stated that his dissertation ‘is not solely devoted to the study of 
violence and peace [but] will simultaneously examine the social phenomena and actions of 
collective violence and inter-religious cooperation,’180 my research, in contrast, is fully devoted to 
investigating the role of religious leaders and institutions that contribute to peacebuilding in 
Maluku.  
Although peacebuilding is a complex phenomenon that involves a range of actors and 
institutions, I choose to focus specifically on the contribution of religious resources for 
peacebuilding in Maluku. This allows me to obtain a deep and broad understanding of religious 
peacebuilders in Southeast Asia. In other words, my specific focus on religion and peacebuilding, 
allows me to examine how religious people and institutions, official or formal and unofficial or 
informal uses of religious resources contribute to the peacebuilding process. 
In short, the position of religion in the research on Maluku has shifted along with the 
changing conflict dynamics in Maluku. I label the “first generation” of researchers as Maluku 
conflict researchers. They are represented by the work of Bertrand, Sidel, and Klinken who 
subscribed to the religion and conflict perspective, and whose investigations focus on the “rational” 
and “objective” aspects on how and why the conflict erupted. In answering those questions, they 
tended to ignore or blame religion as a cause, if not the primary cause, of the conflict. This 
demonstrates, in general, the prevalent influence of the secular paradigm in the social sciences, 
which inclines to see religion as problem rather than a solution in the public sphere. In this tradition 
of knowledge, the possibility of approaching religion as having a potential role to play in 
peacebuilding has extremely limited room. 
I have labelled the second generation of researchers who adopted the religious and 
peacebuilding perspective in Maluku as post-conflict researchers because, in alternative to the first 
generation of researchers, they accounted for subjectivity, irrationality, culture, and religion in their 
analyses. The works of Azca, Amirrachman, and Sumanto positively indicated that their research on 
Maluku was developing with greater nuance compared to that of their predecessors. However, 
because the Maluku post-conflict research was not fully released from the secular perspective, the 
role of religion in peacebuilding remained inadequately explored. Indeed, research that is conducted 
to investigate the role of religion as a resource for peace and reconciliation in Maluku by focussing 
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on influential religious institutions and leadership, is justified, and, in fact, needed to complement 
the existing literature. 
 
2.2.2 Overview and Assessment of Research on Mindanao 
The intractable conflict in Mindanao has led to the production of different perspectives, theoretical 
frameworks, and methods. Central research themes include the history of conflict and its root 
causes,181 the formation of a Filipino and Moro political identity,182 the assessment of the peace 
process,183 and peace and gender.184 In contrast to the extremely recent shift in research focus on 
religion as a peacebuilding resource in Maluku, the conflict in Mindanao has led to a substantive 
body of research on the topic.185 In this context, I focus on two works that are relevant to my 
research. Subsequently, I develop my thesis to build upon and extend these research projects. 
The two scholarly works that I review in this section are the work of William LaRousse, 
Walking Together for Peace: the Local Church of Mindanao-Sulu Journeying in Dialogue with the 
Muslim Community (1965-2000),186 and the PhD dissertation of Jerson Benia Narciso, entitled 
Christianity and Islam in the Search for Peace in Southern Philippines.187  
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LaRousse’s book is the most comprehensive survey of the role of Catholic Church, as the 
majority religion in the Philippines, in peace and conflict in Mindanao. Although, in his book, 
LaRousse aimed to describe the Catholic Church’s position towards peace from 1965 to 2000 (post-
Second Vatican Council), LaRousse also explained in detail the historical background of the arrival 
of Islam and Christianity in Mindanao, and the prolonged conflict of the Moro Wars that produced 
political, cultural, and religious antagonisms between Muslims and Christians.188  
LaRousse reviewed the written documents (particularly letters and statements) of the Catholic 
Bishop’s Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) that reflected the position of the Catholic Church 
on peace and conflict, and especially on how the idea of interfaith dialogue that the Second Vatican 
Council promoted operated in Mindanao and in the Philippines at large. He movingly explained the 
dynamics within the Catholic Church, the decision to implement the Second Vatican Council, 
especially the concept of inter-faith dialogue as the new form of Catholic mission. He argued that 
the initiative of organising interfaith dialogue, as an avenue to resolve conflict, emerged much 
earlier and more strongly in Mindanao, compared to the other parts of the Philippines. For example, 
in 1984, Bishop George Dion, head of the Apostolic Vicariate of Jolo, in his pastoral letter entitled 
Attitudes of Christians towards Muslims, showed that the attitudes of Catholics were contrary to the 
spirit of the Second Vatican Council. He also recommended that the teachings of the Second 
Vatican Council should be included in the seminary curriculum and in the religious education of lay 
groups.189 Since then, Catholic Church in Mindanao has undertaken numerous dialogue initiatives 
in various forms.  
LaRousse’s work reveals two dimensions that are useful for my research. First, it constitutes a 
useful secondary data source on the role of religion in peacebuilding in Mindanao. Among the 
earliest interfaith dialogue initiatives in Mindanao, which were outlined in the book, was the 
establishment of the Silsilah Dialogue Movement (SDM), which I use as a micro-case in the chapter 
of the Mindanao case study. In his book, LaRousse described a general profile of the SDM—its 
vision, mission, programmes and activities.190 Whereas LaRousse’s short and descriptive profile of 
SDM is extremely helpful, he neglected to address some critical questions. Among them are 
analytical questions, such as those concerning the specific religious resources that the SDM used in 
its dialogue mission and activities; the manner in which it used religious resources; the role that 
religion played in motivating the SDM activists to operate the SDM for three decades; and the 
effects of the SDM programmes and activities on the daily life of the people of Mindanao.  
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Muslim Community (1965-2000), 23-71. 
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Second, LaRousse’s description of how the local Catholic Church in Mindanao was 
increasingly motivated to implement the concept of interfaith dialogue as a product of the Second 
Vatican Council, compared to other Catholic churches in other parts of the Philippines, revealed the 
existence of an internal dynamic within the Catholic hierarchical structure. Although the Catholic 
Church is renowned for its rigid hierarchical structure, and especially for its rigidity on theological 
matters, in this case different social, cultural, and political settings of country and region led to 
different interpretations of the Second Vatican Council’s theological documents. In this case, the 
bloody conflict in Mindanao was “the external context,” which is part of the hermeneutic of peace, 
and was critical in shaping the Catholic leaders’ theological approach to their decisions. Because 
Mindanao is a plural and diverse society, inter-religious tensions led the Catholic leaders in 
Mindanao to become more open to interfaith dialogue as a means to achieve peace and 
reconciliation, compared to Catholics leaders in other parts of the Philippines.  
The second document that I review is the PhD dissertation of Jerson Benia Narciso, who 
completed it for a doctoral degree in Inter-Religious Studies at Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia. 
Narciso’s dissertation is titled Christianity and Islam in the Search for Peace in Southern 
Philippines,191 of which I wish to highlight its most pivotal findings. First, unlike LaRousse, who 
only focused on researching the role of the Catholic Church in promoting peace through interfaith 
dialogue, Narciso skilfully surveyed the role of all formal or official religious institutions in the 
Philippines that contribute to peacebuilding. The official religious organisations are the Catholic 
Bishop’s Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), the National Council of Churches in the 
Philippines (NCCP), the Philippines Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID), the Ulama League 
of the Philippines (ULP), and the Bishop-Ulama Conference of the Philippines (BUC).192  
Narciso comprehensively described the history, vision and mission, membership, theological 
construction, and programmes and activities that were organised by each formal religious institution 
to contribute to peace and conflict resolution in Mindanao. Narciso also criticized and provided 
recommendations to those organisations on how to improve their engagement in the peace process 
in Mindanao. He identified problems that required a resolution within and between religious 
organisations to enable them to increase their contribution to solving Mindanao’s problems, such as 
“negative competition” within and between organisations, mistrust, elitism, and an absence of a 
clear unified theological and political agenda for peace.193  
Realising the substantial amount of research on the contributions of formal or official 
religious organisations to peacebuilding in the Philippines, including Narciso’s prominent work, I 
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choose to identify alternative trajectories in my research. Although I have interviewed religious 
leaders who represent the CBCP, NCCP, PCID, and BUC during my fieldwork in Manila and 
Mindanao, I do not intend to write about the role of those official religious organisations in 
peacebuilding because other scholars have already achieved that task. Instead, I use those 
interviews to broaden my perspective on how religious leaders and organisations understand the 
conflict and how they respond to the conflict. As I have already discussed in the methods section, I 
examine how theological arguments that were constructed and shaped mainly by those official 
organisations, became operational and materialised in the micro-cases that I choose in Mindanao. 
By choosing the three micro-cases, I have greater opportunity to reflect deeply on how religious 
resources that are used by religious leaders and institutions contribute to peacebuilding. 
Secondly, Narciso also identified crucial theological concepts within Christianity and Islam 
that can be utilised as theological justifications for the peaceful resolution of the Mindanao conflict. 
In Christianity, he identified numerous key concepts in the Gospels, such as the hermeneutics of the 
Kingdom of God, Shalom (a Hebrew concept), and Eirene (a Greek concept) that can be used as 
theological foundations to build peace. In Islam, he also identified several critical theological 
concepts, such as tawhid, taqwa, jihad, and iman as principles that can be utilised for peace.  
Narciso’s identification of theological concepts in Christianity and Islam as religious 
resources for peacebuilding is strategically critical. However, whereas in my research, I also seek 
theological arguments in religion that can be used to contribute to peacebuilding, I pursue a 
methodological approach that differs from that of Narciso. As a theologian who was conducting 
research on inter-religious studies, Narciso developed critical concepts in Christianity and Islam, 
such as the Kingdom of God or tawhid, based on his theological investigation, which he assumed 
Christians and Muslims could use as a theological foundation for the practical social, cultural, and 
political transformation in Mindanao. In contrast, my focus is on how religious people on the 
ground actually use religious resources, including theological arguments from sacred texts and 
traditions that they have already used and practiced, to support and motivate their engagement in 
peacebuilding. In other words, whereas Narciso constructed his argument through a “top-down 
process,” I choose to build my argument through a “bottom-up process.”  
 
2.3  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the literature that is relevant to the research problem and established 
the overall trajectory of the thesis. In the first part of this chapter, I demonstrated two crucial facts. 
Firstly, religion is not a new consideration in IR and PCRS. However, four significant factors led to 
ignoring religion in IR and PCRC: the political myth of the Westphalia settlement and the 
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Enlightenment presumptions concerning religion, the strong influence of the modernisation and 
secularization perspectives, the domination of the realist, neo-realist, or structural realist 
perspectives, and the use of behaviourism and quantitative methodology. Subsequently, I noticed 
that three new developments within IR and PCRS (the idea of non-state actors’ diplomacy, 
peacebuilding from below, and the question of culture) helped create the opportunity and 
momentum to recognise the contribution of religion in peacebuilding. 
Secondly, I also identified a substantial amount of literature on religion, conflict, and peace, 
which can be grouped into three categories: the secular-atheist, the religious-violence, and the 
religious-peacebuilding perspectives. As I demonstrated in this section, the religious-peacebuilding 
perspective has slowly established itself in IR and PCRS debates. The thesis extends upon the 
existing religious peacebuilding perspective literature.  
In the second part of this chapter, I showed that, in general, the research on the conflict in 
Maluku and Mindanao follows the religious-violence perspective, which is largely influenced by 
the secular paradigm, which, in turn, primarily includes a perception of religion as source of the 
conflict that has little to do with peace. This type of argument was presented especially by scholars 
who conducted research on conflict in Maluku and who see the instrumentalisation of religion by 
elites as one of the principal causes of the conflict. However, changing conflict dynamics also 
gradually changed the manner in which scholars viewed religion. In the literature on the post-
conflict situation in Maluku, scholars, especially Sumanto, have begun to perceive the potential role 
of religion for peacebuilding. However, this research topic remains extremely underdeveloped.  
The intractable, four-decade long conflict in Mindanao appears to have been the context for 
research on the role of religion in peacebuilding, whereas the secular paradigm still influences most 
research. The two scholarly works that I reviewed have substantially contributed to the analysis of 
religion and peacebuilding. Nevertheless, they still have limitations because they were either too 
descriptive or insufficiently analytical, and did not directly examine how various religious resources 
were used to contribute to peacebuilding.  
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CHAPTER 3  
Methods and Cases 
 
 
Having discussed the literature that is related to this research, in this chapter, I discuss the 
methodology and introduce the cases that I employed to investigate the contribution of religion to 
peacebuilding in Maluku and Mindanao. Spesifically, I first discuss the method, approach, data 
collection techniques, respondents, and fieldwork report in the methodology section and clarify 
concepts and terms that I used in this research. In the second section, I introduce the two case 
studies that I used in this research: Maluku, in Indonesia, and Mindanao, in the Philippines. 
 
3.1  Methodology  
To answer the research question of how Muslims and Christians use religious resources to 
contribute to peacebuilding in conflict-torn societies in Southeast Asia, this research included the 
use of qualitative methods to provide ‘an insight on how people make sense of their experiences 
that cannot be easily provided by other methods.’194 Qualitative methods ‘provide meanings and 
interpretation, concepts, definitions, metaphors, symbols and description of things.’195 Qualitative 
methods were used to examine how religious peacebuilders understood, conceptualised, and defined 
religion, and used the spirit and practices of religion for concrete peacebuilding activities. 
I used a case study approach in this research. According to Berg, a case study is not a 
technique for collecting data, but a methodological approach that uses numerous data-gathering 
techniques.196 Moreover, case studies allowed me to obtain information about individuals, groups, 
organisations, and social settings, and to interpret how they operated. Champion, cited by Berg, 
argued that data and information gathered from this method is extremely rich, detailed, and in-
depth.197  
In this research, I employed multiple case studies; specifically, I chose Maluku (Indonesia) 
and Mindanao (the Philippines) as case studies. Some scholars argued that multiple case studies 
require other forms of methodology, such as a “comparative methodology.” However, according to 
Yin, single or multiple case studies are simply a design variant of the case study that was method.198 
                                                          
194 Pranee Liamputtong and Douglas Ezzy, Qualitative Research Methods  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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196 Ibid., 225. 
197 Ibid. 
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Yin argued that multiple case studies are more compelling and robust,199 and Berg noted that 
multiple case studies offer a superior understanding and the opportunity to enhance theoretical 
frameworks.200  
 
3.1.1 Data Collection 
In this research, I used three data gathering techniques. First, I employed library and document 
research. I gathered information from books, reports, and media, and from the internal documents of 
various organisations, such as organisational profiles, strategic planning, vision and mission 
statements, programmes, organisational progress reports, and evaluation papers. I analysed these 
documents to develop an understanding of the dynamics, goals, approaches, and activities of the 
religious peacebuilders across the two case studies.201 Moreover, the library and document research 
provided basic information about the organisations and leaders whom I interviewed. This data and 
information allowed me to formulate and further clarify critical questions, when I employed the 
second data gathering technique, concerning the activities that religious organisations and leaders 
conducted.  
Second, I employed in-depth interviews in this research. According to Ezzy and Liamputtong, 
the aim of in-depth interviews is to understand the complexity of social and political interaction 
within which meanings and interpretations are created. According to them, in-depth interviews bear 
a closer similarity to conversations than to structured questions.202 However, I started my interviews 
by asking basic questions, such as the following: (1) How long you have been involved in 
peacebuilding activities? (2) How does religion influence your work in peacebuilding? (3) 
Specifically, what sorts of religious resources (e.g., personal faith, sacred texts, religious networks, 
system of communications, education and training, and schools or madrasahs) strongly motivate 
you or your organisation to work on peacebuilding? Following these questions, I asked for further 
detail and discussed questions such as the following: (1) Does religion affect your personal 
involvement in peacebuilding work? (If so, in what ways?); (2) What concrete peacebuilding 
activities did you or your organisation complete or are currently undertaking? (I also prompted for 
details on each activity). I asked other questions as the interview evolved.  
                                                          
199 Ibid. 
200 Berg, Qualitaive Research Methods for Social Sciences, 229. 
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44 
 
I assessed and clarified data by triangulating the responses of the respondents. I also verified 
their responses by other means, where possible. For example, I conducted interviews with numerous 
former participants of training and seminar programmes, asking them about their experience of the 
extent and nature of religious understanding and motivation in these programmes. Where necessary, 
in some cases, I arranged a second follow-up interview with these respondents to clarify their 
responses. Furthermore, I also kept in touch with many of my respondents through emails, phone 
calls, text messages, and social media, such as Facebook, allowing me to clarify any questions or 
ambiguities that I had regarding the research data and findings.   
During the interviews, I noted crucial and relevant information on my fieldwork diary. I also 
digitally recorded the interviews with the consent of the respondents. I reviewed and selectively 
transcribed the interviews in developing the analysis for the thesis.  
Thirdly, by drawing on the ethnographic tradition, I used participant observation techniques to 
gather data.203 Researchers usually employ participant observation to improve their understanding 
of the research participants or respondents in their socio-cultural context204 because it allows 
researchers to become more closely acquainted with the respondents’ daily life experiences and 
activities.205 Because I could not spend extensive time with research participants, I took whatever 
opportunities became available to facilitate ethnographic observations: I participated in various 
programmes and activities during my fieldwork, including the Mindanao Week of Peace, and 
informal meetings, seminars, musical performances, and religious preaching, and ceremonies.  
 
3.1.2 Respondents 
Careful selection of respondents was crucial in answering my research questions. Because the aim 
of my research is to investigate the role of religion in peacebuilding and to examine how religious 
communities in Maluku and Mindanao used religious resources for peacebuilding, I interviewed, 
firstly, religious leaders who formally represented official religious organisations. In Maluku, I 
interviewed eight leaders of Gereja Protestan Maluku (Protestant Church in the Moluccas) (GPM). 
The GPM is the strongest and most effectively structured Protestant religious institution in Maluku. 
In addition to the GPM, I also interviewed three Catholic leaders of the Diocese of Amboina, and 
leaders from the Muslim community from three organisations: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 
Muhammadiyah, and the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) (MUI). The three 
                                                          
203 See, for example, Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in Practice Second ed. (London 
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organisations are local or provincial branches of influential national Muslim organisations in 
Indonesia. I interviewed three leaders of MUI, four leaders of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and five 
leaders of Muhammadiyah.  
In the Philippines, I also interviewed leaders from official religious institutions. From the 
Christian organisations, I interviewed one leader of Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines 
(CBCP) in Manila, three Catholic leaders in Zamboanga City, and one leader of the National 
Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP). From the Muslim organisations, I interviewed two 
leaders of the Ulama League of the Philippines and two leaders of the National Ulama Council of 
the Philippines (NUCP). I included the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), as a Muslim official 
religious organisation or group for the reasons that I discuss in detail in Chapter 8. I interviewed 
eight leaders and members of the Front. In short, I interviewed 35 respondents in Maluku and 43 
respondents in Mindanao.206 
In addition to official religious organisations, I also interviewed respondents from informal 
or unofficial religious institutions, such as groups, foundations, or non-governmental organisations 
that did not have structural relations with the mentioned formal religious institutions. Rather, 
specific religious affiliations strongly influenced the vision and mission of these institutions. 
Interfaith groups were included among them. I interviewed five activists of Lembaga Antar Iman 
Maluku (LAIM) (Maluku Interfaith Foundation); four people in Wayame; three people in Seith; 
three activists of the Philippines Centre for Islam and Democracy (PCID); two leaders of the 
Bishop-Ulama Conference (BUC); 18 activists and alumni of Silsilah Dialogue Movement (SDM); 
and four activist of Peace Advocate Zamboanga (PAZ). I included in this category eight activists 
and people, whom I interviewed, in Nalapaan Space for Peace.  
In addition to respondents from official and unofficial organisations, I also interviewed 
people in Maluku and Mindanao from various professions, such as Raja Kampung (village chief), 
teachers, journalists, human and women’s rights activists, and government officials. I interviewed 
them to gain a greater understanding of the contribution of official and official religious 
organisations to peacebuilding.  
 I should highlight from the outset, as I revealed in my review of the literature in Chapter 2, 
that scholars have conducted substantial research on the role of official religious organisations in 
peacebuilding in Mindanao. Therefore, unlike the case study of Maluku, I did not write a specific 
chapter on the contribution of official religious organisations in Mindanao to peacebuilding.  
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3.1.3 Fieldwork  
In order to conduct in-depth interviews and engage in participant observation in the most optimal 
manner, I organised five periods of fieldwork across two fieldwork sites. This included three 
periods of fieldwork in Maluku (Indonesia) and two periods of fieldwork in Mindanao (the 
Philippines). However, I faced difficulties in organising the fieldwork because of institutional 
guidelines regarding travelling to Maluku and Mindanao. Fieldwork was delayed for approximately 
three months because of the University of Queensland’s travel restrictions, which are linked to a 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) policy. My fieldwork sites, according to DFAT’s 
travel warnings, fell in the categories of “reconsider your need of travel” (in Indonesia overall) and 
“do not travel” (in Mindanao). Finally, through complicated procedures, I received approval from 
the Deputy Vice Chancellor International to conduct the fieldwork.  
I conducted the first period of fieldwork in Indonesia (mainly in Maluku, but also in Jakarta) 
over a period of seven weeks (from 24 June 2011 to 14 August 2011). During this fieldwork period, 
I conducted interviews and participated in numerous programmes that were organised by NGO’s in 
Ambon City. My participation in the programmes allowed me to improve my understanding of the 
dynamics of Malukan society during the post-conflict situation.  
I conducted the second fieldwork period in the Philippines primarily in Mindanao, but also in 
Manila, where I spent approximately five weeks (from 16 November 2011 to 24 December 2011). 
The fieldwork in eight cities in Mindanao (Zamboanga City, Basilan, Davao City, Cotabato City, 
Pikit, Kidapawan, and Marawi City) was extremely intensive. I conducted the fieldwork during the 
Mindanao Week of Peace, which is a yearly event that civil society groups organise with the 
support of local governments. The Week of Peace, therefore, provided me with an excellent 
opportunity to not only meet and arrange interviews with peace activists and other potential 
participants but also to participate in the various peace programmes that were organised during this 
event.  
I conducted the third fieldwork period on my way back from Manila to Brisbane, when I 
stopped by in Jakarta for a one-week period. I was motivated to visit Ambon City in particular, 
following the outbreak of communal violence on 11 September 2011. There, I met key informants 
to gain their insights on the events that had occurred and on how the religious peacebuilders 
managed to localise and contain the outburst of the violence to prevent it from spreading to other 
places, just as had occurred in the conflicts of 1999.  
Between the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2014, I visited Mindanao and Maluku for my 
fourth and fifth fieldwork periods, respectively. Unlike the previous fieldwork periods, during these 
periods, each of which was approximately three weeks long, I could focus on uncovering specific 
information that I needed to enrich my understanding, which I outlined in the draft of the Mindanao 
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and Maluku case study chapters of this thesis. For example, I conducted follow-up interviews with 
some respondents to clarify information or I interviewed new respondents, such as the alumni of 
training programmes that was organised by religious institutions, to, potentially, enrich my data. I 
managed to meet Fr. Bert Layson, one of the animators for the Nalapaan Space for Peace in the 
extremely remote and small city of Colaman, in Mindanao, which I could only reach during the 
rainy season by riding a motorcycle for four hours.   
In short, the five sessions of fieldwork that I undertook in Maluku and Mindanao allowed me 
to advance my understandings of peacebuilding actors and gather significant amounts of data and 
information for use in this thesis. Before I proceed to introduce the case studies, I turn to explain 
some concepts and terms that I use in this thesis. 
 
3.1.4 Concepts and Terms 
This section includes a brief explanation of concepts and terms that I use in subsequent chapters.  
(1) Religion. An agreed definition of religion among scholars does not exist. Martin Marty, in his 
landmark book, Politics, Religion and the Common Good, presented seventeen different definitions 
of religion before noting that ‘scholars will never agree on the definition of religion.’207 Charles 
Kimball acknowledged that defining religion is extremely difficult. However, he is optimistic that 
readers can understand what religion is without defining it because ‘religion is a central feature of 
human life. We all see many indications of it every day, and we all know it when we see it.’208 
Whereas I am not as optimistic as Kimball, I will not to propose a new definition of religion for this 
research. In this research, I specifically examine two recognizable religions, Christianity and Islam, 
as the majority religions in the Philippines and Indonesia, and which, therefore, have considerable 
influence on people’s daily lives. In essence, Muslims and Christians believe in (a) supernatural 
being(s), hold sacred texts that are believed to be the words of God, practice rituals, believe in life 
after death (e.g., the concepts of Judgment Day, paradise, and hell), and build a sense of religious 
community. However, by focusing “only” on Islam and Christianity, I do not mean to argue that 
Islam and Christian are monolithic. In this research, to be precise, I investigate how “Islams” or 
Muslims, and “Christianities” and Christians contribute to peacebuilding.   
 
(2) Religious resources. I define religious resources as various capacities or facilities provided or 
offered by religion that can be used to contribute to peacebuilding. Religious resources can range 
from faith, spiritual and moral authority, and religious narratives to more concrete and tangible 
elements, such as sacred texts, schools, churches and mosques, networks, and organisations.    
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(3) Peacebuilding and religious peacebuilders. The consensus on the definition of peacebuilding is 
limited.209 Peacebuilding is an elastic concept210 and a complex and multidimensional exercise.211 
Galtung, perhaps one of the most prominent pioneering scholars in peace and conflict resolution 
studies (PCRS), published Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and 
Peacebuilding’ in 1975.212 He defined peacebuilding as efforts to establish positive peace over 
negative peace, marked by not only the absence of war but also the presence of socio-political 
justice. Positive peace also encompasses the ability not only to overcome direct violence but also 
structural and cultural violence.213  
The purposes of this research require broadening the definition of peacebuilding and the scope 
its activities. First, I agree with the “synergist” school of thought, which includes the argument that 
peacebuilding activities can be intertwined and integrated into the pre-conflict (conflict prevention) 
and the mid-conflict (peacekeeping and peacemaking) phases, as well as in post-conflict 
reconstruction phases.214 In contrast, the “gradualist” school of thought suggests that peacebuilding 
can only occur during the post-conflict reconstruction phase.215 Lederach’s notion of the time 
dimension in peacebuilding constitutes a confirmation of the idea that peacebuilding initiatives can 
occur from the beginning of a conflict’s formation by conducting a so-called crisis intervention 
(between two to six months), up to the so-called generational vision (over 20 years) in post-conflict 
society.216 If peacebuilding is defined in generic terms as “building peace,” all efforts and initiatives 
to establish positive peace and overcome direct, structural, and cultural violence can be included 
into peacebuilding activities. Peacebuilding ranges from short-term programmes, such as addressing 
immediate needs, such as food and medical supplies, to long-term projects, such as peace education, 
reconciliation, and trauma healing. It touches on social transformation, as well as political change.  
Stemming from the mentioned elaboration of the meaning and extension of the activities of 
peacebuilding, religious peacebuilders, specifically religious adherents and leaders and religious 
organisations, can be viewed as conducting activities ranging from preventive diplomacy to 
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peacekeeping and peacemaking, and as striving to build peace in the divided societies of conflict-
torn countries by using available religious resources. They are religious activists who believe that 
they can use religious virtues as the spirit and energy that are needed to contextualize the religious 
teachings that contribute to peacebuilding. They initiate local cease-fires, conduct peace education, 
organise interfaith dialogues, provide education, food, and medicines for refugees, and conduct 
other activities, such as building mutual understanding, eliminating prejudices, and participating in 
truth and reconciliation committees. 
 
(4) Adat. The term “Adat” can be translated as customary law. Adat, according to Cooley, has been 
used to guide and govern behaviours and relationships in society.217 Cooley further explained that 
adat is ‘customary usage which has been handed down from ancestors.’218 In other words, adat was 
part of the indigenous Malukans’ beliefs long before the arrival of Islam and Christianity. 
 
(5) Pela and gandong. The concepts of Pela and gandong (they are commonly called pela-gandong, 
although they are two different institutions) are part of local adat in Maluku. Pela refers to ‘an 
institusionalized bond of friendship or brotherhood between all native residents of two or more 
villages, which bond was established under particular circumstances and carries specific duties and 
privilege for the parties thus bound together.’219 Villagers that have pela relations agreed to help 
each other during hardships such as war, natural disaster, and famine. Villages that are bound by 
pela relations might embrace different religions. Gandong, on the other hand, involves genealogical 
ties between one or two villages. Gandong, which derives from Bahasa Indonesia, simply means 
“uterus.” In this context, gandong is stronger than pela. Like pela, villages that have gandong 
relation might embrace different religions.220 
  
3.2  Introduction to Case Studies 
3.2.1 Understanding the Conflict in Maluku 
Maluku221 is one of the provinces in Indonesia that is located in the eastern part of the Indonesian 
archipelago. Maluku covers 54,185 km2, lies between 2o 30´-9o south latitude and 124o-136o east 
                                                          
217 Frank L. Cooley, "Altar and Throne in Central Moluccan Societies: A Study of the Relationship between the 
Institutions of Local Government in a Traditional Society Undergoing Rapid Social Change" (The University of Yale, 
1962), 131. 
218 Ibid., 153. 
219 Ambonese Adat: A General Description (New Haven: Yale University , Southeast Asia Studies, 1962), 71-72; ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Maluku, or Moluccas, is one of the earliest provinces in Indonesia to encounter foreign powers. European 
adventurers called Maluku the Spice Island because it was the main producer of the “trinity of spices” (clove, nutmeg, 
50 
 
longitude.222 Administratively, the Maluku province is divided into 11 regencies or cities, 90 
districts, and 1,022 sub–districts or villages.223 The five religions in Maluku are Islam, 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. According to the 2011 census, the 
percentages of the adherents of the three major religions were 57.6% Muslim, 32.4% Protestant, and 
1.2% Catholic out of a total population of 1,703,541. In Kota Ambon, the capital city of Maluku, 
Protestants constitute the majority at 54.3%, followed by Muslims at 38.3%, and Catholics at 
7.03%, out of a total population of 294,530, with an extremely small minority, less than 1%, of 
Buddhists and Hindus.224  
The arrival of the Portuguese in 1511 marked the opening of an extensive, problematic 
relationship between “central and civilized” colonial powers and “peripheral and uncivilized” 
Malukans, which extended into the twentieth century.225 A deeply problematic colonial legacy 
affects religious affairs in Maluku. Both oral and written histories reveal the problematic and 
traumatic historical narratives that Malukans sustain about “the others,” which developed when the 
Europeans, in the context of the conflicting political and economic interests of the colonial powers 
and the local rulers, introduced their religions among the Malukan population.226 This demonstrates 
that the violent conflict that occurred in 1998 had roots in nearly 500 years of history.  
The religious conflict in Maluku, which is one of the two case studies that constitute the focus 
of this research, occurred during Indonesia’s transition period to democracy,227 which is usually 
cast as a democratisation success story. Those who view the Indonesia’s transition period is 
peaceful perhaps, only considers the formal process of procedural democracy where in 1999, 
Indonesia held its first peaceful, democratic, free and fair election since 1995. Nevertheless, looking 
beyond the procedural democracy viewpoint, from 1997 to 2005, Indonesia witnessed conflicts in 
which approximately 19,000 people lost their lives and around 1.3 million people became internally 
displaced persons.228 
The number of people who died in the Maluku conflict is unknown. The International Crisis 
Group (ICG) reported that after approximately two years of the conflict, more than 5,000 people 
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were dead and 500,000 people had been displaced.229 The conflict caused both incalculable costs in 
infrastructure damage and the creation of a “lost generation” because, in numerous areas, many 
children were unable to attend school and suffered from malnutrition.  
The conflict in Maluku started on 19 January 1999 when Muslims were celebrating I’dul Fitr, 
the Muslim festival marking the end of the fasting month of Ramadhan. This day, which was 
supposed to be a happy day not only for Muslims but also for Christians,230 turned into a day 
sorrow and tragedy. A street brawl between a Christian mini-bus driver and a Muslim youth—
brawls are an extremely common occurrence in Ambon—turned into a religious riot and quickly 
spread to other parts of Ambon City.  
Two different versions exist about how the brawl began. The different versions indicate how 
each community has its own version to prove that its members were in the right and that they were 
the victims, and that the members of the other community were the perpetrators.231 According to the 
Christian version, two Muslim youths, one of whom was named Salim, wanted to force a minibus 
driver, Yopy (a Christian from Aboru), to give them money. The driver refused to pay and a fight 
ensued.232 According to the Muslim version (the police officials, apparently, used this version), 
Yopy was the driver of a mini-bus that was owned by a Muslim, and Salim was the conductor of the 
minibus. Yopy had subsequently rented the minibus to someone. Acting on behalf of the owner, 
Salim asked for the money that Yopy had received from renting the mini-bus. Yopy refused and 
threatened Salim. Eventually, the passengers of the mini-bus, who were also Christians, assaulted 
Salim, who then ran to Batu Merah Bawah (a Muslim village) to ask his friends for support. The 
two groups, Salim’s friends (Muslims) and the bus driver’s friends (Christians) fought and the 
conflict escalated into other parts of Ambon City.233  
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Maluku (Justice Party), "Kronologi Ied Berdarah," (1999). 
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Within hours, the brawl that started in Batu Merah Bawah spread to Mardhika, Silale, 
Waihaong, Kuda Mati, Batu Gantong, and Waringin.234 The riots continued overnight, when 
Muslims and Christians attacked each other. 
In the early morning of the second day of fighting (20 January 1999), Christians had set fire to 
all the major markets in the city. These were mostly owned by Muslim migrants from Bugis, Buton, 
and Makassar (popularly dubbed the BBM), such as the Pelita shopping area, the Gambus and 
Mardika markets, the Mardika fruit market, and the Cakar Bongkar food market. The houses of the 
Butonese Muslim settlement around the Gambus market were also burned down, as well as the Al-
Hilal, a Muslim school.235  
Still on the second day of fighting, Muslims from villages in the Laihitu Paninsula (Hila, Hitu 
Lama, Hitu Mesing, Mamala, Morela, Negeri Lima, Seith, and Wakal) marched toward Ambon 
City. They had been provoked by a rumour that the Al-Fatah mosque (one of the most significant 
symbols of the Muslim presence in Maluku) was burnt down and that Christians had massacred 
numerous Muslims.236 It was reported that “the crowd stretched for more than a kilometre.”237 On 
their way to Ambon City, the Muslim crowd passed the villages of Telaga Kodok, Benteng Karang, 
Hanut, Durian Patah, Waiheru, Nania, and Negeri Lama.238 The rioters wore white cloth on their 
arms (a symbol for Muslims) shouting takbir (Allahu Akbar, God is Great) and shouted “Kill them! 
Kill them!” They burnt down churches, homes, and killed numerous Christian who lived in those 
villages.239 When I visited Benteng Karang in 2011, I still could see the ruins of Christian houses. 
The Mobile Police Brigade (Brimob) in Air Besar stopped the Muslim crowd and dispersed it to the 
Laihitu Peninsula. An even greater degree of violence and death could have occurred had the 
Muslims been able to continue their march to Ambon City because they would have passed by 
Passo, a stronghold of the Christian community. At the end of January and in early February 1999, 
the conflict spread to cities and villages outside Ambon: to the Island of Manipa on 24 January 
1999, to Ceram and Saparua on 3 February 1999, and to Haruku Island on 13 February 1999.240  
Contrary to the common perception, the conflict in Maluku was not a constant war. The war 
was intermittent and sporadic. It occurred in phases and stages. People in Maluku and scholars 
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described the conflict phases differently.241 Trijono, an Indonesian scholar who intensively 
researched the conflict, gave a particularly useful account of the phases of the conflict. He divided 
the conflict into three phases. During the first phase, from 19 January to approximately April 1999, 
the violence had stopped before the national election on 7 June 1999 and the election was held 
peacefully. During the second phase, from 24 July 1999, when the election results were announced, 
to 26 December 1999, the conflict spread to North Maluku. The third phase began on 26 April 
2000, when Laskar Jihad (Troops for Jihad) from outside of Maluku arrived in Ambon to help their 
Muslim brothers and sisters.242 This fighting occurred intermittently until February 2002, when the 
Malino Peace Agreement was signed by the government, as well as by Muslim and Christian 
leaders. After the Malino Peace Agreement, some bombings and shootings still occurred; however, 
no large-scale fighting occurred, with the exception of a riot on 25 April 2004.  
Scholars have been particularly interested to investigate Trijono’s second and third phases of 
the conflict. In the second phase, the conflict spread to North Maluku, a newly established province 
that split from Maluku in 1998. Provoked by news that Muslims had burned down the Silo Church 
in Ambon City, one of the oldest churches that symbolised the presence of Christians in Maluku, in 
the late December 1999, Christians massacred hundreds of Muslims in Tobelo, including a 
substantial number of Muslims who had taken refuge in the Al-Ikhlas mosque in Togaliwa 
village.243  
This notorious event was broadly publicised in the “Islamic media,” consisting of books, CDs, 
and pamphlets. Consequently, the violence in Tobelo led to the establishment of Laskar Jihad (the 
Troop of Jihad, or “LJ”),244 which brought a new dynamic in the conflict and marked Trijono’s 
third stage of conflict. The presence of LJ in Maluku not only changed the conflict dynamics but 
was also became a precedent for a new phenomenon in modern Indonesian history. For the first 
time, a religious paramilitary group declared their involvement in religious conflict. LJ was 
established by Ja’far Umar Thalib, a leader of the Salafi movement in Indonesia who had joined 
mujahidin (holy warriors) in the battlefields in Afghanistan. Following a gathering at the Senayan 
Stadium in Jakarta in early April 2000, LJ published an open call for people to join their group. LJ 
opened a paramilitary camp in Bogor to prepare Muslims for jihad in Maluku and Poso. In late May 
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2000, around 3,000 members of LJ left Java for Maluku.245 Although other groups also organised 
the mobilisation of non-local jihadist fighters to Maluku, such as KOMPAK, Jama’ah Islamiyah, 
and Brigade Hizbullah, LJ was ‘the largest and best organised group sending voluntary jihad 
fighters to the Moluccas.’246 In short, the influx of non-local religious fighters in Maluku prolonged 
the conflict and made its religious dimensions considerably more obvious and explicit.  
After a long process of negotiation and mediation, 35 Christian leaders (Protestant and 
Catholic) and 35 Muslim leaders, together with the government, signed Perjanjian Maluku di 
Malino (Maluku Agreement in Malino) on 12 February 2002. The agreement did not stop the 
violence in Maluku immediately. Indeed, the signing of the agreement sparked a new controversy 
among those in both Muslim and Christian communities who opposed a peaceful resolution. The 
comprehensive implementation of the agreement (such as the departure of Laskar Jihad from 
Maluku, the decommissioning of weapons, and the rehabilitation of refugees) were additional 
controversial issues that occasionally provoked outbursts of violence. However, in general, the 
situation in Maluku was considerably more peaceful after the signing of the agreement. After the 
Malino Agreement, two relatively major incidences of unrest occurred in Ambon City. The first 
eruption of violence occurred on 25 April 2004 when some Christians celebrated the 54th 
anniversary of the formation of the rebel group called the Republic of the South Moluccas 
(Republik Maluku Selatan) (RMS), provoking a reaction from Muslims who believed that the RMS 
represented the Christians’ political agenda in Maluku. Two churches and a Muslim school and 
hundreds of homes were burned to the ground. Approximately 10,000 people were displaced and 38 
others were killed.247 The second incident of unrest occurred on 11 September 2011 where the death 
of a Muslim motorcycle taxi driver in Gunung Nona (a Christian village) turned into an inter-
communal riot.248 This unrest resulted in seven dead, 65 wounded,249 in the burning of 150 homes, 
and the displacement of 4,000 people. 250  
In recent times, the situation in Maluku has become relatively peaceful, with an occasional 
outbreak of violence. People from different religious backgrounds interact freely in markets, 
government offices, schools and universities, coffee shops, banks and other public services. 
However, most people are still living in segregated villages: kampong muslim (Islam) and kampung 
sarane (Christian). Prejudices and stigmas about “the other” remain. People have not yet fully 
healed from their social traumas. The latest unrest (11 September 2011) shows how fragile the 
peace in Maluku is, where trivial matters could provoke considerable problems.  
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The Malukans have experienced the effects of violent conflict over numerous years. Whereas 
this experience has been traumatic and has contributed to the current segregation, it is also possible 
that it has produced a situation where Mulakans are less likely to be easily provoked into violence. 
The unrest in Ambon, although strongly loaded with religious sentiments, settled down within days 
and only occurred in specific areas in Ambon City. Fears that the unrest will re-ignite the deadly 
communal violence that occurred between 1999 and 2002 have not been borne out. Secondly, the 
government and NGO’s have implemented numerous post-conflict peacebuilding programmes and 
activities. However, considerably more work is necessary to establish a durable and sustainable 
peace. 
 
3.2.2 Understanding the Conflict in Mindanao  
Mindanao is the name of the second largest island in the Philippines, and is located in the Southern 
part of the country. The island stretches from 121°26'9.66" to 126°35'50.55" East, and from 
5°22'10.35" to 9°48'21.36" North. Mindanao used to be inhabited predominantly by Muslims. 
However, nowadays, following the systematic policies251 of successive colonial powers of Spain 
and the United States, as well as the policies of the post-independence Philippines government, 
Muslims have become a minority.252 For example, Tuminez shows that in 1903 Muslims 
constituted 76% of the total population in Mindanao, decreasing dramatically to 23% in 1960. In 
1980, Muslims comprised 16.8%, whereas Christians constituted 76.7% of the population, with 
tribal groups composing the remaining 6.4%.253 The latest data shows that Roman Catholics are the 
dominant religious affiliation at 60.9%, whereas Islam comprised 20.44%. Protestant groups are the 
third largest religious affiliation, comprising groups such as Evangelicals (5.35%). Anglipayan 
(2.16%), Iglesia ni Cristo (1.66%), and Seventh Day Adventists (1.65%).254 These religious 
demographics are significant, because, as with the case of Maluku, religion played a key role in 
fuelling the Mindanao conflict. 
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The conflict in Mindanao, which started in the early 1970s, is widely known as a Muslim or 
Moro255 separatist or secessionist conflict.256 The conflict is ‘the world’s longest-standing armed 
conflict’.257 The accuracy of the data on how many people died or were internally displaced because 
of the conflict is open to debate. However, it is broadly estimated that the conflict has claimed 
approximately 160,000 lives.258  
Numerous scholars have argued that the conflict has centuries-old historical roots that are 
traceable to wars between (Christian) Spanish colonisers and Muslim sultanates that occurred 
within a 333-year period.259 The wars produced deep-seated prejudices among Filipinos, especially 
because of the use of religious language in the wars. The Spaniards, who successfully Christianised 
the native people from the north, mobilised them for the war in Mindanao. As Rodil noted, 
expeditions against Muslims were framed as ‘just war[s] or holy war[s] against [the] wicked sons of 
the Qur’an,’ and soldiers were encouraged to “have no fear in their hearts because they were 
supported and protected by fury of the God of armies.”260 During my fieldwork, I found that mutual 
distrust and animosity between Christians and Muslims could be traced to the conflict with colonial 
powers. Christian friends still remember how they grew up with the prejudices that were created 
during the American colonial period, which were summed up with the expression “the only good 
Moro is dead Moro.” Others recalled that their parents would scare them by saying that they would 
be taken by Moro pirates if they did not stop being naughty or crying.  
However, deep-seated historical burdens and prejudices were not the only reasons for the 
creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which was the first Muslim group in the 
Philippines that engaged in armed struggle. Specifically, the establishment of the MNLF was the 
result of the accumulation of problems that Muslims faced in Mindanao in the 1960s and at the 
beginning of the 1970s. Two critical events, in particular, triggered the establishment of the 
MNLF.261 The first event was the Jabidah massacre, where the Philippines Armed Forces killed 
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approximately thirty Muslims in Corregidor Island.262 The second event was the 1971 general 
election, which reflected a shift in political power from Muslims to Christians in the region that was 
caused by the influx of Christian immigrants from the north of the Philippines. This new political 
configuration disrupted the traditional economic and political system in which Muslims previously 
enjoyed a majority status.263 More importantly, the election campaign was accompanied by open 
conflict between Muslims and Christians. During that time, some Muslims formed armed groups 
that were identified as “barracudas” or “black shirts,” whereas Christians also established a group 
called Illagas (rats). The declaration of martial law by President Marcos facilitated the formation of 
the MNLF, which became more organised and enjoyed popular support, while the government 
committed gross human rights violations.264 Fr. Mercado succinctly described the Mindanao 
conflict as follows:  
The Mindanao conflict has been with us since the 17th century. It is a continuing 
struggle of a minority people against various forms of political, economic, and 
cultural assimilation, which they perceive as weakening or destroying the 
religious, cultural, political traditions of Moro society.265  
 
Several attempts were made to resolve the Mindanao conflict through peaceful means. 
Pressure from oil-producing countries, especially the Libyan government, produced the Tripoli 
Agreement in the late 1976, which was signed by the Philippines government (GPH) and MNLF. 
The agreement provided a general framework for a ceasefire, a peace settlement, and autonomy for 
Bangsamoro266 in thirteen provinces and nine cities. However, the agreement was never fully 
implemented and, therefore, it did not solve the underlying problems in Mindanao. The conflict 
continued despite the ceasefire agreements that had already been established.267  
In 1977, because of internal conflict within the MNLF, some MNLF leaders established a new 
liberation movement called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). As the name suggests, the 
MILF is more religiously oriented than the MNLF.268 The establishment of the MILF saw the 
development of what is, according to ICG, “the country’s largest and best armed insurgent 
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organisation,”269 and led to the wider conflict becoming more complicated and, thus, difficult to 
resolve.  
After the collapse of the Marcos regime in 1986, the new president, Corazon Aquino, resumed 
talks with the MILF, leading to the Jeddah Accord, which highlighted the commitment of the two 
parties to continue peace negotiations. The two parties did not reach any agreements in subsequent 
meetings. However, in November 1989, the GPH moved unilaterally to organise a constitutionally 
based plebiscite that the MNLF had not endorsed. After the plebiscite, the GPH established the 
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which, as with the Tripoli Agreement, has 
not yet been fully implemented. The intractable conflict, therefore, continued sporadically. 
In 1992, Fidel Ramos, the newly elected president, resumed peace talks with MNLF by 
organising two exploratory talks with MNLF in Tripoli and in Cipanas, Indonesia. The long process 
of peace negotiation, finally, produced the so-called Final Peace Agreement that was signed on 2 
September 1996. The aim of the new agreement was to fully implement the Tripoli Agreement that 
was signed twenty years earlier. However, the agreement, which was supposed to fulfil the 
implementation gap of the Tripoli agreement, failed in its implementation. As Tuminez highlighted, 
the ARMM, as the GPH’s principal response to Moro demands and aspirations, failed to address 
critical matters of land, governance, and control over the Moro future. The term “autonomy,” which 
suggested that Muslims would have a considerable degree of self-government in their land, could 
not be implemented. In fact, ‘the ARMM was almost completely dependent on block grants and 
subsidies from the central government.’270  
At the same time, Muslims became frustrated with the political manoeuvring by the MNLF, 
causing the MILF to gain increased public support, leading to it becoming a more, or even the most, 
significant player in the conflict. In 1997, the Philippines’ armed forces launched a full-scale attack 
on the MILF’s military camps. Three years later, in 2000, President Joseph Estrada launched an 
“all-out-war” to vanquish the MILF. With the failure of this initiative, the peace negotiations 
between the GPH and MILF resumed in 2001 and produced a general Agreement of Peace. 
However, it failed to prevent the outbreak of the Buliok War between GPH and splinter groups of 
the MILF in 2003. This series of wars killed thousands of people, both combatants and civilians, 
and resulted in hundreds of thousands of IDPs. One of the worst affected areas of those wars was 
Nalapaan in Pikit. While locals acted in response to the wars, the people in Nalapaan self-organised 
and declared their village a Space for Peace, as I demonstrate in Chapter 6, where I discuss the 
Mindanao case study.  
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A year after the Buliok War, peace negotiations resumed. Since then, numerous exploratory 
talks, which were facilitated by the Malaysian government, were held. Numerous agreements were 
reached, including the framework for a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities that welcomed the 
involvement of the international community through an International Monitoring Team (IMT) 
committee to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement on the ground. 
The intermittent peace talks culminated with the plan to sign a new peace treaty between GPH 
and MILF that was called the Memorandum of Agreement on Moro Ancestral Domain (MoA-AD 
or MoA) in Kuala Lumpur on 5 August 2008. However, protests from Christian politicians and 
leaders in Mindanao led the Philippines Supreme Court to issue a temporary restraining order 
(TRO).271 The MoA was not signed and, consequently, clashes erupted in numerous parts of 
Mindanao. This new conflict dynamic led to the formation of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 
Fighters (BIFF), a splinter group in MILF that was led by a former MILF field commander, Ameril 
Umbra Kato, whose leadership was built on the dissatisfaction of attaining the peace process 
outcomes in conjunction with the GPH.272  
The failure of the MoA marked a key setback in the peace process. Peace talks could only 
resume in February 2011 after the election of the new president, Benigno Aquino III.273 When I was 
in Cotabato, I met Mohager Iqbal, the chief of the MILF negotiation team, who had just returned 
from Kuala Lumpur for the 23rd Exploratory Talk, which had been held on 7 December 2011.274 
After several exploratory, which the Malaysian government was still brokering, the two parties 
signed the historical document called the Framework Agreement (FA) on 15 October 2012. The 
place of signing the agreement was extremely special: Malacanang Palace in Manila, which is a 
meaningful symbol of the Philippines nation. The FA is a general agreement on the establishment of 
a new political entity that is called the Bangsamoro. The FA comprises a general agreement on 
power sharing, revenues and wealth sharing, territory, basic rights, transition and implementation, 
normalization, and related miscellaneous matters.275 As at the time of writing, which is well over a 
year after the signing of the FA, the parties have not yet completed the FA’s annexes, which are 
supposed to be an integral part of the FA. In October 2013, the GPH and the MILF released a joint 
statement on the 41st Formal Exploratory Talks, reporting that the parties made significant 
                                                          
271 Their objection to the MoA-AD was based mainly on the absence of disclosure in the peace negotiation and public 
consultation processes between GPH and MILF, especially towards people, mostly Christians, who would have been 
directly affected politically if the MoA-AD were to be implemented. Interview with Emmanuel Pinol, Kidapawan City 
20 December 20012. He was former Governor of Cotabato, one of petitioners to the Supreme Court.  
272 International Crisis Group (ICG), "Back to the Table, Warily, in Mindanao," (Jakarta/Brussel: ICG, 24 March 2011), 6. 
273 Ibid., 2. 
274 My conversation with some civil society activists in Cotabato demonstrated that they were not extremely 
optimistic about the peace talks because they said “But, it’s still better to talk than fight.”  
275 For complete the FA, see http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/framework-agreement-bangsamoro-0, accessed on 10 
November 2012. 
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progress, but the remaining annexes on power sharing and normalisation issues remain to be 
discussed.276 The latest joint statement of the two parties stated that they have already signed the 
power-sharing agreement during the 42nd Formal Exploratory Talks and the two parties were 
committed to finalise the remaining annexes on January 2014.277 This shows that the FA is moving 
in a positive direction.278 
In general, the present conditions in Mindanao have been relatively peaceful since the two 
parties began trying to follow the FA. However, two notable incidents, besides criminal activities 
that are common in Mindanao, could jeopardize the peace process. The first is the invasion of Sabah 
(Malaysia) by the Sulu people in February 2012 over their claim that Sabah is part of the Sulu 
Sultanate. The clash between the followers of the 70-year-old Jamalul Kiram III, the Sultan of Sulu, 
and the Malaysian army resulted in 62 deaths. As reported by the Sydney Morning Herald, the 
invasion revealed Kiram III’s unhappiness at his exclusion from the peace process between the 
GPH and the MILF.279 This in turn potentially weakened the position of the MILF because the 
question was raised as to whether the MILF truly represents Bangsamoro, including the people of 
Sulu.  
The second incident pertains to the MNLF’s attack of some villages in Zamboanga City when 
the GPH and the MILF organised the 40th exploratory talks in Kuala Lumpur in September 2013. 
Approximately 200 people (rebel members, military personnel, and civilians) were killed in the 
hostage taking and ensuing standoff. This move was believed to be a political attempt by the MNLF 
to jeopardize the peace negotiations being held in Kuala Lumpur.280  
I conclude this introduction by recalling Sydney Glazer’s 1941 journal article, in which he 
wrote that “the problem [in Mindanao] is complicated by centuries-old religious and political 
antagonism.’281 One might argue that religion is not the root cause of the conflict. However, the 
intractable conflict and deep process of instrumentalisation of religion at the grassroots level has 
made the religious and political antagonism even more complicated than when Glazer wrote her 
article. Throughout my fieldwork in Mindanao, I found that the mutual distrust between Muslims 
                                                          
276 See http://opapp.gov.ph/milf/news/gph-milf-joint-statement-41st-exploratory-talks, accessed on 30 October 2013. 
277 See http://opapp.gov.ph/resources/joint-statement-gph-milf-42nd-formal-exploratory-talks, accessed on 13 
December 2013.  
278 During the finalisation of this thesis, a new positive development in the Mindanao peace process occurred. On 27 
March 2014, the GPH and the MILF signed the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro at Malacanang Palace. The 
signing agreement was attended by President Benigno Aquino III, Murad Ebrahim (MILF Chairman), and the Malaysian 
Prime Minister Najib Razak who formally facilitated the peace talks.  
279 See http://www.smh.com.au/world/sulu-sultan-invades-sabah-to-stake-claim-20130304-2fgu8.html, accessed on 6 
March 2013. 
280 A join statement that was released by the GPH and the MILF showed that the parties would not stall the Mindanao 
peace process because of the standoff in Zamboanga City.  See http://www.mindanews.com/top-
stories/2013/09/11/gph-milf-assure-zambo-standoff-wont-derail-peace-talks-condemn-misuari/, accessed on 12 
September 2013. 
281 Glazer, "The Moros as a Political Factor in the Philippines Independence," 78. 
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and Christian to be considerable. Prejudices and stigmas were (re)produced and transferred from 
one generation to the next and the tools to question them were limited and inadequate. In this 
context, whereas discussion at the negotiation table in Kuala Lumpur is critical for resolving “Moro 
problems,” I argue that religious leaders and organisations have provided numerous opportunities 
for negotiation at the grassroots level, and that this has substantially contributed to breaking down 
the barriers that prejudices and stigmas create. In the long term, these types of efforts are what will 
support and foster a sustainable peace.  
 
3.3  Conclusion  
In the first section of this chapter, I explained that the thesis uses qualitative methods through a case 
study approach. I detailed my data gathering techniques, namely library and document research, in-
depth interviews, and participant observation. In the second section, I introduced the two case 
studies that I adopted for the thesis: the conflicts and related peacebuilding efforts in Maluku and 
Mindanao. Because the mentioned complex conflicts have been at least partially characterised by a 
deep instrumentalisation of religion, they constitute valuable cases to investigate how religion might 
be used as a resource for conflict management and peacebuilding. In the next chapter, I directly 
investigate how Christian and Muslims used religious resources to contribute to peacebuilding in 
Maluku.  
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CHAPTER 4 
The Contribution of Official Religious Institutions to Peacebuilding in Maluku 
 
 
In Chapter 3, I introduced the dynamics and complexity of the conflict in Maluku. In this chapter, I 
directly address the research question by examining how religious adherents use religious resources 
to contribute to peacebuilding in Maluku through official religious institutions. I use the theory of 
the ambivalence of the sacred (AoS) to demonstrate how official religious institutions that are 
involved, to a certain degree, in “religious conflict” in Maluku became key players in 
peacebuilding. I argue that religion became a force that could be used to oppose conflict-saturated 
populism, because the leaders of official religious institutions provided strong leadership through 
the hermeneutics of peace (HoP). They took initiatives to reinterpret the existing understandings of 
religion and contextualised them to form a new understanding of religion that supported the 
peacebuilding process in the context of Maluku.  
To develop my argument and examine the role of the official religious institutions in 
peacebuilding, I use two “micro-cases”: (1) the Protestant Church in Maluku (Gereja Protestan 
Maluku, GPM)282 and (2) the Muslim organisations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and 
the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI). Taken together, the evidence 
from these two micro-cases challenges the notion that religion is monolithic or inflexible. I found 
that the Protestant and Muslim communities283 in Maluku were extremely dynamic social agents 
that creatively used a range of religious resources within their respective traditions to contribute to 
peacebuilding. In the Protestant community, the GPM is an organised and hierarchical local church 
organisation that has the moral and religious authority to direct and influence Protestants’ daily life 
in Maluku. The GPM began its involvement in peacebuilding through a formal approach by 
conducting theological reform projects that involved the HoP: these were efforts to reinterpret the 
sacred texts to develop religious arguments for the Protestant community’s engagements in 
peacebuilding. The Church then used its hierarchical and extensive structures to build formal and 
                                                          
282 In the context of Maluku, I use the term Christian refers specifically to Protestantism.  The Indonesian government 
recognises the Protestant (Kristen) and Catholic (Katolik) Churches as “formal religions” or “state-recognised religions” 
and regards them as separate. The separation between the two is part of the colonial legacy because of “the state of 
origin” of the two religions (the Portuguese brought Katolik and later the Dutch introduced Kristen in Indonesia).  
283 In this chapter, I focus on the role of Protestantism and Islam as the two largest religions in Maluku. They played 
crucial roles in the conflict and peacebuilding. I focus on the role of Protestantism and Islam as the crucial players in 
the conflict and peacebuilding in Maluku. Both religions are the two largest religions in Maluku. I use the term 
Christian and Protestant community interchangeably. This does not mean that other religions, especially Catholicism, 
do not contribute to peacebuilding. Bishop Petrus Mandagi (Uskup Ambiona) played key roles in peacebuilding, and 
the formation of the Maluku Interfaith Foundation and the Concerned Women’s Movement, as I explain in the next 
chapter, was greatly influenced by Catholics.  
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grassroots commitments to peacebuilding. During this time, progressive and courageous leaders 
who facilitated the internal transformation of the church led the GPM. 
The Muslim community, in which the tradition of having a single authoritative religious 
organisation is largely absent, became engaged in peacebuilding through other mechanisms. Here, 
official Muslim institutions (the MUI, the NU, and Muhammadiyah) also played a central role in 
peacebuilding, though through less formal and structural approaches when compared to the GPM. 
During the conflict, within the fragmented Muslim community, leaders from the MUI, the NU, and 
Muhammadiyah assumed the initiative to develop the HoP. Through the HoP process of re-reading, 
contextualising, and rejuvenating the Qur’an, the Hadith, the history of Islam, and a platform for 
moderate Muslim organisations, they identified theological arguments that could be used through 
official Muslim institutions and networks to convince grassroots Muslims to engage in 
peacebuilding.  
 
4.1  The Role of the Protestant Church of Maluku (GPM) in Peacebuilding 
Whereas Klinken, one of the key analysts of the Maluku conflict, adopted a “politics by other 
means” approach, arguing that the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan/Indonesia Democratic 
Party-Struggle (PDI-P)284 and the GPM were the principal local parties that were responsible for 
mobilising people to engage in conflict,285 my research uncovered a rather different reality. The 
GPM engaged in the HoP to reinterpret and rejuvenate sacred texts to solve dilemmas arising from 
the conflict and post-conflict situation. This section demonstrates that the GPM, as a local, 
traditional, and aptly structured religious body, had the spiritual power and authority to redirect its 
Christian community, even as it was overcome with emotionally charged religious conflict. The 
GPM could conduct a self-critique and evaluation by questioning its existing theology, which could 
not offer avenues for preventing the conflict from erupting. The GPM produced a new theology and 
doctrinal justification to support the Christian involvement in peacebuilding.286 Therefore, I argue 
that the GPM constituted a crucial religious resource for peacebuilding within the Christian 
community in Maluku.  
This section includes an investigation into how theological reform occurred in the GPM and 
how the reform influenced the perspectives of Christians on and their attitudes towards 
peacebuilding in practice. Additionally, I argue that religious leaders served as a critical resource to 
                                                          
284 PDI-P is one of the political parties in Indonesia led by Megawati Soekarno Putri. She was President of Indonesia 
from 2001 to 2004. She is also the daughter of the first Indonesian President, Soekarno.  
285 Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars, 106. 
286 Of course, using theology to support peacebuilding in Christianity and Islam is not new. As I discussed in Chapters 1 
and 2, peacebuilding initiatives have occurred in other parts of the world that are deeply driven by religion. What I 
specifically investigate here is how local religious organisations dynamically produce a new theology in the specific 
context of Maluku to overcome a bitter social reality that is caused by conflict. 
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complement the GPM’s institutional structures and processes in the pursuit of peacebuilding. 
Particularly, I investigate the role of Rev. Hendriks, a charismatic theologian who became 
Chairman of the Synod during a critical time, and who “formally” ended the conflict by signing the 
Malino II Peace Agreement.  
Before I examine the GPM’s theological reform and its implications for peacebuilding on the 
ground, I briefly introduce the manner in which the GPM organised its religious organisation and 
demonstrate how the structures of the GPM reached Christians even in the remote areas of Maluku.  
 
4.1.1 Introduction to the GPM 
Klinken correctly observed that the GPM is ‘the largest non-government organisation in the 
province… All Protestant young people are socialised in the elements of an extremely formal 
religion through a constant round of activities that takes the dedicated believer away from home 
most nights of the week.’287 The GPM has an extensive history of acting as a suitably structured and 
organised local Protestant church institution after becoming independent from the Dutch Reformed 
Church in 1935.288 It has its own hierarchical structure to govern and coordinate its networks, not 
only in Maluku Province but also in parts of North Maluku Province.  
To deliver religious and social services, as well as reach people even in remote villages across 
Maluku, the GPM organises itself in a three-level leadership structure: Sinode (Synod), Klasis, and 
Jemaat. The Synod is the central authority of the GPM. The discussion and decisions about 
renewing the Church’s theology, as I discuss below, occurred at this level of leadership. Every five 
years, the GPM holds the “Persidangan Sinode GPM” (the GPM Synod Conference) to elect 
democratically the Chairman of the Synod and five other executive positions for a five-year 
tenure.289  
Below the Synod are the coordinative bodies, called Klasis. In 2012, the GPM had twenty-
eight Klasises, which the Church established on an “as-needed” basis to deliver its social and 
religious services, and based on the effectiveness of the administrative coordination. In Ambon 
City, for example, there are two Klasises: Klasis Pulau and Klasis Kota. Because of changes in the 
                                                          
287 Gerry van Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratisation in Indonesia: Small Town Wars (New York: Routledge 
2007), 92. 
288 See for example M. Tapilatu, Sejarah Gereja Maluku (1935-1960)  (Maluku: Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku, 
2004); F. Ukur and F.L. Cooley, Jerih Dan Juang: Laporan Nasional Survey Menyeluruh Gereja Di Indonesia  (Jakarta: 
Lembaga Penelitian dan Studi-DGI, 1979). 
289 Besides electing the leader of Synod, the participants of conference also evaluate the last five years of the Church’s 
vision, mission, programmes, and activities. Based on the evaluation, they plan the Church vision, mission, 
programmes and activities for the next five years. Additionally, to evaluate the progress report of the Synod’ 
programmes, policies, and activities a smaller conference called “Persidangan Badan Pekerja Lengkap Sinode (the 
Conference of Synod Executive Body) is organised every year. This demonstrates that the GPM is hierarchical. Yet, it is 
also a “democratic institution”: the Synod leaders meet regularly and the representatives of Jemaat and Klasis who 
attend the conference draft the Synod programmes collectively.  
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demographical composition of Ambon City and the need to deliver the Church’s social and 
religious services more effectively, the GPM plans to divide two existing Klasises in Ambon City 
into three Klasises. In wider Maluku, the GPM has a strategic plan to have 32 Klasises in place by 
2015.290 
The lowest level of leadership of the GPM is the Jemaat. A cluster of Jemaats constitutes a 
Klasis. Generally, one Jemaat has at least one church. In numerous cases a Jemaat has one large 
church and two or three smaller churches. The role of a Jemaat is critical in the GPM’s structure. 
The real social, political, and religious problems are found at the Jemaat level. The Jemaats usually 
forms “units” consisting of Christian families that reside in a Jemaat area. The GPM’s programmes 
include a focus at this level of leadership because it directly “meets” with people on the ground.  
To spread the GPM’s perspective on religion and social life across society, the synod, for 
example, regularly publishes and distributes small books for Jemaats called Bina Jemaat (Guidance 
for Jemaat), Bimbingan Khutbah (Guidance for Preaching for the GPM pastors), Santapan Harian 
Keluarga (Guidance for Family Daily Activities), Renungan Pengantar Kerja (Reflection for 
Workers/Professions before Working). In 2005, it was reported that the GPM had 524,403 
members, consisting of 110,784 families and 754 Jemaats.291  
During my fieldwork, I was able to observe how the GPM structure works. In the GPM 
churches that I visited, I saw the GPM’s theme and sub-theme written on banners that were hanging 
on the churches’ walls. My interviews with the GPM pastors in the local churches show how the 
GPM’s decisions were taken as guidance for daily life by the Church apparatus and the grassroots 
members. In short, the GPM influenced the daily lives of ordinary Christians in Maluku very 
strongly. The GPM Synod’s decisions are heard and obeyed by the faithful because of its religious 
and spiritual authority. In some cases, the GPM’s authority is substantially stronger than the formal 
political authority of the government.  
Having discussed the GPM’s strong structure, which can reach people even in remote areas in 
Maluku, together with the position of the GPM Synod as the central religious authority, which 
strongly influences Christian daily life in Maluku, in the next section I investigate the theological 
reform process that has been occurring for the last 10 years within the GPM. The process of reform 
is a crucial part of recent GPM history and is central to how the religious institution identified a 
basis for contributing to peacebuilding.  
 
 
                                                          
290 Interview with Rev. Abraham (Ampi) Hatharie, Ambon, 14 January 2013. He is Coordinator of the Bureau for 
Publication and Documentation of the GPM Synod. 
291 "Report of the Result of the 35th Conference of the Gpm Synod Held on 25 October -02 November  2005 at Gereja 
Maranatha (Ambon City)." 
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4.1.2 The Call for Theological Reform 
Theology determines the church’s formal position and direction. As a powerful religious 
organisation, the GPM used its spiritual influence as a religious resource for peacebuilding by 
engaging in theological reform through the HoP process. The HoP consisted of deep reflection and 
an extended period of contemplation to answer the fundamental question of why the existing church 
theology and the practice of religion failed to prevent the eruption and escalation of the conflict.292 
The question of reform could only emerge within the GPM itself because the GPM was not only 
playing a political game. The GPM, as John Ruhulessin explained, is a religious institution that has 
multiple social and cultural responsibilities: to Christians and the people of Maluku in general, to 
government, and to God.293 Therefore, the self-critique and the evaluation that eventually led to 
theological reform were necessary for the GPM to remain relevant to the actual challenges that 
people in Maluku faced.294 
I.W.J. Hendriks, the former Chairman of the GPM Synod who was responsible for initiating 
theological reform in the GPM, further illustrated why theological reform took place in GPM:  
When I was elected as the Chairman of Synod [in 2001], I asked a question to myself 
and colleagues in the Synod. How we—as the Church, the religious organisation, the 
Kingdom of God—understood the conflict and resolved it. We kept questioning our 
theological position. We were the church and the way of our thinking must be based 
on the Church’s spirit, it must be based on a theological perspective. [Of course] we 
learnt [the conflict dynamics] from a social, political, and security perspective. But 
don’t forget, this was the Church, so all of our decisions and policies must be 
theologically justifiable and accountable.295  
 
The internal struggle within the GPM to understand the conflict and its solution theologically 
manifested in the call for renewal of the Church’s theology during the height of the religious 
conflict. Sidang XXIV Badan Pekerja Lengkap Sinode GPM 2002 (the 24th Conference of the Synod 
Executive Body) highlighted the need for the theological reformation of the GPM to cope with new 
developments in Maluku, including how the GPM would deal with the escalation and de-escalation 
of the conflict.296 In the Conference, the GPM laid down the foundations of the reform of its 
theology by using the church’s sub-theme: “Theological Reform as a Force for Empowerment of 
the Umat (Believers) to Overcome the Multi-dimensional Crisis in Church, Society and State.”297  
                                                          
292 Interview with Rev. John Ruhulessin, Ambon City, 12 July 2011. He is the Chairman of the GPM Synod from 2005 to 
2015.  
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Interview with Rev. Izaac Willem Josias (I.W.J.) Hendriks, Ambon City, 14 January 2013. He was the Chairman of the 
GPM Synod from 2001–2005. 
296 "The Result of the 24th Conference of the Gpm Synod Executive Body Held on 10-14 November 2002 in Kei Besar ". 
297 "The Result of the 24th Conference of the Gpm Synod Executive Body Held on 10 -14 Nonember 2002 in Kei Besar." 
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The need for the GPM to reform their theology is demonstrated clearly by its self-evaluation 
and self-critique leading to the conclusion that “almost all Church apparatuses and adherents 
slipped into everyday patterns of violence and indifference.”298 Therefore, a position gradually 
emerged, and was consolidated because “a new theology is needed to ensure that the GPM becomes 
the Church of Christ, which is prolife, inclusive, incorporative, synergistic, and pro-existence.”299  
The idea of the reformation of theology assumed a concrete formulation in the GPM’s visions 
and missions in 2005. The GPM vision consists of the following:  
As a Reformed Church, the GPM should continue to reform itself by transforming 
for progressiveness, betterment, perfectness, usefulness, and meaningfulness, and not 
the other way around, transforming towards regression, degradation and missing of 
the meaning and orientation of life.300 
 
Therefore, the GPM missions are to  
Liberate the Church from a Church worldview that is scripturalist, dichotomist, 
paternalistic, exclusive, triumphalistic, and imperialistic and to enhance the cultural 
service based on, for example, contextual, equal, equative, inclusive, pro-existence 
and dialogical-synergic, humanistic, cooperative, sharing, pro-life oriented 
principles.301  
 
Although the document does not explicitly mention the GPM’s vision, mission statements, 
and attitudes in previous times, we can assume that the GPM wanted to revise their previous 
position or the inclination of the Church’s scripturalist, dichotomist, paternalistic, exclusive, 
triumphalistic, and imperialistic values and attitudes. By noting that reasons might have existed for 
the Church to reform itself, some research demonstrates that Christians in Maluku feel superior to 
others. This problem is called pangkat serani (Christian status or rank).302 In the colonial era, as 
Cooley records, Christians were granted privileges in the context of colonial rule by virtue of their 
religion. These privileges included better access to education and jobs, and consequently, numerous 
Christians felt that they had a higher political and social status than non-Christians.303 This colonial 
legacy persisted after the independence of Indonesia until the 1980s through the convention that 
Christians tended work in formal sectors (e.g., civil servants, banks, and military and police 
officers) whereas Muslims worked in informal sectors (e.g., trading and services).304 
                                                          
298 "Report of the Result of the 35th Conference of the Gpm Synod Held on 25 October -02 November  2005 at Gereja 
Maranatha (Ambon City),"  36. 
299Ibid.  
300Ibid., 55. 
301Ibid. 
302 Cooley, "Altar and Throne in Central Moluccan Societies: A Study of the Relationship between the Institutions of 
Local Government in a Traditional Society Undergoing Rapid Social Change," 389. 
303 Ibid., 389-90. 
304 Jacob W. Ajawaila, "Orang Kristen Di Maluku Dan Perubahan Sosial Budya," in A Conference of the GPM in Ambon 
City  
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The GPM mission statement quoted above offered an answer to this reality. Furthermore, two 
formulations and manifestations of the GPM’s HoP directly answer the need to justify working for 
peaceful conflict resolution: pro-life spirituality and the spirit of pluralism. Before I discuss in 
detail pro-life spirituality and the spirit of pluralism in the GPM, noting that theological reform does 
not necessarily mean that the GPM was involved in speculative debates about, for example, truth 
and salvation in the hereafter is critical. Rather, the Church’s focus was on theologically justifying 
acting as an institution in the “here and now” to address multiple problems that existed in conflict 
and post-conflict peacebuilding situations. Additionally, in the GPM’s view, theological reform 
should not only occur in seminaries and formal educational institutions, but the attitudes of the 
GPM’s leaders and members in their daily life should also reflect it. Specifically, ‘the 
term ”theology” [is interpreted as all] considerations, decisions and actions that are guided by faith 
to cope with daily life to enhance the life quality of the people of Maluku.’305  
 
(1) Pro-life Spirituality 
One of the clear manifestations of the GPM’s theological reform, as it relates to the process of 
peacebuilding, was an emphasis on respect for human lives. The GPM called it ‘spiritualitas yang 
menghidupkan’ or ‘spritualitas yang pro hidup’ (the spirituality that promotes life or pro-life 
spirituality). Pro-life spirituality involves the interpretation and contextualisation of the local 
situation, but it is also linked to the national situation. The national theme for the Communion of 
Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan Gereja-Geraja di Indonesia) (PGI), of which the GPM is a 
member was ‘Seek me and live; seek the Lord and live.’306  
According to Hendriks, the GPM’s decision to choose a pro-life spirituality is based on Jesus 
Christ’s personality, who is taken as an exemplary leader of non-violent resistance for all 
Christians. Hendriks explained that, during his life, Jesus could have used alternative strategies for 
his liberation mission, such as joining Zealot groups, which adopted military means to achieve its 
liberation mission. However, Jesus chose “liberation without violence” by developing the 
awareness of faith and rightness in his disciples. He chose Jalan Salib (the Stations of the Cross) as 
a way of liberating people. The crucifixion must be viewed as Jesus’ nonviolent protest to unjust 
power, as well as his consistency in using nonviolent means. Jesus sacrificed himself to liberate 
people from the cycle of violence.307  
In the context of GPM’s theological reform in Maluku, Hendriks stated that he often asked 
himself and the GPM’s pastors and believers these rhetorical questions: ‘it is true that Jesus wants 
                                                          
305"Report of the Result of the 35th Conference of the Gpm Synod Held on 25 October -02 November  2005 at Gereja 
Maranatha (Ambon City),"  38.  
306 Amos 5:6-5-6.  
307 Interview with Rev. I.W.J Hendriks, Ambon City, 14 January 2013. 
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Christians to be involved in this religious war? Does God want the destruction of His own 
creations?’ Hendriks believes that God, as the Creator, does not promote the death and destruction 
of His creations. Therefore, all GPM members must follow Jesus’ ways in their lives, including the 
pro-life spirituality that was formulated by the GPM in response to the devastating impact of 
religious conflict in Maluku.308  
Pro-life spirituality emphasises that life is a valuable gift from God, which should be 
respected, and for which people should be thankful. During the conflict, human life was not valued. 
In Rev. Hendriks’s expression, “the lives of people are even cheaper than the price of a piece of 
chicken.”309 In the pro-life spirituality adopted by Hendriks and his GPM colleagues, respecting 
God means appreciating human life. Searching for God means “ensuring that the accrual of political 
power, money and knowledge is for the betterment of life and humanity. Therefore, rituals to God 
cannot be separated from social action for humanity.”310  
Pro-life spirituality emerged between 2002 and 2004 when it became central to the GPM’s 
theological orientation. The GPM’s sub-theme in 2002, for example, was “Developing spirituality 
that promotes life as realisation of theological reform in order to overcome the multi-dimensional 
crisis in the Church, community, state and nation.”311 With slightly different wording, the GPM’s 
sub-theme in 2003 and 2004 still emphasised the significance of respecting life in the new 
elaboration of GPM theology. Crucial for the GPM’s involvement in peacebuilding is that the term 
“spirituality” does not only refer to a vertical relation between God and believers but it also 
emphasises the horizontal connection between people, including with other religious believers. The 
GPM document in 2002 approached spirituality as a lifestyle that draws on strong faith and heartfelt 
belief and is expressed as ideas and actions that can be used to answer contextual problems. 
Therefore, a pro-life spirituality was developed “to prevent things that possibly make humans 
become inhuman.”312  
 
(2) Promoting Pluralism and Recognising Local Adat  
The GPM is renowned as an ecclesiastical institution that historically had strongly opposed the local 
adat. The strong process of “Westernisation” of the church in Maluku, enacted by the Dutch 
missionaries, proscribed against traditional practices. The Bible, religious instructions, and rituals 
were translated to the Indo-Malay language, causing Christians to not speak the local Malukan 
languages. In contrast, these are, still widely spoken by Muslims.  
                                                          
308 I.W.J. Hendriks, Ambon 14 January 2013. 
309 Interview with Rev. Hendriks, Ambon City, 11 July 2011.  
310"Report of the Result of the 35th Conference of the Gpm Synod Held on 25 October -02 November  2005 at Gereja 
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The process of Westernisation meant that Christians’ connections with local practices and 
customs were broken or disrupted. Adat and the ancestral beliefs were often perceived as 
backwardness, which was to be ignored. Adat was to be separated from Christianity so that it would 
not “contaminate” the purity of Christian teaching.313 For example, in the recent history of the 
GPM, the students from Faculty of Theology of the Universitas Kristen Maluku (UKIM), which 
belongs to the GPM, were sent to conduct practical fieldwork (Kuliah Kerja Nyata-KKN) in 1980s. 
They destroyed a holy adat site of the local people in Seram Island because they considered the 
rituals performed at the site to be against Christian teaching.314  
Within this context, the second manifestation of theological reform in the GPM involves 
pluralism (kebhinekaan/kemajemukan). It includes recognising the importance of local adat, such as 
pela and gandong, as traditional mechanisms to promote peace and social cohesion. In post-conflict 
peacebuilding, the GPM realised that, in the past, the Church did not seriously account for the idea 
of cultural and religious pluralism. This was reflected in the GPM’s strategic plan for 1995–2005, 
which placed little emphasis on the importance of pluralism.315 As a response, the sub-theme of the 
GPM from 2005 to 2010 has been pluralism.  
The idea of pluralism, in fact, had already emerged in the GPM’s discourse in 2002. Eight 
points were presented in the document entitled ‘Pemahaman Iman Gereja tentang Pluralism’ 
(Church Perspective on Pluralism). Among them is the acceptance of plurality and diversity as 
historical facts that should be responded to positively and optimistically. Pluralism should be built 
on responsibility and inclusivity, to learn about each other in order to enrich and celebrate diversity. 
Furthermore, with the spirit of pluralism, comes a call for the GPM to establish new functional 
relations between religions in Maluku, which should be implemented concretely, instead of simply 
through academic and theological debate.316 Again, the GPM became involved in the HoP, the 
process of reinterpretation of its basic doctrine, to adjust its position and lay the foundations for 
contributing to peacebuilding. 
Furthermore, in 2006, the GPM’s sub-theme was ‘Together, implementing the Church’s 
commitment in the context of people of faith in a plural society.’317 As a religious institution, the 
GPM realised that cultural and, especially, religious plurality and diversity are a reality that 
Churches should acknowledge by embracing new perspectives. The GPM, with its goal to promote 
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pluralism, aimed to develop a common humanity and share responsibility for a new world order at 
large, and, specifically, a peaceful Maluku, based on justice and non-violence.318 
To summarize, the theological reform within the GPM, especially regarding pro-life 
spirituality and the promotion of pluralism and local adat, was part of the process of the HoP. The 
reform laid the foundation for the GPM as a hierarchical religious organisation to contribute to 
peacebuilding. For an official religious organisation that is highly respected by Protestants in 
Maluku, theological reform was a critical avenue for using religion for peacebuilding. In the 
following section, I present the practical application and implementation of the GPM’s theological 
reforms and assess how the reform has directly contributed to the process of peacebuilding in 
Maluku. 
 
4.1.3 Theology in Action: ANSOS and the Live-in Programme 
As I outlined above, the GPM has a powerful structure that reaches people systematically. In this 
section, I outline two manners in which the GPM systematically mobilised its structure to enact 
post-conflict peacebuilding in accordance with its theological reforms. The first practical 
manifestation of the theological reforms within the GPM is the Training in Social Analysis (Analisa 
Sosial) (ANSOS) programme. To implement the Church’s vision and mission, which is to answer 
real problems in the community, including the post-conflict peacebuilding situation, the GPM 
Synod regularly conducts ANSOS for the GPM’s apparatus. This training helps participants to 
broaden their perspective on social and development theories that could be used as an analytical 
tool to locate their religious beliefs and church mission in the context of social problems (e.g. 
poverty, development, environment, and local good governance), including peacebuilding 
initiatives at the grassroots level. ANSOS is designed to analyse abstract theological perspectives to 
produce concrete, tangible, and measurable programme activities that address specific problems at 
the grassroots level.  
According to Hengki Pesiwarissa, the head pastor of Silo Church, ANSOS has helped him to 
link the GPM’s theological reforms with social phenomena. Through ANSOS, Pesiwarissa realised 
that the existence of the Church, for example, is not only for Christians but also for people 
surrounding the Church, regardless their religious affiliation.319 Although the Silo Church has not 
yet established long-term, systematic programmes to reach Muslim communities, the ANSOS 
training has laid down the foundation for the Church to broaden its perspective and awareness to 
engage in concrete social actions. The Silo Church, for example, has worked for several years with 
Muslim communities in Jalan Baru (a Muslim Community behind the Silo church building) to 
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provide dinner for breaking the fast during Ramadhan to show solidarity across religions.320 In 
return, the Muslim community in Jalan Baru has organised gotong-royong (voluntary work) with 
the Silo Church congregation members to clean areas surrounding the Church before Christmas.321 
The second practical activity to implement theological reform at the grassroots level was the 
Live-in Programme. One of the most serious problems of post-conflict peacebuilding in Maluku 
was that the people were segregated along religious lines. Whereas both Christians and Muslims 
now frequent the same government offices, banks, and markets, the segregation barrier is extremely 
strong and continues to affect social relations deeply. To combat segregation, the GPM, with the 
assistance from Muslim activists from Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku (LAIM), organised the Live-in 
Programme, which was an activity that had been conducted numerous times for the GPM pastors. 
After conducting sessions on Islam and Christianity, the participants brainstormed their perceptions 
and concerns about living or staying with a Muslim family. Subsequently, arrangements were made 
for every GPM pastor to stay overnight with a Muslim family.  
According to the alumni of the Live-in Programme whom I interviewed, as well as the 
transcriptions of the programme that I could access, the programme changed the participants’ 
perceptions towards their Muslim brothers and sisters. Most of the participants had unpleasant 
memories of the conflict. Novadyette Mailoa, a woman pastor, said that, if she had a choice, she 
would have refused to stay overnight with a Muslim family. Her husband and she were the GPM 
pastors in Poka, where all Christians were expelled from the villages and their church was burnt 
down during the conflict. Since then, she had found it deeply traumatic to interact with Muslims. 
She explained that, because the programme was compulsory, she tried to convince herself that her 
participation in the programme would be a beneficial experience that she could share with her 
current congregation members. However, because of her personal trauma, she planned to have only 
extremely limited interaction with the house owner. Even before leaving for her homestay, she had 
a bath to avoid having a bath in the Muslim house. Because she would arrive at the house in the 
evening, she planned to have only short conversations, go to sleep, and leave the house early in the 
morning.322 
However, Nova had a entirely different experience to that which she expected. The Muslim 
family that she was to stay with warmly welcomed her. They had a friendly conversation until the 
middle of the night. They shared the same sadness and worries, as well as hopes that the conflict 
would not erupt again. She had a bath in the morning and had a chance to work around the 
neighbourhood and converse with neighbours. One interesting moment and an unforgettable 
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memory for her was before leaving the house she met an old Muslim woman who gave her Rp 
10,000 (around AUD$1) and asked her to donate the money to the Church and pray for her daughter 
to recover from a serious illness. She offered this comment:  
The old lady is Muslim. And she donated money to the Church, to a religious 
institution that does not belong to her religion. The Live-in Programme totally 
changed my mind toward Muslims. The old Muslim lady also taught me to be a good 
believer. Sometimes we don’t need to have a complicated religious understanding 
and sophisticated theories on religious pluralism and multiculturalism. Just interact 
with ordinary believers; you will get wisdom.323 
 
Another participant of the Live-in Programme was Lenny who found that the programme 
played a significant role in her personal life. She also had extremely negative memories of the 
conflict. Her church was burnt down and all the members of the congregation were evacuated from 
the village where she worked as a pastor during the conflict. When she was sent to Kebon Cengkeh, 
a Muslim village in Ambon, to stay overnight with a Muslim family as part of the Live-in 
Programme, she could not deny that she still had deeply traumatic feelings. She could not imagine 
that she would sleep in Kebun Cengkeh because it was a stronghold of Muslim combatants and a 
base camp of Laskar Jihad during the conflict.324 
Yet, through the Live-in Programme, she experienced a personal transformation. Direct 
interaction with a Muslim family was part of healing her trauma. She realised that the Muslim 
family that she stayed with was also a victim of the conflict. Before the programme, she even 
thought that only Christians suffered from the conflict, and that all Muslims supported the conflict:  
I thought all Muslims are just bad. Why did they kill and expel us from our homes? I 
thought I would never forgive them. But then I realised that many Muslims disagreed 
with the conflict, but they just couldn’t do anything to oppose and stop it. In fact, 
they were victims too. Just like us Christians. Not all Muslims are bad.325 
 
In addition, the program became a great avenue for her to be more committed to Christian 
teachings on peace, reconciliation, and forgiveness. After the conflict, she often experienced a “split 
personality.” She should have preached the basic teachings of Jesus Christ on mercy and 
compassion, but because of her experiences, she preached those values half-heartedly: “sometimes I 
felt like a hypocrite. I preached in my congregation things that I didn’t fully embrace.”326 Therefore, 
the programmes run by the GPM helped her to heal the wounds and put the church teaching into 
reality.  
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The mentioned personal stories show how theological reform within the GPM has influenced 
the mind and attitudes of the Church apparatus to cope with challenges in the post-conflict context. 
Whereas the general perception of religion is that it is a force for conflict, the GPM, as a formal 
religious institution, made a deliberate and substantial effort to find a position to contribute to 
peacebuilding. The process involves the HoP, which produced theological reform as a foundation to 
form a new orientation in post-conflict society. Those cases also show how religion, which, to some 
degree, had previously facilitated conflict, can became a vehicle for social mobilization, as well as 
for organisational networking, to sustain peace, and legitimise moral righteousness, and justify 
peace. 
In the next sub-section, I discuss the personal history of the chief leader of the GPM to reveal 
how he used theological reform to act decisively to terminate the conflict and develop sustainable 
peace. My discussion also demonstrates that religious leadership within the GPM is a critical 
religious resource in the Protestant community in Maluku. Not only did leaders like Hendriks 
contribute decisively to theological reform that lay the foundation for concrete and practical 
peacebuilding; they also exemplified concrete efforts to make peace.  
 
4.1.4 Decisive Religious Leadership 
Rev. I.W.J Hendriks is a charismatic and senior theologian who became the Chairman of the GPM 
approximately two years after the outbreak of the conflict. He was elected as the Chairman of the 
GPM Synod in 2001 and was part of efforts that ended the conflict by signing a peace agreement in 
Perjanjian (Maluku di) Malino (the Malino II Agreement) in 2002. Hendriks’s involvement in 
peacebuilding efforts is partly embodies the GPM’s theological reforms. This leads me to argue that 
the combination of a highly organised and hierarchical religious organisation, as the premier 
resource, and passionate personality and leadership, as a secondary important religious resource, 
made possible the strong engagement of the Protestant community with peacebuilding.  
The Synod, as an official religious organisation that has power to direct people’s lives, 
became more powerful and meaningful for peacebuilding when a charismatic personality began to 
lead it. Hendriks was widely recognised by the Protestant community as a respected senior 
theologian who has also an exceptional personality, making him the right man, at the right time, in 
the right place.327 The deep instrumentalisation of religion during the conflict meant that Christians, 
including some pastors, could not easily accept peace negotiations as an avenue to terminate the 
bloody conflict. The GPM, as a religious organisation, was also divided. Lay people and religious 
leaders fully recognised the importance of the position of the Chairman of the Synod, as the highest 
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symbol of religious authority in the Church. Therefore, internal competition to control this highest 
position in the Church hierarchy could not be avoided.  
The 2001 Synod Conference exemplifies the ambivalence of religion, where “moderate” and 
“hard-line” groups within the GPM contested the highest position of the Synod. Both groups 
realised that the Church’s future theological orientation and political policy would be determined by 
the chairmanship of the Synod. The election of Hendriks as the Chairman in the 2001 Synod 
Conference symbolised the victory of a “moderate voice” within the GPM over the “hardliners.” 
Another strong contender was Hengky Leleury, who publically promised that, if he were elected as 
the Chairman of the Synod, he would mobilise all means, including legalising formal institutional 
supports from the GPM, to fund “Christian soldiers” to defeat the Muslims.328 Two Chairmen of 
Klasis in Ambon (Klasis Kota and Klasis Pulau) were part of the hardliners faction within the 
GPM. Lay people entered into the Conference Hall during the Conference, which, according to the 
GPM internal law, can only be attended by pastors, to urge the Conference to decide to provide 
formal support for the Christian warriors in the battlefields.329 In this extremely tense situation, the 
election of Hendriks could be viewed as the victory of the religious peacebuilders over the religious 
peace-spoilers.  
In leading the GPM, Hendriks’s faith and belief in God, as well as his commitment to the 
Synod’s decisions, especially those on pro-life spirituality, became his resources to lead the church 
to advocate the ideas of peacebuilding. As the Chairman of the GPM Synod, he became involved in 
the HoP to define his position in the context of the conflict. He felt a great responsibility to tell 
Christians “the bitter truth” that the violent conflict must end because it contradicts the basic 
teachings of the Church. The passage in the Hebrew Scriptures that inspired Hendriks to lead the 
synod decisively and that was so meaningful to him is worth quoting:  
The word of Lord came to me: “Son of man, speak to your countrymen and say to 
them: ‘When I bring the sword against a land, and the people of the land choose 
one of their men and make him their watchman and he sees the sword coming 
against the land and blows the trumpet to warn the people, then if anyone hears 
the trumpet but does not take warning and the sword comes and takes his life, his 
blood will be on his own head. Since he heard the sound of the trumpet but did not 
take warning, his blood will be on his own head. If he had taken warning, he 
would have saved himself. But if the watchmen see sword coming and do not 
blow the trumpet to warn the people and the sword comes and takes the life of one 
them, that man will be taken away because of his sin, but I will hold the 
watchmen accountable for his blood.330  
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According to Hendriks’s understanding and interpretation of these verses, the religious 
leaders are given a privilege as “watchmen” to see “problems” in a broader, clearer, and longer-
term perspective, compared to the lay people’s perspective. He adopted the analogy of religious 
leaders standing up at the top of a fort so they can see “the problems” more clearly than the ordinary 
people who only stand on the ground. Religious leaders are religiously obliged to remind and warn 
the people of potential problems. Furthermore, religious leaders are sinful if they do not warn 
believers of imminent disasters.331  
When he was elected as the Synod Chairman, he humbly explained his position as follows:  
I’m an ordinary human being who is afraid. But, as a religious leader, I didn’t want 
to compromise the theological principles that were chosen by the Church, with all 
possible risks that might occur to me and my family. I realised that I was against the 
mainstream. But I believe in that [theological perspective of pro-life spirituality]. I 
wouldn’t diverge from that theological position.332  
 
Through his faith in pro-life spirituality, Hendriks worked tirelessly to end the conflict and 
restore the relationship between Christians and Muslims. Hendriks used pro-life spirituality as a 
religious resource that was grounded in the GPM’s theological reform as a reason to energise him to 
work tirelessly for peace in Maluku. He initiated and attended numerous secret meetings and 
backchannel conversations to build bridges of communication with Muslim leaders to solve 
problems peacefully. Those meetings evolved into an understanding that the conflict should be 
terminated by formally signing a peace agreement in Malino (Perjanjian Maluku di Malino/Malino 
II).  
In numerous cases, tensions between the church and some members were unavoidable. A few 
days before the Malino II agreement was to be signed, a bomb exploded behind the Maranatha 
Church (the GPM Synod office), which signalled the disagreement of some of the grassroots 
Christians with the Synod’s decision to attend Malino II. However, Hendriks called a meeting with 
pastors and Christian grassroots leaders to convince them that the conflict must be terminated. He 
asked all Christians in Maluku to practice consistently a pro-life spirituality that should reduce 
violence and to behave peacefully during the conflict.333 
The personal process that was involved in the HoP led Hendriks to believe that a pro-life 
spirituality also implied non-violent resistance. One of the concrete examples of the application of a 
pro-life spirituality is Hendriks’s non-violent action around the middle of 2001. This action was 
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symbolically critical in showing the Christian and Muslim publics and the local and national 
governments that the top leader of the GPM had shown his commitment to end the conflict 
peacefully. After Hendriks had been working for days and nights on building peace constituencies 
among Muslims and Christians and everyone could see that the conflict was about to end, a horrible 
tragedy occurred that raised a new tension and wrecked the trust that had just started to develop. A 
Christian motor boat was bombed, killing dozens of people. Early in the morning after the tragedy, 
Hendriks had spoken to his colleagues in the Synod that “the war was now his war.” Then, wearing 
his religious attire, he walked to the Governor’s office. In front of the Governor’s office, below the 
Indonesian flag, he spread newspapers and sat down on them, closed his eyes and started fasting 
and meditating. He promised himself that he would not stop fasting and meditating unless 
government, police, and military officers promised and committed themselves to take serious 
actions to stop the conflict and enforce the law. In less than one hour, the governor of Maluku came 
to see him, begging him to stop the action and asked him to discuss the matter in the Governor’s 
office.334 
The powerful structure of the GPM synod and the consistency of Hendriks’ actions in 
preaching and practicing a pro-life spirituality were fruitful. The GPM, with its considerable 
influence as a representative body of the Protestant community, and Hendriks’s leadership were 
instrumental in persuading the local and national governments to take crucial measures to end the 
conflict. Hendriks’ attitudes, including his non-violent action in front of the governor’s office, also 
convinced the Muslim leaders and grassroots communities that the top leader of their enemy was 
extremely serious about stopping the conflict.335 After a long conversation and negotiation with 
Muslim leaders and the government, Hendriks led the Christian delegation to sign the Malino II 
Agreement on 22 February 2002. 
The signing of Malino II, as noted by some scholars, did not cause to the immediate cessation 
of the conflict. Sporadic and provocative incidents still occurred in Maluku until the end of 2002, 
especially in Ambon City. Convincing the grassroots Christians to obey the points in the Perjanjian 
Malino while the violence continued constituted a significant challenge. Hendriks and the GPM 
religious leaders continued campaigning for the idea of a pro-life spirituality as part of the post-
conflict peacebuilding process.  
In short, one of the concrete manifestations of the GPM’s theological reforms partly became 
evident through Hendriks’s personal actions. The election of Hendriks, who was renowned as a 
charismatic leader who strongly opposed religious conflict, to the highest position in the Church’s 
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hierarchy, could be interpreted as the GPM not always acting as the type of political actor that 
appears in Klinken’s analysis.336 The majority of the voters within the GPM structure elected 
Hendriks because they believed that Hendriks (with five other elected leaders) would use the 
GPM’s spiritual power to redirect people to end the conflict and build peace. The combination of 
the power of the official religious organisation (the GPM), through its authoritative religious 
structure, and Hendriks, who, in his daily life, implemented the theological reforms consistently, 
were strategic religious resources that were put to use for peacebuilding.  
To conclude this section, I summarize some essential findings and arguments that I made thus 
far. First, the case of the GPM demonstrates, following Appleby’s concept of the ambivalence of 
the sacred, that religion is a phenomenon that can be used to produce positive or negative effects. 
Whereas the secular perspective approaches religious networks as always having been used to 
mobilise conflict, the GPM hierarchy provides evidence that it was a critical religious resource in 
the Protestant community and a significant force in managing peace and security in Maluku. 
Through a strong and hierarchical religious institution, the GPM can reach and influence hundreds 
of thousands of grassroots Protestants. More importantly, the GPM holds spiritual power and 
religious legitimacy for its congregation members, which allows it to direct and redirect the 
Protestant believers’ perceptions and attitudes toward peace and conflict.  
In the GPM, the dynamic processes of the HoP were implemented as internal debates that 
proceeded from rereading the sacred texts together through deep spiritual reflection, contemplation, 
and socio-cultural and political analysis. The HoP allowed the GPM leadership to ask fundamental 
questions of whether the Church’s theology and its religious practices before and during the 
religious conflict were in accordance with the fundamental mission of the faith and were relevant to 
overcome actual problems within society. These were the types of question that allowed the GPM to 
perform a constructive self-critique and evaluation to identify a new form of theology that could be 
used as a religious resource for peacebuilding.  
Secondly, charismatic, decisive, and passionate leaders who were elected as the GPM’s 
Synod leaders, especially the election of Hendriks as the Chairman of the Synod at the height of 
the religious conflict, were also critical resources for peacebuilding in the Protestant community. 
Through the HoP, the process of reinterpretation, and re-contextualisation of the teachings of 
Jesus, they could facilitate the GPM’s change of its stance against populism to redirect the 
Church’s orientation from a strong engagement in communal violence to active participation in 
peacebuilding. They were religious leaders who wisely used the Church’s hierarchy and authority 
to influence and convince people at the grassroots that the Church must engage in peacebuilding 
activities. The GPM Synod, with other religious leaders, organisations, and government was able 
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to sign the Malino II Agreement that ended the religious conflict. They worked tirelessly to 
implement the agreement by convincing its grassroots network that the agreement was the most 
appropriate solution for Maluku. The leaders also ensured that the GPM’s structure actively 
participated in peacebuilding. The GPM, for example, organised ANSOS and the Live-in 
Programme, which helped to break down the new theological understanding into real activities at 
the grassroots level to deal with complex problems in post-conflict conditions.  
Having discussed the role of the official Christian organisations, I now turn to discuss the 
contribution of the official Muslim organisations in Maluku. As part of the analysis, I examine the 
different challenges that Christian and Muslim communities faced in using religious resources for 
pursuing peace in Maluku.  
 
4.2  The Quest for Peace in Muslim Organisations  
In this section, I investigate how the Muslim community used religious resources in Maluku to 
contribute to peacebuilding. Different religious traditions generate different religious resources and 
approaches to attain peacebuilding. As I discussed in previous section, the primary resource of 
Christian peacebuilders is the GPM, which is a powerful religious authority that could influence 
Christian life in Maluku. Islam, in contrast, does not follow the tradition of having a single body of 
religious authority. For this reason, the religious resources that contribute to peacebuilding in the 
Muslim community derive less from a highly authoritative and hierarchically structured religious 
organisation, and more from the religious leaders that constitute and give life to informally and 
laterally structured organisations.  
The people who channelled religious leadership in Muslim organisations in Maluku 
demonstrated courage by opposing the prevalent public sentiments and emotions, including those 
expressed by Laskar Jihad (the Troops of Jihad),337 the paramilitary group from outside Maluku 
that wanted to prolong religious wars in Maluku. In a very chaotic situation, the Muslim religious 
leaders demonstrated decisiveness and commitment to working for peace. They became involved in 
the HoP, the process of using religious resources (i.e. the Qur’an, the Prophet’s Traditions, and the 
history of Islam) as inspiration and justification to establish a lasting peace in Maluku.  
In this section, I begin by assessing the source of religious authority in the Muslim 
community (ummah) of Maluku. Subsequently, I examine the role of the religious leaders of three 
Muslim organisations, the Indonesia Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) (MUI), 
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Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and how they individually contributed to peacebuilding 
and used these organisations to contribute institutionally to peacebuilding.  
 
4.2.1 Sources of Religious Authority 
The common practice in the Islamic Sunni world is that Islam is not based on a hierarchical 
religious institution that has the authority to supervise Muslim religious affairs. In other words, no 
body or institution in Islam can become a supreme religious authority that can claim and 
monopolise the “interpretation of truth.”338 This reality can mean numerous things. One rendering is 
that Islam is a “leaderless religion” or a “religion without structure.” This interpretation, perhaps, 
confirms the reality that Muslim communities in numerous parts of the world are scattered, divided, 
disorganised, and suffer from intra- and inter-religious conflict. Another interpretation might be that 
Islam offers a non-hierarchical framework to its adherents where pluralistic interpretations of 
religion can flourish and, sometimes, are allowed and appreciated. Everyone’s voice should be 
heard, no one or any Muslim group can claim to be superior to another.   
The internal plurality of the ummah is also a reality in Maluku. The diversity of Muslims in 
Maluku, in terms of religious organisations, schools of thoughts, and political affiliations generates 
a complex situation. Muslims never had a single perspective on conflict situations, leading to 
different interpretations of the sacred texts to justify the means to engage in conflict or find a 
solution to it. This has also led to the contention on the question of religious leadership in Muslim 
communities: Who could represent whom? Which organisation could speak on behalf of Muslims? 
Whose ideas and interpretations of religions were more “valid” and deserved to be followed by 
adherents? 
In this context, unlike the GPM, which has the moral and spiritual authority to influence the 
Christian perspectives and attitudes towards conflict and peacebuilding, Muslims face an extremely 
different institutional landscape, including a far less clear delegation of religious authority. The 
current Chairman of the MUI, Idrus Tatuhey, for example, describes the different modes of 
operation of the MUI and the GPM as follows: 
MUI is totally different with GPM. The instruction of the Chairman of the Synod 
will be directly followed by all the GPM’s pastors. In the Muslim community, as you 
know, we need discussions before we (Muslims) can agree to do something together. 
Look at real life. The role of the pastor is very important in the Christian community. 
A funeral cannot be performed in Christianity without the presence of a priest. All 
rituals in Churches should be led by priests. [In contrast] an elder [without a formal 
                                                          
338Eickelman and Piscatori discuss the contested meaning of sacred authority in Muslim Societies. See Dale F. 
Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics  (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996).  
81 
 
position in Muslim organisation structures] can lead the funeral or ritual in 
mosques.339 
  
One consequence of the less formal structuring of Muslim organisations is that it is 
institutionally difficult to produce a final and bounded doctrinal perspective and “political” decision 
on the process of peacebuilding. In these circumstances, the Muslim religious leaders undertook 
initiatives for peacebuilding individually and completed them through and on behalf of Muslim 
organisations. Thus, the approach is not “institutional” in the same sense that it is within the GPM, 
and yet, in and through their actions, individual leaders enacted institutional action and leadership in 
manners that resonate with the actions of Hendriks of the GPM.  
Like Christians, Muslims engaged with emotions and sentiments that were caused by a deep 
instrumentalisation of religious language and symbols in circumstances where the state was absent 
or compromised. In this highly polarised context, the Muslim leaders conducted the HoP by 
identifying verses of the Qur’an, the Hadith, and the personal history of Prophet Muhammad that 
they could use to justify theologically becoming involved in peacebuilding. With a refreshed 
understanding of Islam, they offered a new stance against populism to open up communication with 
the enemy and, thus, to end the bloody conflict by finding common ground. They worked 
assiduously, often at considerable personal risk, to convince the ummah that peacebuilding is not 
only politically appropriate but also theologically justified. Thus, religious leaders used religious 
resources to contribute to build peace through three Muslim organisations: the MUI, the NU, and 
Muhammadiyah.  
 
4.2.2 Religious Peacebuilders in Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Maluku  
In this sub-section, I investigate the role of the MUI, as an official religious organisations, and its 
leaders in peacebuilding and I emphasise my principal argument: strong Muslim religious 
leadership still channelled and facilitated informally peacebuilding initiatives through institutional 
structures. Muslim leaders engaged in the HoP, using an interpretation of Qur’an and Hadith to 
justify peacebuilding and introduced the new interpretation to the Muslim community on behalf of 
the MUI. To illustrate this case, I specifically discuss the contribution of Ustadz Abdul Wahab 
Polpoke, the Co-chairman of the MUI, who signed the Malino II Agreement.  
From the outside, the MUI, as the Council of Ulamas, can easily be thought to be the most 
representative Muslim organisation in Maluku. However, this is not the case. Although, historically, 
the establishment of the MUI was a part of the political strategy of the New Order regime to control 
the Muslim community and, thus, to expand its political domination, in reality the MUI does not 
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have power to act as a Muslim umbrella organisation that oversees Muslim religious affairs.340 In 
addition, the MUI does not have the grassroots membership base of other Muslim organisations. 
One effect is that Muslim believers have greater loyalty to the organisation that they are pledged to 
than to the MUI. Therefore, the MUI decided not to automatically bind the other Islamic 
organisations from which the Council of Ulamas is drawn. In short, although the government, in 
some cases, has used the MUI for its political agenda, it does not mean that, by controlling the MUI, 
it can automatically control Muslim affairs in Indonesia.341  
Regardless of some of the MUI’s weaknesses, this situation arose from the nature of the 
Islamic community, and simply creating other formal and hierarchical organisations could not help 
to solve it. Saleh Latukonsina, the Governor of Maluku, with some Muslim leaders, intended to 
establish a more cohesive and unified Muslim organisation as the alternative to the MUI. After 
months of preparation, Musyawarah Besar Ummat Islam Maluku (the Congress of Muslims in 
Maluku) was held in Ambon City on 18–21 June 2001. It was claimed that the participants 
represented all the districts in Maluku and represented all the sectors of the Muslim communities 
based on age, profession, and gender.342 The participants agreed to form Badan Imarat Muslim 
Maluku (BIMM) (Executive Body of Muslims in Maluku) and democratically elected a senior 
Muslim cleric in Maluku, Ustadz Ali-Fauzi, as General Chairman, and Nasir Rahawarin, as General 
Secretary. The formation of BIMM, however, did not help to solve the problems that they were 
intended to solve. As I explain further in the next section, a controversy, and even tensions, 
surrounded the issue of who would represent Muslims at the peace negotiations with Christians. By 
examining the original document of the Maluku Peace Agreement in Malino, it becomes evident 
that some leaders signed the agreement on behalf of the BIMM. Yet, after being inactive for several 
years, the BIMM was finally dissolved by its leadership.343  
The MUI, in this context, was still regarded as a Muslim umbrella organisation. However, 
unlike the GPM, as a religious organisation that was formally engaged in the HoP by evaluating 
existing theology and building a new theology that was compatible with peacebuilding issues, the 
MUI did not follow formally and directly the GPM’s trajectory. The MUI found it impossible to 
make a formal political and theological decision during the conflict. During my fieldwork, I did not 
find any formal MUI written documents that showed its theological position in the conflict. Yet, the 
MUI leaders provided me with numerous stories on how they engaged in the HoP, rereading and re-
interpreting the sacred texts to overcome crisis. The initiative to participate in the peacebuilding 
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Society 12, no. 1 (2005). 
341 Ibid. 
342 Interview with Natsir Rahawarin, Ambon City 15 July 2011. He is former Secretary General of BIMM. 
343Natsir Rahawarin, Ambon 15 July 2011. 
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process, as I reveal in my forthcoming detailed discussion of the case Ustadz Abdul Wahab 
Polpoke, originated from individual leaders rather than from institutional policies.344 A series of 
secret meetings with Christians, which produced the peace negotiation in Malino, were not formally 
established as organisational decisions and policy. However, the Muslim leaders later used the MUI 
to attain greater recognition, support, and justification from the Muslim community. 
After the Malino II Agreement, the MUI tried to be more effective as an organisation.345 The 
MUI kept working to promote peace in post-conflict Maluku and played at least three roles in post-
conflict peacebuilding. First, the MUI has maintained excellent institutional relations with the GPM 
and the Catholic Bishop of Amboina. They often organised meetings that produced press releases or 
moral messages to strengthen the peace in Maluku. In critical situations, these religious institutions 
emerged in public to remind religious people to maintain peace and order.  
Second, as a formal religious institution, the MUI continued to support Lembaga Antar-Iman 
Maluku (LAIM, The Maluku Interfaith Foundation). The MUI’s support of LAIM has significantly 
affected the acceptance of the LAIM programme in Muslim communities and organisations. I 
specifically discuss the role of LAIM in peacebuilding in the section below.346  
Thirdly, the MUI leaders showed their commitment to the harmonious relations between 
religion and adat as a vehicle for mobilising support for peacebuilding. As elaborated above, an 
internal plurality existed within the MUI leadership. Some leaders rejected the idea of mixing 
Islamic teachings with the local culture and adat because they might influence the “purity” of Islam. 
The MUI’s General Chairperson, who was the central figure of the organisation, showed his  
respect to the local adat, advocating that it should be enhanced in tandem with religion to establish 
a suitable peace in Maluku.347  
The question that remains unanswered is how the MUI leaders decided to participate in 
peacebuilding projects within the limited formal institutional religious authority that they had. To 
describe how the MUI leaders used religious resources for peacebuilding, I examine the case of 
Ustadz Abdul Wahab Polpoke, the co-chairman of the MUI. 
 
 
                                                          
344 As the Malino II document shows, the thirty signatories of Malino II formally represented Muslim organisations and 
villages. One represented the MUI, the other six Muslim leaders represented the BIMM. Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Al-Hilal were respectively represented by one leader.    
345According to Tukan In 2011, the MUI established its branches in all cities and districts in Maluku, except for Buru 
Selatan. The government of Maluku continues to support the MUI. Every year, the MUI receives Rp 150 million 
(around AU$15,000) for its operational costs from the government, including the salary of two administrative staff, a 
janitor, and two drivers. The government also provided a building for the MUI Maluku at Kapaha, including two cars 
that are used by the Chairman and General Chairman of the MUI. 
346Idrus Tukan, Ambon 19 July 2011. 
347Ibid. 
84 
 
From Warrior to Peacemaker 
One of the most influential local Muslim leaders in Maluku was Ustadz348 Abdul Wahab Polpoke 
whose personal leadership was seen as equal to that of Rev. Hendriks, the Chairman the GPM 
Synod. Their names, out of 30 signatories from their respective religions, were the first signatories 
on the Malino II Agreement. Polpoke’s personal history regarding peacebuilding is unique for 
numerous reasons. First, Polpoke’s personal history exemplifies the complexity of religion and the 
contention and competition over the idea of peace and conflict within the Muslim community in 
Maluku. Second, it demonstrates the ambivalence of the sacred, where religion has power to 
motivate its adherent to be either warlords or peacemakers. It also shows the power of the HoP: 
religious interpretation can be used to mobilise for peace.  
Third, it confirms my argument that in the Muslim community, in the context of the absence 
of a religious institutional authority, serious peacebuilding initiatives relied on individual leadership 
to leverage wider institutional legitimacy. Without the organisational support, the Muslim leaders 
tried to convince the ummah of the importance of peace in accordance with the “new” interpretation 
of the Qur’an and the Hadith. Later, to provide a stronger justification, those personal efforts to 
build peace were incorporated as part of an organisational decision. 
Polpoke is not, to borrow Race’s term, an inclusivist and pluralist peace activist.349 When I 
interviewed him, Polpoke still seemed to me to be a “conservative” religious leader. He opposed the 
idea of the revitalisation of adat (pela-gandong) that has been widely promoted by most peace 
activists in Maluku. For him, pela-gandong was part of the Dutch strategy to weaken the position of 
Islam. Pela-gandong, according to Polpoke, also failed to prevent violent conflict from erupting 
and, therefore, he saw no reason for revitalising it to sustain peace in Maluku. He also criticised 
Muslim leaders in the Ambon government who open and close their speeches by greeting their 
audience with shalom350 instead of assalamu’alaikum, which is recommended by Islam. 
Nonetheless, although he is not an inclusivist and a pluralist according to “Western standards,” the 
story of Polpoke shows that, even for an “exclusivist” religious person, religion still provides 
opportunities to mobilise for peace.  
A month before the conflict erupted in Ambon City, Polpoke claimed that he was informed by 
“someone” that Christians would attack Muslims. He carried a parang (sword) everywhere he went. 
Even during his speeches in tarweh prayer in Ramadhan,351 he urged Muslims to equip themselves 
                                                          
348Ustadz is an Arabic term that means teacher. In Indonesia, the term ustadz is commonly referred to religious or 
Islamic teachers.  
349 Alan Race, Christian and Religious Pluralism  (New York: Orbis Books, 1982), 10-37. 
350 Part of indication of the rise of religious symbolism in Maluku is that Malukan Christians greet others using shalom 
in their formal speeches, which cannot be found among any Christian communities in Indonesia.   
351The conflict in Maluku erupted on 19 January 1999, during ‘IdulFitri, the largest Muslim festival in Indonesia, which 
marks the end of Ramadhan, the month of fasting.  
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and their families with an “arsenal” to defend themselves from Christian attack. Because of this, 
people labelled him a crazy ustadz who preached violence.352  
During the conflict, Polpoke was one of the Muslim leaders to whom the communities 
listened. With other leaders, he became involved in setting up a strategy to defend and save 
Muslims communities from being attacked by Christians. Numerous informants told me the widely 
renowned story that in a speech that was given to thousands of people during a mujahidin’s funeral 
in a Muslim graveyard in Waihaong, he swore that he would cut off his own finger if he were 
unsuccessful at kicking Christians out of Ambon City.353 
However, a certain understanding and interpretation of the Maluku conflict dynamics allowed 
him to soften his political and religious position toward the “enemy” (Christians). This case 
demonstrates that change and dynamism within religion through the HoP are possible. Polpoke 
became involved in the process of the HoP when he was trying to interpret and rejuvenate the 
meaning of some of the verses of the Qur’an and the Hadith, as the principal source of theological 
justification, in accordance with the new developments and dynamics within the conflict.  
When I interviewed him, Polpoke revealed the reasons and means for changing his position 
from “warrior” to “peacemaker” as he came to terms with a shift in conflict dynamics that he 
analysed through an Islamic theological perspective. First, Polpoke believed that Islam teaches its 
followers to take seriously the “Islamic ethics of war.” In Islam, for example, war can only be 
declared as a self-defence mechanism to protect Islam and Muslim communities from the enemy. In 
other words, Islam prohibits its adherents from initiating offensive wars. Polpoke observed that, at 
the time when he was assuming initiatives to identify solutions to Maluku’s problems, Christians 
were no longer attacking Muslim communities, or at least the intensity of the wars that Christians 
initiated had greatly reduced. Therefore, Muslims had a reason, grounded in Islamic ethics, to 
organise dialogue to find avenues to terminate the violence.354 
Second, and more specifically, the HoP played a critical role in developing the Islamic ethics 
of war. According to Polpoke, Islam prohibits Muslims from “exceeding the limit.” Numerous 
verses in the Qur’an, in various contexts—not only in war situations—oblige Muslims to view 
matters proportionally and not to transgress.355 According to Polpoke, when he was involved in 
dialogue with Christians, Muslims were at the point of winning the war. Because of the Christians’ 
weak position, Christian leaders sent a “signal” that they wanted to stop the war: 
                                                          
352 Interview with Abdul Wahab Polpoke, Ambon City, 15 July 2011. He was co-Chairman of the MUI in Maluku during 
the conflict. 
353Conversation with numerous friends and respondents in Ambon. 
354 Interview with Polpoke 
355 See, for example, the Qur’an, Al-Baqarah: 190 “And fight in the way of Allah the ones who fight you, but do not 
transgress; surely Allah does not love the transgressors.” 
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In wars, there is no an Islamic teaching that obliges us (Muslims) to vanquish the 
enemy (Christians). We cannot even kill an enemy who has surrendered. And there is 
not a verse in the Qur’an or the Hadith that instructs Muslims to continuously fight 
the war against the enemy (without conditions).356 
 
Thirdly, according to Islam, Muslims should forgive their enemies if they surrender. 
Forgiveness is one of the basic teachings of Islam.357 As suggested by Abu-Nimer, forgiveness is 
one of the profound principles of Islamic peacebuilding.358 However, Muslims often forget the 
concept of forgiveness during conflict, perhaps, because of self-interest, which stimulates anger, 
hated, retaliation, and prejudice. During my interview, Polpoke quoted the Qur’an:  
Quite a number of the People of the Book wish they could turn you (people) back to 
infidelity after you have believed, from selfish envy, after the Truth has become 
manifest unto them; but forgive and overlook, till Allah accomplish His purpose; for 
Allah has power over all things.359  
 
Numerous verses in the Qur’an, according to Polpoke, persuade Muslims to forgive even their 
harshest enemies, if they want to make peace. However, because of emotions and limited knowledge, 
some Muslims, especially those who rejected the idea of peace, only observed a particular verse or 
verses in the Qur’an without interpreting it or them within the more comprehensive spirit of the 
Qur’an. For example, Polpoke noted that verses such as “Never will the Jews or the Christians be 
satisfied with thee unless thou follow their form of religion” (Albaqarah: 120) was extremely popular. 
It was used by some Muslims to oppose the process of peaceful resolution without knowing the 
specific context of the verse’s revelation and whether the verse was relevant to the Maluku 
situation.360  
Polpoke also argued that to resolve Maluku’s problems, people must focus on its problems 
and not introduce outsiders’ problems, which could worsen the difficulties already faced in Maluku. 
He pointed to the manner in which the religious conflict in Maluku became more difficult because 
Muslim fighters were associated with the Palestinians and the Christians with the Jews. Therefore, 
in a Muslim public gathering, Polpoke said this to his audience:   
If Christians do not want to solve the problems peacefully, let them go to the Middle 
East to help Israel to attack Palestinians. [Or, the other way around], if Muslims do 
not want to allow the peace process to materialise, they should go to Middle East to 
help Arafat [the Palestinians] to fight against Jews. Ambon is not a place for 
(religious) fighting!361 
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357 Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice, 67. 
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With these and similar political and theological motivations, Polpoke became involved in a 
conversation to search for the possibility of a solution to the conflict. Several meetings were 
organised voluntarily by religious organisations or were facilitated by the government. Notably, no 
one explicitly and publically used and promoted the words “peace” or “peaceful resolution” 
(perdamaian or penyelesaain konflik secara damai). Any efforts to discuss peace would be rejected 
by the masses. Therefore, the religious leaders needed to paraphrase the term “peace and peaceful 
conflict resolution” to “menyelesaikan sengketa” (to resolve a dispute) or mengakhiri 
kekerasan/masalah” (to terminate violence or resolve a problem).  
Assuming a position to promote dialogue was not without risk. For example, in a public 
consultation before the Malino II Agreement, in a mosque in Kapaha, Polpoke explained the 
importance of the “termination of the conflict” with Christians. A young man stood up and spoke in 
front of the gathering, discouraging him from promoting a peaceful resolution with Christians. If 
Polpoke did not adopt this position, the young man claimed that Polpoke’s blood would be halal—
allowed to be spilt. The young man thought that killing Polpoke was justified because he persuaded 
Muslims to compromise with the enemy, which Islam did not allow. The crowd started to scream. 
Luckily, some elders could control the situation from becoming more chaotic. This type of terror 
occurred several times.362 
The risks that Polpoke and other participants of the Malino II Agreement faced increased after 
they returned from Malino.363 When returning home from the Al-Fatah Mosque, Polpoke’s car was 
stopped by hundreds of people who opposed the Malino II Agreement. They threw stones at his car, 
breaking all its windows. The crowd, who were carrying swords, tried to approach him. Fortunately, 
police officers guarded him from the angry crowd.364 Polpoke affirmed that he was able to 
overcome his terror because of his belief in God. He believed that his interpretations of the Qur’an 
and the Hadith that drove him to become involved in the process of peacebuilding were correct and, 
therefore, blessed by Allah. He believed that Allah protected him because he did what Allah 
instructed him to do.365 
Polpoke used his personal interpretation of religion to justify the process of peacebuilding 
through the MUI, of which he was co-chairman, and to support his commitment in the face of real 
and significant personal risk. As noted above, although the MUI was not highly organised and 
functional in Maluku during the conflict, its peacebuilding missions gained considerable legitimacy 
and recognition in the eyes of Muslims, Christians, and the both national and provincial government 
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because it was a religious organisation. As noted above, Polpoke, who signed the Malino II 
Agreement on behalf of the MUI, recognised that his peacebuilding mission attained greater 
effectiveness in reaching the larger Muslim communities when he worked through organisations.366 
The MUI, according to Polpoke, helped to build a perception among Muslim communities that 
mainstream ulamas in Maluku were pro-peace agreement and Muslims in Maluku must follow the 
ulamas’ decision.367 
To sum up, in the Muslim community, charismatic and courageous religious leaders, such as 
Polpoke, used their long historical engagement with the Muslim community before and during the 
conflict, and their knowledge of Islam, to convince the ummah that a peaceful resolution was the 
best choice for them. Polpoke engaged in the HoP, finding justification from the Qur’an and the 
Hadith to cease the conflict. Yet, Polpoke signed the Malino II Agreement on behalf of the MUI. 
This indicated that support from official religious institutions was substantial and that the interplay 
between Muslim leaders and organisations was critical. Furthermore, in post-conflict peacebuilding, 
the MUI played peacebuilding roles, such as maintaining good relations and communication with 
other official religious organisations (e.g., the GPM). The MUI, together with other official 
religious organisations, also established and continued to support the LAIM (Maluku Interfaith 
Foundation). The MUI’s commitment to support the revitalization of local customs (pela-gandong) 
was also crucial to building peace in Maluku. Below, I turn to investigate the contribution to 
peacebuilding in Maluku by the NU and Muhammadiyah, and of their leaders as provincial 
representatives of the two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, which have contributed 
substantially to Indonesian development in general. 
  
4.2.3 Muslim Peacebuiders in Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah 
Extensive research has been conducted on Islam in Indonesia, which is the most populous Muslim 
country in the world, and especially on the NU368 and Muhammadiyah,369 the two largest Muslim 
organisations in Indonesia. Both the NU and Muhammadiyah370 were established long before 
Indonesia gained independence in 1945. They played critical roles at every juncture of Indonesian 
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history. A strong network, which was established through their branches, and concrete social 
programmes at the community level throughout Indonesia make Muhammadiyah and the NU 
extremely influential in Indonesia, both socio-culturally and politically.371  
No systematic local study about the Muhammadiyah and the NU in the context of Maluku is 
available. My fieldwork findings in Maluku coincided with Klinken’s conclusion that the NU and 
Muhammadiyah are weaker compared to their counterparts in other parts of Indonesia.372 However, 
NU and Muhammadiyah in Maluku are still religiously and politically credible because they are part 
of strong and influential religious organisations in Indonesia, which is the largest Muslim country in 
the world. Moreover, the moderate Muslim organisations of NU and Muhammadiyah, which were 
strongly established in Indonesia, also used their platform in Maluku to help to resolve the conflict.  
In the context of peacebuilding in Maluku, the Chairman of the NU, Jakuba Karepesina,373 
was one of the signatories of the Malino II Agreement. I was unable to identify any specific 
documents that outlined the NU’s theological position on peacebuilding, just as I was unable to 
identify such a document for the MUI. According to Syarief Hidayat, the secretary of NU in 
Maluku, no systematic and intensive discussion occurred within the NU to answer fundamental 
questions, either concerning the reasons why the NU should attend the Malino peace talks or the 
nature of the NU’s theological position on the resolution of the conflict.374 This occurred because 
the conflict impeded the NU’s structure from working adequately. More importantly, the internal 
plurality of the NU prevented the NU from forming a consensus among its leaders on how it should 
have acted during the conflict and how the conflict should have ended. Some NU senior leaders, 
such as Mohammad Attamimi, strongly opposed the Malino peace talks.375 Conversely, Karepesina 
decided to attend the peace talks in Malino, with all of the possible risks that he would encounter 
from the ummah, including facing the NU members who rejected the idea of the Malino peace talks.  
Hidayat explained that Karepesina had two reasons for attending the Malino peace talks. The 
reasons consisted of a combination of the NU’s perspectives on Islam and “political realism.” First, 
the Indonesian public already knows the NU as a “moderate” Muslim organisation that offers a 
peaceful approach to undertaking dakwah (proselytising) and rejects any forms of radical, violent, 
and extremist activism. The NU is also extremely friendly towards local traditions and practices, 
which led to the NU being dubbed a traditional Muslim organisation. The NU, therefore, strongly 
supports the traditional belief and practice that all people of Maluku are orang basodara (siblings), 
regardless of their religious affiliation, because they are tied by pela and gandong. These are the 
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NU’s general principles that were used by Karepeinsa as a principle, which all the NU members 
must support, for the termination of conflict between orang basodara. The NU members should 
also be involved in the process of reconciliation in this “family dispute.”376  
Second, regarding politics, an immediate termination of the religious conflict was the only 
available choice if Malukans did not want to face a worst-case scenario. At the same time, the local 
and national governments had also shown their strong commitment to end the conflict. With these 
two perspectives, Karepesina decided to become involved in the peace process, attending the 
Malino peace talks.377    
The participation of Karepesina, as one of the signatories of the Malino II Agreement, was 
highly appreciated because his presence boosted the political and social legitimacy of the 
agreement.378 Although the NU in Maluku was weak, within the context of both national and local 
political landscapes, the presence of an NU representative at the Malino peace talks increased the 
political and moral credibility of choosing peace because the Maluku branch of the largest Muslim 
organisation in Indonesia supported it. In this case, the NU, as a religious organisation, played a role 
in peacebuilding in Maluku. The association of the NU in Maluku with the national Muslim 
organisation has helped to increase its credibility as the voice of Muslims in Maluku.  
Additionally, the involvement of the NU in the post-conflict reconstruction was incorporated 
by its autonomous body, the Institute for Research and Human Resource Development of the NU 
(Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia NU) (LAKPESDAM NU). 
Currently, LAKPESDAM is actively involved in peacebuilding activities as a part of a consortium 
of non-governmental organisations called Titian Perdamaian, which focuses on the revitalisation of 
local culture to support the peace and reconciliation process in Maluku.379  
I argue that, although the NU is weak in Maluku, it played crucial organisational roles in 
mobilising support for peace. The NU leaders command a degree of social and political recognition 
not only from Muslims but also from Christians and the local government because they are part of a 
powerful Muslim national organisation. Additionally, the teaching of the NU as a moderate Muslim 
association also encouraged the NU local leaders to participate in resolving conflict peacefully. 
I turn to discuss Muhammadiyah, a Muslim organisation that is renowned for its network of 
social services, such as schools, universities, hospitals, and orphanages.380 Like NU, 
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Muhammadiyah in Maluku is weaker compared to other Muhammadiyah branches in Java and 
Sumatra.381 Although some of Muhammadiyah’s social services are present in Maluku, they are 
considerably fewer compared to other Muhammadiyah provincial branches.382  
One of the more noticeable attempts of Muhammadiyah’s involvement in peacebuilding was 
the initiative of the Department of Muhammadiyah Elementary-Secondary Education of Ambon 
City (Majelis DIKDASMEN Muhammadiyah Kota Ambon) to establish Sekolah Rekonsiliasi 
(Reconciliation School). In 1999, Sekolah Menengah Umum Muhammadiyah Ambon (SMUM 
Ambon) (Muhammadiyah High School of Ambon) was burnt down during the conflict. With 
extremely limited facilities and resources, SMUM Ambon continued to run the school by sharing 
space in Sekolah Dasar Negeri  (elementary state school) Tawiri and Sekolah Menengah Pertama 
Negeri  II Ambon (secondary state high  school) Ambon. The principal objective of the Sekolah 
Rekonsiliasi was to provide an educational space where Christian and Muslim teachers and students 
could interact and mingle as a real example of the idea of reconciliation. Having rebuilt the SMUM 
Ambon with the support of the UNDP, the Sekolah Rekonsiliasi was formally opened on 5 February 
2004. The school promoted reconciliation through classes where Muslim and Christian students 
studied in the same classes with teachers from different religious backgrounds. Given that, during 
the conflict, schools, teachers, and students were segregated along religious lines, the initiative of 
the SMUM Ambon represented the first effort to break down the segregation barriers in 
education.383 A few months later, violent conflict broke out again in Ambon City. On 24 April 
2004, the Sekolah Rekonsiliasi was burnt down amid mass violence. 
In addition to Sekolah Rekonsiliasi, Idrus Tatuhey, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, became 
actively involved in the process of peacebuilding. Tatuhey recalled that he was involved in the early 
stages of preparation of the Malino II Agreement. Even long before the Malino peace talks initiative 
had emerged, he was already engaged with a local peace initiative called Pusat Rujuk Sosial (Centre 
for Social Reconciliation) where some inter-religious leaders and academics established strategies 
to terminate the bloody conflict.384 
It was difficult to decide for Muhammadiyah whether it should become involved in the 
Malino peace talks because some Muhammadiyah leaders and members, in principle, opposed the 
idea of “peace” and “reconciliation” with the enemy. In other words, Muhammadiyah, as an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
186 tertiary education institutions (universities and technical collages), 284 health service units (hospitals and clinics), 
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382 Interview with Idrus Tatuhey, Ambon City 18 July 2011. He is former Chairman of Muhammadiyah in Maluku and of 
the signatory of Malino II Agreement. 
383Ivan Hadar, "Terobosan Pasca-Konflik: Aliansi Perdamaian." Can be accessed on  
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organisation, could not formally agree on a stance about the conflict and conflict resolution. As was 
also the case for the NU, no formal meetings were organised involving Muhammadiyah’s Maluku 
provincial leadership because the Muhammadiyah leaders were scattered in refugee camps or stayed 
with their relatives outside Ambon City. Only two or three leaders could meet occasionally in 
Muhammadiyah’s offices. During the conflict landline and mobile phone connections were highly 
unreliable, making communication difficult.385 In that challenging context, Tatuhey believed that, 
as the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, he had to attend and participate in the Malino II meetings to 
stop the conflict because he saw that the conflict had destroyed the future of people of Maluku.386  
As with the case of the NU, I could not find any documents that would explain 
Muhammadiyah’s theological position on peacebuilding. However, according to Tatuhey, as a 
Muslim leader, his decision to attend the Malino talks was sturdily grounded in Muhammadiyah’s 
religiosity. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, was a controversial figure during his 
time because of his progressive thought and actions, which the majority of people did not 
understand when he started his reform activism. People later recognised that Dahlan’s actions were 
theologically and socially correct because they saw their positive implications. Tatuhey knew that 
his decision “to shake hands” with the enemy would be perceived by the ummah as madness by 
religious leaders. However, Tatuhey strongly believed in the principle that “a leader is to lead,” 
despite realising that coming to Malino would negatively affect him and his family.387  
Tatuhey explained, moreover, that his decision was theologically justified in Islam. He was 
convinced that the Prophet Muhammad’s life story provides an excellent example of how the 
Muslim ummah could resolve political disputes and conflict through peace negotiations. The 
Prophet Muhammad personally negotiated numerous peace treaties with Christians and Jews to find 
common ground for peaceful coexistence.388  
After signing the Malino II Agreement and returning to Ambon, Tatuhey experienced 
numerous acts of terror and intimidation from Muslims who disagreed with the agreement. Again, 
Tatuhey considered that the Prophet consistently upheld the peace treaties that he had reached and 
promised to punish any Muslims who broke the agreements. With this understanding, Tatuhey 
continued to persuade Muslims to accept the Malino II Agreement as a starting point to begin a new 
chapter in Maluku’s history. His commitment to uphold the Malino II Agreement was also 
strengthened by the fact that the Vice-Chairman of Muhammadiyah’s Central Board, Din 
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Syamsuddin, also attended the Malino II Agreement signing and advised him to consistently 
support it.389  
I argue that, as in the case of the NU, Muhammadiyah is not a strong Muslim organisation in 
Maluku. However, being part of an influential national religious organisation, Muhammadiyah in 
Maluku has social and political leverage as a religious organisation to contribute to peacebuilding in 
Maluku. Moreover, Muhammadiyah’s leader in Maluku also used the teaching of the founder of 
Muhammadiyah as an inspiration to participate in the process of peacebuilding, which diverged 
from populism.  
 
4.3  Conclusion  
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the official Protestant and Muslim organisations exercised 
different, rich, and pluralistic religious resources in peacebuilding. The Protestant organisation (the 
GPM) used a formal religious approach to peacebuilding by using its powerful and hierarchically-
structured religious organisation, which had the power to determine the direction and orientation of 
the Protestant believers in Maluku, as the primary religious resource for peacebuilding. The GPM 
explored the HoP as part of theological reform in an exegetical process of re-reading doctrinal texts 
and contextualising them to facilitate the flourishing of peace. The GPM also organised practical 
programmes, such as the Live-in Programme and Social-Analysis Training (ANSOS), which helped 
to analyse the theological reform to produce practical and implementable programmes for building 
peace at the grassroots level.   
The Synod leaders who were elected during the height of the religious war were also part of 
the religious resources in the Protestant community. Conducting and institutionalising the GPM’s 
theological reforms was possible because of the decisive and charismatic leadership that emerged 
during the conflict. In other words, personal leadership complemented the role of the GPM as the 
principal religious resource that contributed to peacebuilding in the Christian community.  
In contrast to the GPM, the absence of a single hierarchical religious authority in the Muslim 
community led Muslims to pursue peacebuilding using a different approach. Whereas the GPM 
adopted a formal institutional approach to peacebuilding, Muslims worked toward peace in an 
informal manner. The role of individual Muslims, specifically leaders, in this context, was central. 
The Muslim leaders led through informal initiatives to engage in the HoP, discovering theological 
justifications for peacebuilding and introducing new theological understandings to official Muslim 
organisations to attain greater and larger levels of support from Muslim communities.  
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The three top leaders of the Muslim organisations (the MUI, NU, and Muhammadiyah) also 
used different religious resources in their attempts to contribute to peacebuilding. Whereas Polpoke 
(Co-chairman of the MUI) explicitly used the Qur’an and the Hadith to establish an Islamic ethic of 
war that justified his initiatives to build peace, Karepesena (Chairman of NU) and Tatuhey 
(Chairman of Muhammadiyah) did not directly use the Qur’an and the Hadith. Karepesena used the 
NU’s platform as a moderate Muslim organisation that opposed all forms of religious violence and 
extremism and supported peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims based on local 
custom and wisdom (pela-gandong). Tatuhey used the life history of the founder of 
Muhammadiyah, Ahmad Dahlan, who modelled strong, consistent, and decisive leadership even 
when making decisions that ran against the mainstream. Tatuhey also believed that his decision to 
become involved in making peace deals with Christians had its precedents in Islamic history, such 
as the peace treaties that the Prophet Muhammad himself implemented.  
Muslims organisations also contributed to peacebuilding practically. They organised practical 
programmes, such as the School of Reconciliation, strengthening the relationships of religion and 
local adat, and promoting inter-communal harmony through interfaith institutions. Within 
limitations, the Muslim organisations still had a relatively high level of social-cultural recognition 
from the people because of the long period in which they had been present in Maluku, which 
preceded the conflict considerably. More importantly, those organisations are part of large national 
Muslim organisations that gave them a level of legitimacy as representatives of the Muslims in 
Maluku in the eyes of the Muslim community, the Protestant leaders, and the government. 
 Both of the micro-cases concerning the Christian and Muslim official religious institutions 
demonstrate that ignoring the contribution of religion to peacebuilding in Maluku is a mistake. In 
fact, official religious organisations that previously engaged in “religious war” through the HoP 
turned to offer pluralistic, flexible, and rich resources for peacebuilding.  
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CHAPTER 5  
Searching for Peace through Unofficial Religious Institutions 
 
 
Having examined the role of official religious institutions in peacebuilding in the previous chapter, 
in this chapter I investigate the role of “unofficial” religious organisations in Maluku. I use the term 
“unofficial” to refer to religious groups or communities that are part of an official religious 
organisation in terms of their theology, but whose operations are akin to those of non-government 
organisations (NGOs) and which do not have structural links to official religious organisations.390 
What, in turn, makes them different to “secular NGOs” and other types of peacebuilding initiatives 
is that their formation, programmes, and activities are used as religious resources. The unofficial 
religious institutions engage in the hermeneutics of peace (HoP), the process of re-reading sacred 
texts, religious traditions, and narratives to identify religious arguments that can justify their 
involvement in the peacebuilding process. Therefore, their peacebuilding missions are deeply 
motivated and grounded in religious worldviews. The principal argument of this chapter is that 
religion significantly contributes to peacebuilding in Maluku in pluralistic manners. That is, I argue 
that religion makes a far greater contribution to peacebuilding than numerous commentators allow, 
and in manners that are far more flexible, dynamic, and diverse than is usually supposed. 
Specifically, unofficial religious institutions show flexibility and fluidity by using others resources, 
such as local beliefs and traditions (adat), as well as secular norms and perspectives to build a 
sustainable peace.  
To develop my argument, I present three micro-cases: (1) the Maluku Interfaith Foundation 
(Lembaga Antar-Iman Maluku) (LAIM); (2) the Concerned Women’s Movement (Gerakan 
Perempuan Peduli) (GPP); (3) and peacemaking efforts in two villages: Seith and Wayame. The 
three micro-cases demonstrate that, firstly, religion can contribute to peacebuilding through 
interfaith organisations (e.g., LAIM) that can adopt approaches and strategies that are commonly 
practiced by secular NGO’s in organising their peacebuilding programmes. Secondly, religion in 
Maluku contributes to peacebuilding through the women’s movement (the GPP), which used a 
feminist perspective to reinterpret and rejuvenate sacred texts so that they can be utilised as 
resources for peacebuilding. Thirdly, religion played a critical role in keeping the villages of Seith 
and Wayame peaceful during the religious conflict in Maluku. Religious people in the two peaceful 
                                                          
390 As I explain in more detail later in this chapter, the Maluku Interfaith Foundation (Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku) 
(LAIM), was formally established by three official religious organisations in Maluku: the MUI (Islam), the GPM 
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villages worked together using two different resources: adat in Seith and “secular values” in 
Wayame.  
 
5.1   Waging Peace through Interfaith Dialogue: Maluku Interfaith Foundation 
In this section, I investigate the manner in which religious resources operate through Maluku 
Interfaith Foundation (Lembaga Antar-Iman Maluku-LAIM), an interfaith institution. Religions in 
Maluku developed an inter-religious theology that allowed people from different religious 
backgrounds to work together to solve the common problems that arose because of the conflict. The 
LAIM bases its theology on the assumption that religion is inclusive, rather than exclusive, of other 
faiths. Moreover, the example of LAIM shows that religion can be extremely flexible, particularly 
in adopting the techniques and methods of social transformation that secular NGOs commonly 
practice. Although, historically, three official religious organisations supported the formation of 
LAIM, as I discuss below, LAIM operates like an independent institution on a daily basis, where 
the executive body of LAIM has the authority to establish, organise, and evaluate programmes and 
activities. The line of authority between LAIM and the three religious organisations is coordinative 
and collaborative, rather than directive.  
 
5.1.1 The Formation of LAIM 
Before the outbreak of communal conflict in 1999, the religious community in Maluku never 
imagined that it would be necessary to develop an inter-religious organisation.391 Initiatives for 
communicating and cooperating across religions were extremely limited. The members of each 
religious institution were absorbed with its routine activities and ignored the underlying problems of 
inter-religious relations in Malukan society. Contemporarily, religious communities in Ambon were 
extremely confident that pela and gandong, their traditional inter-communal brotherhood and 
sisterhood, were sufficiently strong to prevent the outbreak of communal violence.392 
However, religious war raised the Malukan people’s awareness that their traditional conflict 
management system was not sufficiently strong to prevent the eruption of conflict. In the face of a 
long history of disharmonious community relations—by which people lived in villages that were 
segregated according to religious affiliation, and stigmatised and held prejudices toward “the 
others”—some religious activists proposed the idea of establishing opportunities for inter-religious 
encounters.393 This led Malukan religious leaders to meet to explore the possibility of establishing 
an inter-faith institution. In addition, because Malukan leaders outside Maluku claimed and spoke in 
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public and even received funding on behalf of Malukan inter-religious communities, the process of 
forming of an inter-religious body in Maluku was accelerated because locals did not want 
“outsiders” to speak on their behalf.394 
Three religious organisations, namely, the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia) (MUI), the Synod of the Protestant Church of Maluku (Gereja Protestan Maluku) 
(GPM), and the Catholic Diocese of Amboina (Keuskupan Amboina) formally joined the initiative 
to develop an inter-religious institution based on the spirit of inter-religious theology. My 
interviews with the religious leaders of these organisations reveal that they shared a common 
concern and that they realised that an inter-religious institution that could facilitate encounters and 
cooperation as part of the reconciliation process in post-conflict Maluku was needed. They were 
fully aware that the inter-religious dialogue that they would establish would not only have a public 
relations purpose. They also realised that they needed to commit themselves to work together for 
peace. More importantly, the inter-religious institute that they would establish had to solve real 
problems within religious communities where the desire for revenge and retaliation was still 
considerable. Having learnt from the conflict, they believed that they could not only think about 
their own religion but that they also had to relate their religion to other religious beliefs.395  
In 2003, LAIM, the first inter-religious institution in Maluku’s history, was formally 
established. Religions in Maluku adjusted their theological position in response to conflict and, 
particularly, to the post-conflict situation. Religions that were previously involved in bloody 
religious conflict turned to engage in promoting inter-religious dialogue as an avenue to achieve 
peace and harmony. 
 
5.1.2 From Inclusive Theology to Practical Peacebuilding Activities  
In the context of post-conflict peacebuilding in Maluku, LAIM strove to be an institution for 
initiating religious encounters and dialogue, as well as consistently promoting an inclusive theology 
that was based on, in its own terminology, multiculturalism, pluralism, and humanity as common 
values to attain a durable and sustainable peace in Maluku.396 The use of the terms multiculturalism, 
pluralism, and humanity might seem to suggest that LAIM follows a Western approach to religious 
and ethnic diversity. Abidin Wakano, the current executive director of LAIM, agreed that 
multiculturalism and pluralism are constructed in the Western tradition. However, along with the 
process the HoP, he also argued that the essence of these concepts could be found in all religious 
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traditions. The Qur’an, for example, recognises the plurality and diversity of culture and religion 
and encourages believers to build inter-communal communication to know and respect other 
traditions.397 Additionally, according to Wakano, Islam strongly prohibits Muslims from imposing 
their Islamic values on other religious believers because the Qur’an states that “there is no 
compulsion in religion.”398 Similarly, numerous verses in the Bible encourage believers to promote 
and celebrate diversity.  
Moreover, the process of the HoP interplays the understanding of two mainstream Abrahamic 
religions, Islam and Christianity, with the recognition of the ancestral beliefs of the people of 
Maluku. Wakano claimed that the concepts of pluralism and multiculturalism are longstanding in 
Maluku, perhaps existing long before scholars in the Western tradition coined the concept. Malukan 
ancestors, according Wakano, had already established, through local wisdom, the spirit of orang 
basodara (inter- and religious siblinghood), which promoted values and practices that resonate with 
contemporary ideas of pluralism and multiculturalism.399  
In this context, the flexibility of LAIM as an unofficial religious institution becomes evident 
in constructing its dialogue mission. Firstly, LAIM, as a local interfaith organisation, did not 
hesitate to adopt, adapt, and contextualise the modern discourses of pluralism, humanism, and 
multiculturalism beyond the local context. Secondly, LAIM strongly realised the need to preserve 
and promote existing traditional values, namely, the spirit of orang basodara, which is embedded in 
the long history of the people of Maluku—a spirit and values that could be utilised for the 
peacebuilding process. 
The question that arises, then, is how LAIM’s inclusive theology contributed to solving 
Maluku’s problems. LAIM was established as a response to both the local dynamics of the conflict 
in Maluku and the post-conflict damage to the social and cultural fabric. To cope with this situation, 
LAIM tried to overcome exclusive theology as the foundation of its presence in Maluku, and, 
instead, focused on practical programmes and activities at a community level. In doing so, LAIM 
learned and borrowed the approaches that the secular NGOs employed in implementing community 
development programmes. Consequently, LAIM organised interfaith dialogue in Maluku informally 
and flexibly, in contrast with other forms of interfaith dialogue that were suggested in some 
scholarly works.400  
LAIM introduced the so-called “faith-based community dialogue” strategy, which used forms 
of social capital, such as family and adat relations, school alumni networks, clubs, and hobbies, that 
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did not totally disintegrate during the conflict. At first, LAIM identified a small group of people to 
be the core group of a coalition for peace. Each member of the core group slowly increased the 
number of people who participated in the encounters according their interests and professions. The 
LAIM, then, could facilitate inter-religious dialogue or encounters among religious leaders, 
journalists, academicians, lawyers, youths, women, dancers, and truck drivers, among others. The 
dialogue and encounter processes were organised using a participatory approach that provided equal 
opportunity for each participant to express their feelings and thoughts freely. The dialogue also 
involved a bottom-up process, whereby LAIM did not impose its own ideas on people. The 
dialogue process was usually organised in informal settings that allowed participants to feel at 
home. LAIM often chose Rumah Kopi (a local term for café) as a favourite place to organise 
dialogue because it offered a friendly environment.401  
The LAIM activists underlined the importance of meetings as a basis for their work because 
Malukans would have been unable to solve their substantial problems (including reconciliation and 
sustainable peace) if they were reluctant to even meet at all.402 Enabling people from different 
religious backgrounds in a post-religious war period to meet, even if “only” to say “hello,” joke, 
and laugh together, should count as a considerable achievement in the circumstances.403  
LAIM activists always ensured that dialogue started in a conducive environment. In the 
encounters, participants started conversations that principally concerned “practical dialogue,” which 
consisted of light and practical topics that would not provoke controversies. This strategy, 
according to Manuputty, the first executive director of LAIM, was called, in the local language, 
“eating hot porridge.” Eating a plate of hot porridge should begin from the edge of the plate, from 
the part that is not excessively hot. Avoiding sensitive and controversial issues during the first 
encounters was critical as a transition to more complicated topics.404  
Conflict fatigue among Christians and Muslims, and especially the shared sense of suffering, 
was an entry point to start conversations about shared responsibilities for societal well-being. In 
other words, LAIM organised interfaith dialogue to identify common social and humanitarian 
problems and address them together. They believed that recognising common concerns and 
problems could help people identify common ground for resolving common social problems in a 
shared living space.405  
Practical dialogue does not mean that LAIM does not promote or become involved in 
“theological dialogue.” Yet, unlike the theological dialogues that have been suggested by some 
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scholars and official religious institutions, which emphasize, for example, theological discourse on 
the concepts of salvation, truth, and the ultimate goal of religion, LAIM conducted theological 
dialogue with a greater focus on how to encourage religious leaders and adherents to rethink 
religion. This would ensure that their interpretations could encourage people to recognise and 
respect religious diversity and improve the cohesiveness and togetherness of Malukans. The 
theological dialogues were intended to strengthen the commitment of the people who were involved 
in the peacebuilding process and ensure that their efforts to walk in the path of peace could be 
justified because they were sturdily grounded in strong theological argument.406  
One of the LAIM programmes that was directly linked to theological dialogue consisted of 
peace sermons. The aim of this programme was to equip Christian and Muslims leaders with the 
understanding of and skills for peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Often, religious ceremony and 
propagation were conducted in manners that provoked hatred and prejudice,407 whereas, through the 
peace sermons, religious leaders from different religious backgrounds learnt and shared those 
elements or insights from each other’s religious traditions that could contribute to peace. The 
religious leaders also made practical guidelines on how to deliver religious messages that were in 
line with the spirit of peacebuilding, and drafted written samples of khutbah (materials that are used 
in religious sermons and propagation). The practical guides and samples of khutbah, then, were 
distributed to religious leaders, mosques, and churches.408 
Additionally, LAIM conducted direct actions. In the social unrest in Ambon City on 11 
September 2011, a few hours after the outbreak of hostilities, an informal network of LAIM 
established a group called “Peace Provocateurs.”409 Having learned from the conflict in 1999, Peace 
Provocateurs realised that the flow of information is crucial in preventing the escalation of conflict. 
Miscommunication and information can easily trigger larger riots, especially when a rumour could 
rapidly lead to violence, because, for instance, it only circulated within a single religious group and 
channels to clarify the rumour in other religious communities were absent. This realisation led the 
Peace Provocateurs, composed of young Ambonese Christian and Muslim, to focus on spreading 
peace messages and clarifying negative rumours within communities through telephone, text 
messages, Blackberry messenger (BBM), and social media, such as Facebook and Twitter.410  
In one case, Peace Provocateurs debunked the rumour that the Silo Church, which was one of 
the largest of the GPM historical churches in the Ambon City and was located in an area marking 
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the border between Christian and Muslim communities, had been burnt down by Muslims. The 
rumour provoked some Christian communities to mobilise and prepare to defend their community, 
or even attack Muslim communities in retaliation. A Muslim Peace Provocateurs member who 
obtained this information from his Christian Peace Provocateurs colleagues went to the Silo Church 
and took a picture of the Church with his mobile phone. He then sent the picture that he had taken 
through social media (Facebook, Twitter, Blackberry messenger, and WhatsApp) to clarify that the 
Silo Church had not been burnt down.411 As noted in a report by the International Crisis Group, the 
work of Peace Provocateurs helped to deescalate the tension.412 The formation of Peace 
Provocateurs, according to Manuputty, who was actively involved in the Peace Provocateur 
initiatives, was only possible because of the long process of informal communication, encounters, 
and dialogue that had built trust among people from different religious backgrounds. Because of it, 
they could form a new understanding of the conflict dynamics that were based on a religious 
perspective that promoted peace rather than violent conflict.413  
To summarise, this section demonstrates one among numerous avenues in which religion can 
contribute to peacebuilding. The interfaith organisation, LAIM, provided a way in which religious 
resources could be flexibly mobilised for peacebuilding. The involvement of three religious 
institutions in the establishment of LAIM demonstrates the ambivalent nature of religion, whereby 
the institutions had been involved in the conflict to a degree, but subsequently turned to use 
religious resources to organise interfaith dialogue as a tool for reconciliation in Maluku. The turning 
point was a part of the HoP process, where LAIM showed that members of religions, who, 
previously, had been theological exclusivists and who had engaged in animosity and mutual 
distrust, became inclusive and cared for each other in promoting peace and reconciliation through 
an interfaith organisation.  
Furthermore, the fact that LAIM acted somewhat independently from official religious 
organisations allowed it the flexibility to adopt a “secular” community-based approach, which in 
turn allowed it to reach the wider community through interfaith dialogue (e.g., religious leaders, 
journalists, academicians, lawyers, youths, women, dancers, and truck drivers). The informal 
approach (such as the “eating hot porridge” strategy, and talking about practical issues for peace by 
contending with practical social and economic issues first and theological justification for peace 
later) allowed people from different religious backgrounds to interact slowly to deepen and improve 
relationships.  
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Having discussed the contribution of religion through an interfaith organisation, I now turn to 
discuss another avenue of using religious resources for peacebuilding, namely, through a women’s 
movement. I investigate the role of women believers in the Concerned Women’s Movement 
(Gerakan Perempuan Peduli) (GPP).  
 
5.2   Religious Women for Peace: The Concerned Women’s Movement  
Whereas the role of the Concerned Women’s Movement (Gerakan Perempuan Peduli) (GPP) in the 
peacebuilding process in Maluku414 has been the subject of research, the current approach of such 
research tends to analyse the GPP as a “normal” NGO that works for humanitarian relief. This 
approach does not fully capture the motivations that led to the establishment of the GPP. From my 
interviews with the founders of the GPP, it is clear that the formation of the GPP was strongly 
motivated by the religious understandings of its activists. In this section, I extend my argument that 
religion is extremely flexible and sufficiently fluid to work with—and at times adopt—other non-
religious resources to contribute to peacebuilding. As I argue, religious women in the conflict-torn 
society could pursue an HoP where strong conviction about the sacred mission of peace was 
combined with a feminist approach to reread religious texts and guide their engagement in the 
peacebuilding process.  
 
5.2.1 The Formation of GPP 
On 6 August 1999, some Maluku Catholic nuns and Protestant women pastors met together in the 
hall of Rinamakana Foundation (a Catholic institution) to discuss the possibility of organising 
concrete actions to overcome the bitter reality that the religious conflict in Maluku has caused.415 
Some ideas emerged from the meeting. One practical action that they agreed upon was to recite a 
common prayer for peace, personally or with their family, every night at 10 p.m. As believers, they 
believed in the power of prayer. The most critical idea that originated from the meeting was to 
invite Muslim women to form an inter-communal and inclusive forum where Christians, Catholics, 
and Muslim women in Maluku could stand up together to campaign for an end to the violent 
conflict.  
After the meeting in the Rinamakana Hall, those women, led by Sr. Francesco Moens 
FDNSC, met Paula Renyaan, the Vice Governor of Maluku (a Catholic woman) to explain the idea 
to establish a women’s network for peace. Because interpersonal communication between 
Christians and Muslims was extremely difficult at the time, Paula Renyaan had asked the 
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Governor’s wife, Ica Latuconsina (a Muslim), to establish communication and discuss the idea with 
Muslim women. Finally, the first meeting between 15 Christian and 15 Muslim women was held in 
the Governor’s house on 7 August 1999.416 
The first hours of the meeting were particularly tense. Both women’s groups blamed each 
other as perpetrators of the conflict. Prejudiced views were expressed acrimoniously in the forum. 
With passion, Ica Latuconsina moderated the meeting allowing everyone to speak freely and 
express his or her thoughts and feelings.417 According to Sr. Brigitta, it was the first time that 
“reconciliation” took place in Maluku. By the end of the meeting, they came to the realisation that 
they all were, in fact, victims of the conflict.418 Furthermore, they agreed to establish an informal 
women’s network called Gerakan Perempuan Peduli (GPP).  
 
5.2.2 Religious Motivation 
As mentioned, previous research on the GPP simply concluded that it is a semi-governmental rather 
than a non-government organisation, because some of its activists were civil servants and the wives 
of high-ranking officials in Maluku.419 From my interviews, it became extremely clear that religion 
had a central place in this movement. The initial meetings of the GPP, which, as mentioned, were 
the initiative of women pastors and nuns, took place in Rinamakana Hall, which belonged to the 
Catholic organisation. The impetus to organise the meetings was the belief that the deep 
involvement of religion in the Maluku conflict was irrational and, yet, also contradicted the most 
fundamental teachings of all the religions, which is to spread peace and bless all humanity.420  
A crucial question that arises is why the GPP activists could use religion as a resource for 
peacebuilding, whereas the vast majority of people in Maluku used religious language and emotions 
to foment religious war. According to some the GPP activists, the active engagement of the GPP in 
peacebuilding was possible because of the ability of religious women to perceive the conflict from 
perspective that differed from that of most people.421 Almost all Malukan men were actively 
engaged in the conflict. They did not care about how the conflict affected the daily lives of children 
as the future generation of Maluku. They claimed that they went to the battlefields to defend God 
and their religion. The GPP activists considered non-violence as a critical religious insight.422  
                                                          
416 Ibid. 
417 Interview with Zuliana Latuconsina, Ambon City, 2 August 2011. She is one of the Muslim leaders in the GPP. She is 
also one of the sisters of the Governor of Maluku at that time. 
418 Interview with Renyaan. 
419Trijono, Keluar Dari Kemelut Maluku, 152. 
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The different perspective of the GPP was possible because of a deep and long process of 
prayers, reflection, and reading of the Holy Books that led to, what might be called, a hermeneutics 
of peace (HoP).423 In the HoP, the GPP activists used a feminist approach. They claimed that a 
feminist approach to sacred texts, an approach that was first established in the non-religious 
tradition, had offered “new eyes” for women in Maluku to reinterpret, rejuvenate, and contextualise 
their religious understanding.424 The feminist approach to the HoP produced a more peaceful 
understanding of religion, which saw all Malukans as brothers and sisters who should not be 
involved in a religious war.425 
The GPP activists did not have a definition of what they called the feminist approach to 
sacred texts. However, through my intensive interviews with some GPP activists, I found the spirit 
of a feminist approach that is linked to the HoP could be identified in three profoundly meaningful 
points. First, the women believed that according to their faith, life is the most valuable gift from 
God and, therefore, should be maintained and guarded.426 No one has right to take somebody else’s 
life.427 Secondly, women are honoured by God to maintain and safeguard human lives. God gives 
women a miraculous privilege to bring forth life.428 Therefore, women must be involved in serious 
endeavours to defend human lives.429 Thirdly, the GPP activist directly used the verses in the New 
Testament that encouraged and motivated the GPP to get involved in peacebuilding. It is a worth 
quoting those specific verses:  
Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has gone, the new 
has come! All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ and 
gave us the ministry of reconciliation: that God was reconciling the world to 
himself in Christ, not counting men’s sins against him. And he has committed to 
us the message of reconciliation. We are therefore Christ’s ambassadors, as 
though God were making his appeal through us. We implore you on Christ’s 
behalf: Be reconciled to God.430  
 
According to Margaretha, the feminist reading of this particular verse in the Epistles could be 
interpreted as an obligation for all humankind to engage in a ministry of reconciliation and 
peacebuilding. This includes having the courage to oppose the populism that supported the 
prolongation of the conflict.431  
                                                          
423 David Little, ed. Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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424 Interview with Rev. Margaretha Hendriks, Ambon City, 15 January 2013. She is co-chair of the GPP (Protestant). 
425 Ibid. 
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International Version,   (Colorado Springs: International Bible Society, 1984). 
431 Interview with Hendriks. 
105 
 
The GPP activists also directly used passage of the Old Testament as a religious resource to 
inspire their engagement in peacebuilding. The feminist approach to rereading the verse that is 
quoted below produced an interpretation that reflects the view that human beings are obliged to 
become involved in peacebuilding, which is symbolized by the obligation to turn “death machinery” 
into “life machinery.” In my interview, Margaretha opened and read the verse below:  
In the last days, the mountain of the Lord’s temple will be established as chief 
among mountains; it will be raised above the hills, and all nations will stream to 
it. Many people will come and say “come, let us go up the mountain of the Lord, 
to the house of the God of Jacob. He will teach us his ways, so that we may walk 
in the paths.” The law will go out from Zion, the word of the Lord from 
Jerusalem. He will judge between the nations and will settle disputes for many 
people. They will beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into 
pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation nor will they train for 
war anymore.432  
 
On the Muslim side, the Qur’an also mentions that Muslims should fully recognise and 
respect human diversity and plurality among religions, nations, and tribes, not to fight them, but to 
learn from them: 
O humanity! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and 
made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may 
despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah (he who 
is) the most righteous of you…433 
   
In this context, the feminist approach to sacred texts helped to explain further the ambivalence 
of the sacred. The sacred texts, as explained above, have been used to support and mobilise conflict. 
The process of the HoP in the GPP, which employed a feminist approach, enabled the GPP activists 
to select some verses in the Holy Books that clearly advocate peace and exclude verses that promote 
violence. Then, the feminist approach helped to produce peaceful interpretations of the sacred texts 
that oblige the women to engage in peacebuilding as a “ministry of reconciliation” by destroying 
“war machineries” and building “life machineries,” including being promoters of dialogue to 
building mutual understanding across genders, tribes, and religious lines. Moreover, in the GPP, 
peaceful interpretations of religion were not only produced for intellectual and academic purposes 
but were also translated into concrete missions and actions for peacebuilding.  
   
 
 
 
                                                          
432 Isaiah 2: 2-4. Interview with Hendriks. He read the Indonesian translation of the Bible to me. I use the English 
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5.2.3 Concrete Mission and Actions 
After numerous meetings, the GPP activists formulated the GPP moral mission statement: “We, 
Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic Maluku women have a strong commitment from the bottom of our 
heart to work together, hand in hand, to sow awareness among Maluku people that violence will 
never solve our problems. Instead, violence will worsen the situation.”434 
There are three objectives of this movement: (1) to immediately stop violence and brawls, (2) 
to conduct programmes to initiate reconciliation, and (3) to advocate the rights of women and 
children. In order to organise the movement, three religious women were appointed as the 
Coordinators of the GPP: Rev. Margaretha Hendriks, from the Protestants, Retty Assegaf, from the 
Muslims, and, Sr. Brigitta Renyaan, PBHK, from the Catholics.  
The GPP’s programmes can be classified into two types of activities. Firstly, the GPP 
organised public campaigns and advocacy. The GPP had approached, visited, and conducted public 
hearings with the government, parliament, police, and military officers to convince them to take 
measurable policies to stop the bloody conflict. The GPP’s activists were invited to speak regularly 
on local TV (TVRI) and Radio (RRI) where they campaigned for peace alongside their other public 
campaigns, such as organising press conferences, as well as peace demonstrations. To publicise 
their ideas, the GPP’s activists produced campaign materials, such as pamphlets and bandanas, that 
were distributed to Christian and Muslim communities.  
Secondly, the GPP organised humanitarian programmes. The GPP had been particularly 
active in delivering humanitarian relief, not only for short-term targets, such as distributing food 
and medicine, but also for to achieve long-term goals, such conducting training for trauma healing, 
workshops for volunteers to provide informal education in refugee camps, and initiating encounters 
between Christian and Muslim youth.435 Some of the GPP activists, including Sr. Brigitta and Rev. 
Margaretha were among the signatories of the Malino II Peace Agreement. To some extent, this 
demonstrates that the public, including the government and religious elites, recognised their work.  
To summarise, in this section, my argument that religion, including unofficial religious 
institutions, offers pluralistic avenues of contributing to peacebuilding is confirmed. Whereas, in the 
previous section, I demonstrated that religion could contribute to peacebuilding through interfaith 
organisations, in this section I provided evidence that religion employed for peacebuilding through 
a women’s organisation, the GPP, which used a feminist conceptual approach, which was 
developed principally in the secular tradition, as a new approach to reread the sacred texts. The 
religious women in Maluku, by adopting a feminist perspective, engaged in a series of discussions 
and reflections to reinterpret and contextualise their sacred texts. “New eyes” to read sacred texts 
                                                          
434Personal documents of Sr. Brigitta Renyaan, a Coordinator of the GPP. 
435 Interview with Renyaan.  
107 
 
produced a new understanding of religion that could be used to motivate and energise the GPP 
activists to firmly mobilise and stand up to establish peace, while numerous (male) religious leaders 
were fighting on the battleground. The GPP is an example of grassroots reconciliators who used 
religion as their primary driving force. This, again, demonstrates the ability of religion to contribute 
to peacebuilding in pluralistic and different manners. 
Having discussed the flexibility of the GPP’s effort to adopt and utilise secular approaches 
and perspectives (including NGO techniques and feminism in the HoP process), I now turn to 
investigate the latest micro-case of the contribution of unofficial religious organisations to 
peacebuilding. In the next section, I demonstrate how religion operated as a significant resource, 
partly working in tandem with local custom (adat) in Maluku during the height of the conflict.  
 
5.3   God in Peaceful Villages: Seith and Wayame  
In this section, I present the cases of Seith and Wayame, two villages in Maluku whose populations 
were isolated from barbaric and inhuman actions that occurred during the conflict. Specifically, I 
focus on how religious resources were used in the two villages. Much has been written on Seith, 
and even more so on Wayame.436 However, the role that religion plays in keeping the two villages 
safe during the conflict is overlooked in the existing research. Contrary to earlier research, I found 
that religious leaders, as well as religion more broadly, played a pivotal role in keeping their 
villages isolated from violent conflict.  
I have chosen these two villages not only because they could prevent bloodshed in their 
communities but also because they have different characteristics. Seith is a negeri adat, a village 
that is ruled by traditional structures and culture, which have been inherited from previous 
generations. For example, a hereditary Latu (Raja or King) rules Seith. Seith has traditional smaller 
“units of government,” called soa, which refer to a group of genealogical ties that occupy certain 
areas in negeri.437 In contrast, Wayame is more ordinary; a soa, or similar systems, are absent. 
Wayame is much like those villages in other parts of Indonesia that are ruled by national law (the 
Law on the Village System of Governance, No 5, 1979). Being a “modern village,” the people 
democratically elect the chief of the village (kepala desa) in Wayame. These differences mean that 
the villages use religious resources in different manners, helping to demonstrate the flexibility of 
religion in contributing to peacebuilding.  
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The central findings of this section are that in Seith, as a “traditional village,” religion was 
used to work closely and harmoniously with the local adat or ancestral worldview, including pela 
and gandong, to promote inter-communal harmony. In contrast, in the “modern village” of 
Wayame, religion was linked across religious faiths by wider norms, including a “secular 
perspective,” such as nationalism, and “universal values,” such as mercy, honesty, openness, and 
social solidarity as blessings to all humankind, to form a common ground that allowed focusing on 
peace.  
 
5.3.1 Seith   
Seith is a small village that it located in Kabupaten Maluku Tengah, approximately 41.2 km, or an 
hour’s drive, from Ambon City. As noted in the Chapter 2, one of the most concrete colonial 
legacies in Maluku is that villages are divided along religious lines as either Muslim or Christian. 
Seith is a Muslim village of approximately 4,712 people.438 Although all of Seith’s inhabitants are 
Muslims, the village is renowned for its role in saving hundreds of Christian lives during the 
Maluku conflict. Approximately 143 Christians, mainly from Ouw, found refuge in Seith during the 
first days of the Maluku conflict. Soon after the conflict erupted in Ambon City, rumours of 
religious hatred and the use of symbolism that divided people along religious lines spread quickly. 
Because Seith is located in Jazirah Laihitu, which is entirely composed of Muslims villages, the 
Ouw people and some other Christians who were visiting Seith, became trapped in a Muslim area.  
The question arises as to why the inhabitants of Seith, a Muslim negeri, saved Christian lives, 
while in other parts of Maluku, people had already started to kill each other in the name of religion. 
The existing literature and the widely held views of the inhabitants of Maluku suggest that this 
situation was possible only because the people of Seith strongly held local adat values. I argue that, 
although adat played a crucial role in shaping the attitudes and actions of the people in Seith 
regarding Christians trapped in their village, the religious dimension should also be accounted for. 
As I explain in detail below, adat and religion were interconnected, strengthened one another, and, 
in the case of Seith, could not be separated.  
The people of Seith strongly believed in the local adat and tradition, which they inherited 
from previous generations, despite the state’s efforts to discredit their way of life. The introduction 
of, to borrow Thomas Gibson’s term,439 “documentary knowledge and the bureaucratic authority of 
the modern state” caused “ritual knowledge and traditional authority of heredity” to considerably 
degrade. The introduction of the Law No. 5 in 1979 by the New Order regime, for example, meant 
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that the role of the head of the village could no longer be inherited. Instead, the people elect the 
Bapak Raja (King) through procedural democracy.440 However, the transformation from 
“traditional” to “bureaucratic” forms of knowledge and authority did not totally replace the existing 
customs and traditions that were deeply embedded in the community of Seith. 
Because of this, the people of Seith have sustained the belief that they have gandong relations 
with people of Ouw: a special kinship relation between villages.441 At the core of the gandong 
relation is a shared belief that both villages are from the same Tete and Nene (ancestors). For 
various reasons the ancestors split apart and lived in two different villages, but the kinship bond 
remains. Some left Seith and established Negeri Ouw in Saparua Island and, although Ouw 
subsequently became a Christian negeri (with Seith holding onto Islam), their brotherhood and 
sisterhood by blood relations were not broken as a consequence. Because of this traditional 
knowledge and understanding, the people of Seith had no reason to kill their own brothers and 
sisters from Ouw, even though they practiced different religious traditions. According to Hataul, it 
was unimaginable that they would persecute their “family” from Ouw. The strength of the bond is 
so strong that it is said that they would sacrifice themselves to protect the life and dignity of Ouw 
people.442 
Despite the strength of the Seith-Ouw bond, in some places in Maluku the practice of adat is 
negated by religious understandings. In Maluku, local wisdom, such as pela and gandong, has been 
considerably degraded because of religious understandings that contradict adat. This degradation 
has occurred in both Christian and Muslim communities.443 For example, in Liang, another Muslim 
negeri adat (traditional village) that I visited during my fieldwork, Yusuf Abdurahman Luhulima, 
the secretary of Liang, opposes pela and gandong systems because, according to him, some rituals 
and practices are not in line with Islamic teachings. More importantly, he argued that the solidarity 
that is based on religious lines or on Islamic brotherhood (ukhuwah islamiyah) should be considered 
more important than the solidarity based on gandong, which involves solidarity with Christians.444  
                                                          
440 Although the people in Seith must follow the law (No. 5/1979) that they should elect their chief of village (Raja 
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In this context, the people in Seith have an impressive ability to ensure the compatibility 
between traditional beliefs and their religion. For people in Seith, the spirit of ukhuwah Islamiyah 
does not necessarily mean that they cannot maintain gandong relations with the Ouw people. 
Rather, the compatibility exists in the sense that both ukhuwah Islmiyah and gandong require a 
commitment to love life and humanity regardless of religious affiliation.445  
Hatual, a leader in Seith, did not deny that some people in Seith questioned why the people of 
Seith should protect Christians while Muslims were being slaughtered by Christians in others part 
of Maluku. Opposition to the decision to protect the life of the Ouw people also came from 
neighbouring negeris. Numerous people in Seith’s neighbouring villages were cynical and accused 
Seith’s inhabitants of converting to Christianity. Intensive meetings between leaders in Seith were 
held to overcome this concern. Mosques were used for meetings to announce and explain the 
leaders’ decision to Seith’s people.446 They believed that what they were doing was the right thing 
in accordance with both their traditional awareness and their understanding of Islam.447 In this case, 
the interplay of adat and religion are the two principal sources of the worldview of Seith’s people. 
Thus, harmonious relations between adat and religion were critical in maintaining the peace in 
Seith. 
Preserving the compatibility between Islam and adat was not without challenges. Yusuf Tala 
(Youth Coordinator of Seith) noted the wave of interventions from “a new version” of Islamic 
understanding, which has been introduced by religious leaders from “outside Seith”448— a version 
whose origin can be traced from outside Indonesia. This understanding of Islam is quite often 
incompatible with existing the religious understanding and the adat worldview. While religious 
leaders from outside Seith teach sophisticated concepts of Islam, such as jihad and ukhuwah 
islamiyah, numerous people in Seith continue to prefer to learn Islam from their own religious 
elders, local imams, and khatib who preach simple moral values of Islam that apply to their locality, 
including understandings of traditional customs.449  
This situation reveals the internal plurality of religion. Islam, in this particular context, is not 
monolithic, but displays positive and negative faces. Islam in Maluku is ambivalent in that it both 
supports and opposes local traditions. This also demonstrates how people in Seith engage in a HoP 
struggle to justify that their own belief in Islam is compatible with local traditions in the face of 
pressure from “outside” that negates the importance of adat in Maluku.  
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The case of Seith is an exception because, through the HoP process, the people of Seith could 
form a religious understanding that was in harmony with adat. The blending of Islam and adat 
became an impetus to live peacefully and harmoniously with people from different religions. 
Whereas some Muslims were campaigning for a universal solidarity that is based on Islamic 
brotherhood (ukhuwah islamiyah) as the only solidarity that Islam can accept, small villages, such 
as Seith, werre removed from global Islamic discourses. A different interpretation of Islam enabled 
those villagers to maintain their belief in Islam while also preserving their local wisdom, which they 
could use to sustain a peaceful coexistence and prevent conflict between Muslims and Christians.  
 
5.3.2 Wayame  
Unlike Seith, which is a Muslim village, Wayame is neither a Christian nor a Muslim village but is 
mixed in terms of both religion and ethnicity. Wayame, a village of approximately 5299 people, 450 
is also a “modern” village that is guided by “documentary knowledge and the bureaucratic authority 
of a modern state.”451 Unlike Seith, which used tradition to maintain inter-communal harmony, 
Wayame applied other means to remain the only peaceful village in Ambon during the conflict.  
Efforts have been made to explain the “peaceful Wayame” phenomenon. Numerous locals in 
Maluku argued that Wayame enjoyed peace because of its proximity to a military camp.452 
However, this cannot constitute an adequate explanation because, in some cases, even the military 
or police offices and buildings were burnt down during the conflict. Another explanation is that 
Wayame was strategically located in the proximity of the largest oil station in Maluku, which is 
owned by Pertamina, the state owned company that supplies energy for whole of Ambon City.453 
Therefore, according to this theory, all warring parties including the government, the military, and 
police officers had strategic interests to isolate Wayame from conflict.    
Whereas those analyses might partly explain the peaceful conditions of Wayame, my tentative 
explanation is that the outstanding quality of the religious leadership from both Muslim and 
Christian communities played a critical role in establishing common interests and shared values as a 
platform that could enable the Wayame community to build peace. They used specific universal 
religious understandings (mercy, honesty, openness, social solidarity, and religion as a blessing to 
all humankind) and linked them to the spirit of Indonesian nationalism as a common identity. The 
mix between religion and secular norms was used to form a common ground to work for keep the 
peace in Wayame.  
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According to Rev. Sahalessy, he adopted three principles from the values of the Bible that 
guided him to work for a peaceful Wayame. First is faithfulness to one’s religion. Everyone, 
including Muslims, should commit and be consistent with their religion and should not be shaken 
by issues and rumours from outside. Second is honesty. Everyone should be honest with himself or 
herself to form a clear view of what really happened in Maluku. Third is openness. Everyone should 
speak and express themselves freely about what they think and feel. This is also a principle to 
establish dialogue that is based on compassion and mercy.454 
Sahalessy observed that those values were absent in both Christians and Muslims during the 
conflict. 
There were many reverends who forgot these basic values and doctrines (of religion). 
The reverends thought they were right and the other was wrong. Everyone claimed 
and tried to prove that their own religious community [Muslims and Christians] were 
right. This is bullshit! In fact, both were wrong and stupid [during the conflict]. Both 
Christians and Muslims did not make up their mind. They only use their knees 
[power/muscle]. The problems were not narrowed, but expanded.455 
 
Furthermore, he observed why the conflict could not be resolved immediately:  
Christian Reverends invited their followers to come to Churches to be taught and 
indoctrinated [to get involved in the conflict]. [On the other side], Muslim leaders 
did the same thing in Mosques. When believers came out from Mosques and 
Churches, they initiated wars.456 
 
At the same time, Muslim leaders, such Imam Musanef, Man Masasabessy, Hanafi, Imran, 
and others, tried to convince Muslims in Wayame that Islam would never preach harmful things to 
people.457 Musanef explained that being a good Muslim should not prevent him from continuing to 
have good relations with Christians. They believed that Muslims in Wayame should embrace a 
general understanding of Islam; for example, that Islam is a religion that brings blessing to all 
humankind.458 Learning from the situation outside Wayame, Sahalessy and Muslims leaders 
decided to isolate Wayame from outside provocateurs. They believed that only the Wayame 
community could ensure that Wayame remained peaceful. They agreed that the believers should be 
prepared to anticipate problems that might arise.  
After meeting several times, Muslim and Christian leaders agreed that they had a common 
religious understanding and shared political interests to work together to maintain peace and order 
in Wayame. They could formulate and transform their religious understanding as a common 
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platform to work with the Wayame community, regardless of religious affiliation. The first thing 
that religious leaders did was to remove the religious symbols in Wayame. As conflict erupted in 
Ambon City, people in Wayame started to display “religious markers” in front of their houses; for 
example, Christians placed the salib (cross) on their house doors, and Muslims displayed Arabic 
calligraphy on theirs. Muslims and Christian leaders agreed to remove all of these religious 
symbols. For them, the people of Wayame must be united through a common interest to keep peace 
in their village: 
After Sunday sermon in Pniel Church, I gave instruction to all Christians in Wayame 
to remove religious symbols in front of their houses. I walked around Wayame. 
Some people were reluctant to remove them. I convince them to remove it. I 
removed religious symbols by myself.459  
 
Simultaneously, Muslim leaders conducted the same action within the Muslim 
community.460 
 
In order to ensure efforts to maintain communal harmony in Wayame, the Christian and 
Muslim leaders agreed to establish a joint working and coordinating group that they called “Team 
20,” consisting of 10 leaders from the two religions. Team 20 served as a leadership board of 
Muslims and Christians that could coordinate internally and communicate externally, and as an 
authority to deal with internal problems within each religion. Team 20 met daily during the eve of 
the conflict and organised mass meetings twice a week (on Sunday in a church and on Friday in a 
mosque).  
To expand their acceptability and authority, the Team 20 also agreed to establish rules or 
“codes of conduct” for all the people of Wayame. First, all people of Wayame were to remove all 
religious symbols. Sahalessi explained to the people of Wayame that  
every Sunday Christians went to Church and every Friday Muslims went to Mosque 
for Friday prayer. When they stepped out from the church and mosque they are no 
longer Christians and Muslims. They are Indonesian. And we should work as 
Indonesians during “religious conflict.461  
 
In this case, religion and religious resources were deployed in tandem with secular values, 
such as the nationalist ideology. Religious leaders linked religion to nationalism to convince people 
from different religious backgrounds to unite and work together for a peaceful Wayame under the 
flag of Indonesia as a universal identity and as an alternative to parochial religious identity during 
the conflict. In other words, the interplay between the religions operated as an organising force for 
peace together with other forces for peace, such as the secular nationalist ideology.  
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Second, if provocative acts occurred in Wayame, such as the stoning of churches, mosques, 
houses, or other types of vandalism, each community had to identify the provocateurs within 24 
hours. If the provocateurs were found, they had to be ostracised from Wayame, regardless of their 
religious affiliation.462 Third, all people of Wayame were prohibited from becoming involved in the 
war outside Wayame. People who had been identified as participating in the war (helping their co-
religionists outside Wayame) had to be expelled from Wayame. Fourth, if someone from Wayame 
were to be killed in the war outside Wayeme, the body would not have been allowed to be buried in 
Wayame.463 In the local tradition, the relatives of a dead person who were not allowed to perform a 
series of funeral rituals in their own house or community would feel a strong sense of shame, 
making this a powerful sanction.  
The agreement was successful, although numerous provocative acts and infiltrations from 
both Muslims and Christians from outside Wayame occurred frequently. From an outsider’s 
perspective, both Muslims and Christians in the Wayame community were regarded as disloyal to 
their religion because they lived peacefully with the enemy when their co-religionists were involved 
in conflict. 
By employing discipline and a spirit of togetherness, the people of Wayame could maintain 
communal harmony through the spirit that developed against outsider provocateurs and intruders. 
Whereas, in other parts of Maluku, religious institutions (Churches and Mosques) were used as 
vehicles to support war, religious leaders in Wayame used their holy places to discuss peace and 
harmony. This situation demonstrates how religion could be used to organise sacred peace, whereas 
others mobilised violent to foment conflict. The leaders were able to offer interpretations of the 
sacred texts that promoted peace that could be used as a common platform to work together, 
regardless of religious affiliations.  
To conclude my discussion of Seith and Wayame, in these cases I found that religion could 
flexibly adopt and enlist other non-religious resources to contribute to peacebuilding. Through the 
HoP, Muslim communities in Seith were able to develop an understanding of religion that was not 
in conflict with their ancestors’ beliefs. The understanding of Islam in Seith could work in tandem 
with adat to save Christian lives. This type of religious understanding was critical because in other 
parts of Maluku, where religious understanding did not support the local adat, inter-communal 
relations were broken.  
Conversely, in Wayame, where the local adat did not exist, religion helped to protect 
Wayame from bloody conflict by engaging in the HoP process, which transformed religious 
                                                          
462 Interview with Sahalessi and Musanef. 
463 In the local tradition, not being allowed to perform a series of funeral rituals for a deceased person in one’s house 
or community brings shame.  
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understanding into acceptable norms, such as honesty, justice, openness, cooperation, and religion 
as blessing to all humankind. These norms were used as a common ground to work for 
peacebuilding in Wayame. Because of the HoP, religious leaders in Wayame also adopted the spirit 
of nationalism to build a sturdier sense of solidarity among the people of Wayame during the crisis.  
 
5.4   Conclusion  
The three micro-cases presented above extend my argument in the previous chapter that religion is 
not monolithic and static. The first micro-case demonstrated that religion promotes peacebuilding 
through interfaith organisations. Whereas believers who were previously involved in conflict found 
justification for their actions in an exclusivist theology, once they became engaged in the HoP 
during post-conflict peacebuilding, they came to endorse and practice a more inclusive theology. 
The HoP allowed people from different religious backgrounds to work together for peace and 
reconciliation in Maluku. Furthermore, unlike interfaith institutions that commonly promoted 
formal theological dialogue, LAIM adopted strategies and techniques of dialogue from the 
“secular” NGOs, such as participatory and “bottom-up” approaches. In this context, LAIM could 
translate the abstract form of theological dialogue into a practical form of dialogue that helped to 
build trust and create common interests and shared values among Christians and Muslims. The 
adoption of non-religious approaches also helped to reach a wider range of people in Maluku. 
In the second case, peacebuilding missions were conducted by the GPP, a group of women 
believers that was the first inter-communal group in Maluku to be established during the conflict. 
This research reveals that the religious motivation and resources behind the creation of the GPP 
were ignored in previous research. The GPP’s activists were involved in the HoP process, where 
they strove to identify religious texts that would support them in adopting productive and 
constructive positions to promote peace in the midst of conflict. In the HoP, the GPP activists were 
open to adopting a feminist approach, a perspective that is commonly used in “secular” discourses. 
The use of a feminist approach in the HoP eventually produced a more peaceful interpretation and 
inspired, motivated, and supported women to be actively involved in peacebuilding.  
Finally, the cases of Seith and Wayame also confirmed my argument in this chapter: religion 
has played a critical role in peacebuilding in flexible ways. The Muslims’ interpretation and 
practice of Islam in Seith, which I term a HoP process, was suitable and compatible with traditional 
norms (pela and gandong). As the result, the blending of religion with local adat became a strong 
mechanism to maintain inter-communal harmony. The ability of people in Seith to preserve Islam 
and adat as living values was critical because numerous Muslims and Christians who claimed that 
the practice adat and their religious faith were incompatible were unable to prevent the violence in 
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Maluku. In Wayame’s case, religion played a pivotal role in sustaining peace in Wayame during the 
conflict. Through the HoP, people in Wayame could form a type of solidarity across religious lines 
to work together to ensure that Wayame was isolated from the worst of the conflict. Whereas most 
people during the conflict in Maluku were ensnared in an exclusivist religiosity, the people in 
Wayame, through the HoP, could develop and transform their understanding of religion into 
common, universally acceptable values, such as honesty, justice, and the spirit of nationalism. 
Based on these universal values, the people in Wayame successfully maintained inter-communal 
harmony.  
Overall, unlike the “secular” assumption that predisposes people to perceive religion as 
monolithic, dogmatic, and inflexible, the three micro-cases of unofficial religious organisations 
strengthen my argument that religion can substantially contribute to peacebuilding in pluralistic and 
flexible fashions. Whereas the official religious organisations, as discussed in previous chapter, 
have developed formal and new theological understandings and justifications to engage in 
peacebuilding, to some extent the “the new” theology was used and operationalized by unofficial 
religious institutions to contribute to peacebuilding through institutions, programs and mechanisms 
that reached wider religious communities.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Building Peace in Intractable Conflict in Mindanao 
 
 
Having discussed the role of religion in the process of peacebuilding in Maluku in the previous 
chapters, I turn to examine my second case study of religious peacebuilders in Southeast Asia. 
Specifically, I investigate how people use religious resources to contribute to peacebuilding in 
Mindanao, in the Southern Philippines, where an intractable ethno-religious conflict has wracked 
the area for several decades. I present three micro-cases based on my fieldwork to offer concrete 
examples of how people in Mindanao use religious resources, even in extremely difficult 
circumstances, to mobilise peace constituencies and inspire people to contribute to peaceful conflict 
resolution. 
I begin by examining the role of the Silsilah Dialogue Movement (SDM). I find that religion 
offers resources, such as faith and Holy Scriptures, which not only inspired the establishment of the 
SDM but also motivated and energised the SDM activists to promote tirelessly a culture of 
dialogue. They dedicated themselves to building a sturdier peace in Mindanao through dialogue 
because it is part of a sacred religious mission and a spiritual journey. The SDM’s commitment to 
peacebuilding was the result of the process of the hermeneutics of peace (HoP) where the SDM 
activists interpreted sacred texts and utilised them to mobilise and support peace.  
In the second micro-case, I demonstrate how religious resources inspired the development of 
the Space for Peace (SP) in Nalapaan. This shows the concrete power of religion to mobilise and 
organise grassroots support for peacebuilding in a time of crisis. The people who were involved in 
the HoP, by re-contextualising and rejuvenating their understanding of religion, believed that 
religion unites and does not divide. This new understanding, in turn, contributed to overcoming the 
crisis in Nalapaan.  
Finally, I turn to discuss the religious discourses within the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF). The case of the MILF differs from the two micro-cases that I presented in the previous 
chapters. On the one hand, whereas the SDM and the SP in Nalapaan are grassroots civil society 
peacebuilding initiatives, the MILF holds a rather unique position in the Southern Philippines 
conflict and in its peacebuilding dynamics. As the principal rebel movement actor, the MILF is a 
non-state actor. On the other hand, because of its ability to exert political influence, the MILF acted 
like a state actor, including attending peace negotiations with the Philippines government. In 
particular, I investigate how the use of religious discourse enabled the MILF’s decision to attend 
peace negotiations with the Philippines government. Although religion has been widely perceived 
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as a force that mobilises and prolongs the conflict, I challenge this common perception by 
examining how an understanding of religious teaching theologically justified the rebel movement’s 
decision to pursue peace negotiations and seek settlement. 
Overall, in this chapter, I reveal that religion has contributed to peacebuilding in Mindanao in 
numerous ways, thus challenging the mainstream peace studies and international relations position 
that focuses on religion’s contribution to fomenting violent conflicts while overlooking its potential 
role in peacebuilding. The cases that I presented in this chapter enrich a growing academic 
understanding of the relationship between religion and peacebuilding, especially the process of the 
HoP, where religious people in Mindanao used religious narratives and texts to justify their 
engagement in peacebuilding efforts.  
 
6.1  Silsilah Dialogue Movement: Dialogue and Breaking Down the Wall of Segregation 
Silsilah Dialogue Movement (SDM) was established by Fr. Sebastiano D’Ambra, PIME,464 a 
Catholic priest, with his Muslim and Christian colleagues on May 9 1984. Formally, the 
establishment of SDM was a response to “religious conflict” in Mindanao and the realisation that 
conflict only could be resolved through peaceful means, especially by promoting a culture of 
dialogue. The SDM offers and promotes a form of dialogue that differs from the secular form of 
dialogue that is practiced commonly by conflict resolution theorists and practitioners. By 
recognising God as the source of dialogue, the SDM envisions a life in dialogue for all Muslims, 
Christians, and peoples of other living faiths, respecting, trusting, loving one another, and moving 
together towards a common experience of harmony, solidarity, and peace.465 
The term “silsilah” originated from the Arabic language, which literally means a chain or a 
link. Specifically, the word silsilah is used commonly in Sufism to refer to spiritual endeavours and 
experiences that pave the way to God. Silsilah also means genealogical tree. D’Ambra’s choice of 
an Arabic and Islamic term for the organisation, within the context of the Philippines as a Catholic 
nation, symbolises of the inclusiveness of the organisation and his solemn intention to invite 
Muslims to a sincere inter-religious engagement. Moreover, the term silsilah, as a specific 
transcendental or mystical term in Sufism, is used with the aim to celebrate the diversity of people 
across religious affiliations, because the very meaning of silsilah is “genealogical brotherhood,” 
regardless of religious background. 
Arguably, the SDM is a religious institution. One cannot deny the critical role that 
D’Ambara’s use of Catholic theology played in considerably influencing the spiritual journey of the 
                                                          
464 PIME is the abbreviation for Pontificio Istituto Missioni Estere, which is the Vatican’s Pontifical Seminary for Foreign 
Missions. 
465 See profile of the SDM. It is also available on http://www.silsilahdialogue.com. Accessed on 25 October 2011 
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SDM. However, although high-ranking religious figures from the Muslim and Christian 
communities are among the SDM’s executive bodies and on its board of trustees, the SDM has 
maintained its autonomy as an independent institution that is not linked structurally to the Catholic 
Church or any Muslim institutions. The SDM seeks to be an avenue for dialogue for everyone, 
regardless of religious affiliation.  
The SDM is suitably resourced, centrally located, and headquartered in Harmony Village, 
Zamboanga City. From its headquarters, the SDM has made significant contributions to 
peacebuilding over the last 30 years. During that period, around 2000 people have attended the 
SDM formation programme, such as summer basic, intensive, and special courses.466 Some of the 
alumni of the formation programme are from neighbouring countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. Some alumni are actively engaged in promoting the SDM vision and 
mission by establishing Silsilah Centres or Forums that exist in numerous parts of Mindanao, and 
have even reached some Northern Philippines cities.467 Other alumni have become activists in their 
own churches, communities, or NGOs. 
In order to promote intensely the importance of the culture of peace and dialogue, the SDM 
also initiated three sectoral programmes. The first one is the community programme, which strives 
to provide basic services to grassroots communities, such as providing food and nutrition for 
children, education, and health services.468 The second sectoral programme is the Silsilah Youth 
Programme, called SilPeace, which has the aim of promoting friendships and improved 
relationships among young Muslims and Christians. Lastly, the SDM has formed the Inter-Faith 
Council of Leaders (IFCL) with the aim of providing an avenue for Muslims and Christians leaders 
from different sectors and professions to reflect, express, and share their views in order to 
strengthen interfaith relations. The IFCL is also an avenue for identifying and anticipating social 
and political issues. Often, following its meetings, the IFCL produces press releases to convey 
moral messages and apply political pressure to government policies that affect people’s lives in 
Mindanao.  
Having introduced the SDM, I move to examine specifically how religion has motivated 
D’Ambra and the SDM activists to initiate the mission of dialogue as a part of peacebuilding 
                                                          
466 Interview with Jovie Emmanuel, Zamboanga City, 30 November 2011. She is the Coordinator of the SDM 
Formation/Training Programme.  
467 According to an SDM report in 2011, the Silsilah Forums or Centers are present in 19 cities, mainly in Mindanao.  
During my fieldwork in Mindanao, I was able to visit the Silsilah Center in Basilan, Davao City, and Marawi City. 
468 One site of the grassroots community programme that I visited is the Silsilah Solidarity School in Lower Clarian, a 
poor, predominantly Muslim, village. The SDM also provides a nutrition and food programme to kids in that area. I 
witnessed women from different cultures and religions working side-by-side, preparing lunch for the kids. In the other 
communities, such as in St. Cruz, Pitogo and Santa Catalina, the SDM also built elementary schools, kindergartens, and 
a madrasah—Arabic for “school”—where Muslim children learn to read the Holy Qur’an.  
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activities. I also examine how they continue to use religious resources to contribute to 
peacebuilding in Mindanao. 
 
6.1.1 Religious Resource for Dialogue: Implementing the Second Vatican Council and the 
Beatitudes  
For approximately thirty years, the SDM has been involved in peacebuilding activities in Mindanao, 
especially by promoting peace through dialogue at the grassroots level. I found that religion has 
played a central role throughout the SDM’s history. D’Ambra, the founder and the key figure of the 
SDM, engaged in the HoP process. As a religious leader, D’Ambra utilised specific theological 
concepts and reinterpretations of sacred texts to justify his engagement in dialogue as a religious 
sacred mission to respond to the devastating effects of the conflict, including the segregation of 
people along religious lines.  
Two fundamental theological resources inspired and motivated D’Ambra to pursue his 
dialogue mission and greatly contributed to the peacebuilding processes in Mindanao. The first 
religious resource is the Second Vatican Council (SVC), by which the Catholic Church made “a 
theological leap” through the HoP. For many centuries, the Catholic theology that the clergy taught 
in seminaries and preached in churches was an exclusivist theology that gave rise to a negative 
perception of “others” and to a superiority complex in relation to those others.469 However, with the 
SVC, the church revised its basic doctrine that there is no salvation outside the church.470 The SVC 
provides a theological justification for openness and inclusiveness toward other religions, especially 
Islam. An example of this new concept was Lumen Gentium, number 16, of the Conciliar 
Documents, which states the following: 
But the plan of salvation also includes those who acknowledge the Creator. In the 
first place amongst these there are the Mohammedans, who, professing to hold the 
faith of Abraham, along with us, adore the One, Merciful God, who on the last day 
will judge mankind.”471  
 
Again, with Lumen Gentium, the Catholic Church recognises that there might be salvation 
outside of itself.472 Furthermore, in other another document of the SVC, Nostra Aetate, which is 
well known within the Church as the magna carta of dialogue, states that  
The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living 
and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and 
earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His 
                                                          
469Fr. Sebastiano D'Ambra, Call to a Dream: Silsilah Dialogue Movement  (Zamboanga City, the Philippines: Silsilah 
Dialogue Movement 2008). 
470 Ibid. 
471 See http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-
gentium_en.html. Accessed on 21 December 2011. 
472 Interview with Fr. D’Ambra, Zamboanga City, 21 November 2011.  
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inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in 
linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they 
revere Him as a prophet. They also honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times, they 
even call on her with devotion. In addition, they await the Day of Judgment when 
God will render their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. 
Finally, they  
value the moral life and worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and 
fasting.473 
 
Nostra Aetate continues to explain: 
Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen 
between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to forget the past and 
to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote 
together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as 
peace and freedom.474 
 
This introspective and self-critical attitude, acknowledging mistakes of the past, alongside the 
declaration of openness as new platform for the future, influenced D’Ambra’s heart and mind to 
pursue a life in dialogue.475 
The second religious resource that greatly influenced D’Ambra’s passionate involvement in 
peacebuilding is his interpretation of the Beatitudes. The term “beatitudes” comes from the Latin 
word beatus, meaning fortunate. Some English versions of Bible interpret Beatitudes as True 
Happiness.476 In this context, the Beatitudes of Jesus, which are found in the Bible (Matthew 5: 3–
10), will lead the Christian to “a deeper experience of dialogue and inter-religious dialogue by 
inspiring Christians to overcome fear, doubt and happily move on together with people from 
different religious backgrounds.”477 
D’Ambra’s book, entitled Rediscovering the Mission of Dialogue and Peace in the Church in 
the Light of the Beatitudes: Formation on Dialogue and Peace and Introduction to Interreligious 
Dialogue, which provides evidence of the depth of his involvement in the HoP process, includes an 
outline of the eight Beatitudes (Mathew 5: 3–5) that Catholics should follow. They are as follows: 
(1) happy are those who know they are spiritually poor; (2) happy are those who are humble; (3) 
happy are those who mourn; (4) happy are those whose great desire is to do what God requests; (5) 
happy are those who are merciful to others; (6) happy are the pure in heart; (7) happy are the 
peacemakers; (8) happy are those who are persecuted for the cause of justice for theirs is Kingdom 
                                                          
473 See http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-
aetate_en.html.  Accessed on 21 December 2011 
474 Ibid. 
475  Interview with Fr. D’Ambra, Zamboanga City, 21 November 2011.  
476See New Testament and Psalms, vol. Fourth Edition, The New Testament in Today's English Version (Philippines 
Bible Society 1981). 
477 Interview with Fr. D’Ambra, Zamboanga City, 21 November 2011. 
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of Heaven.478 D’Ambra’s interpretation of the seventh beatitude is that it is an obligation for all 
Christians, without any exception, to assume a role in peacebuilding activities, which is an essential 
requirement to pursue happiness. 479 The SDM uses the Beatitudes as an ideological approach to 
encourage Catholic adherents to become peacemakers as an integral part of religious teaching. 
Informed by the SVC and the Beatitudes, D’Ambra arrived in Zamboanga City in 1977 and 
started his mission of inter-religious dialogue. Change, though, did not happen easily. When he 
arrived in Zamboanga City, the mission was still considered an unusual approach by mainstream 
Catholics in the City and in the wider Philippines.480 It took twenty-five years before the Catholic 
structures formally embraced interfaith dialogue as one of the crucial ideas of the SVC’s 
documents. The creation of the Episcopal Commission for Interreligious Dialogue (ECID) in 1990 
within the structure of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) marked this 
involvement. Previously, interreligious issues were only incorporated under the Episcopal 
Commission for Ecumenism (ECE).481  
D’Ambra advocated for interreligious dialogue through the SDM, but was not alone in 
initiating dialogue as a religious sacred mission in Mindanao. In the same year of the establishment 
of SDM, Catholic leaders undertook initiatives within the formal structures of the Church in 
Mindanao to urge the Catholic structures in the Philippines to embrace and practice dialogue as a 
religious mission. Bishop George Dion of Apostolic Vicariate of Jolo, for example, released his 
pastoral letters entitled Attitudes of Christians towards Muslims. The letter, which was sent to the 
CBCP and all bishops in the Philippines, urged Catholics to change their attitudes toward Muslims. 
Dion argued that the attitudes of Catholics were extremely removed from the teachings of the SVC. 
He also recommended that the teaching of the SVC should be included in seminary curriculum and 
in the formation of lay groups.482  
The Catholic leaders in the South, who faced the impact of conflict on the ground and 
grappled with its devastating effects, were more open to promote dialogue than mainstream 
Catholic leaders in the North, who tended to maintain the status quo. This demonstrates that the 
manner in which religious people interpret their sacred texts is influenced by the socio-political 
                                                          
478Fr. Sebastiano D'Ambara, Rediscovering the Mission of Dialogue and Peace in the Church in the Light of the 
Beatitudes: Formation on Dialogue and Peace and Introduction to Interreligious Dialogue  (Zamboanga City: Silsilah 
Publication, 2010), 1. 
479Ibid., 15. 
480 Even for Fr. D’Ambra the dialogue is new. Although he came to Mindanao to conduct dialogue mission, he did not 
how to conduct it in practice because the mission was an extremely new concept and practice in the Catholic Church. 
He conducted his mission by “learning by doing”. Through daily interactions, experiences, reflection, and prayer he 
slowly systematized the idea of dialogue; this finally led him to establishing the SDM in 1984. Interview with Fr. 
D’Ambra, Zamboanga City, 21 November 2011. 
481LaRousse, Walking Together Seeking Peace: The Local Church of Mindanao-Sulu Journeying in Dialogue with the 
Muslim Community (1965-2000), 337. 
482 Ibid., 355. 
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context. Moreover, it demonstrates the possibilities of the hermeneutic reinterpretation of religious 
texts and of practice in the pursuit of peace. In other words, religion is not static; religious 
interpretations are dynamic and can be turned to the cause of peacebuilding.   
In short, the SVC’s document (Lumen Gentium and Nostra Aetate) and the Gospels (the 
Beatitudes) have played a decisive role as religious resources that inspired and motivated D’Ambra 
to dedicate his life to establish peace in Mindanao by founding the SDM. Nonetheless, the 
progressive theological teachings of the SVC cannot be easily implemented on the ground, even in 
the Catholic Church, which is a highly structured hierarchical organisation. Change required 
reflection and the advocacy of religious leaders, such as D’Ambra and Bishop George Dion, who 
engaged in the HoP processes. D’Ambra grappled to find resources in his religion, interpreted 
sacred texts in response to “external contexts” (the negative effects of war), and deployed those 
religious resources to generate concrete actions for building up the community at the grassroots 
level.  
 
6.1.2 Faith as Energy and Power for Dialogue 
As I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, numerous books, reports, and journal articles in the social 
sciences, which are heavily influenced by the secular paradigm, have documented how religion has 
initiated, energised, and prolonged conflicts throughout human history. However, my fieldwork 
findings in Mindanao overturn the mainstream perception of religion as a force for generating 
conflict. Religious faith, for example, played a crucial role in D’Ambra’s decision to become 
involved and continue in his efforts to promote dialogue. His faith obliged him to start a new 
Catholic mission, the mission of dialogue, in accordance with of the SVC. Dialogue, in this context, 
is a sacred mission. The Catholic faith, for him, provides energy and power to overcome barriers 
and challenges in organising dialogue. 
Choosing to promote the culture of dialogue in a conflict zone required self-sacrifices. 
Without a strong commitment and dedication to interfaith dialogue, D’Ambra, who was born and 
grew up in Italy, felt despair and was stressed when he migrated from Italy to the Philippines. I 
found that the D’Ambra’s source of dedication and commitment to interfaith dialogue came from 
his faith. For example, Siocon, the first place where D’Ambra started his dialogue mission, was a 
very small and isolated town with poor infrastructure: it had no roads, no public transportation, and 
very poor sanitation. As a human being, he was shocked by the different living standards in Siocon 
and his hometown in Italy. However, he quickly adjusted to the situation and overcame the 
challenges that he faced because he believed that the journey to Siocon was part of God’s plan.483  
                                                          
483 Interview with Fr. D’Ambra, Zamboanga City, 24 November 2011. 
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Politically, it was not an easy task to organise dialogue because of the mutual distrust that 
existed between communities, beside the existing armed groups, criminal armed gangs, family 
feuds (rido), and lack of law enforcement. In the SDM’s history, for example, two dialogue activists 
were assassinated. First, someone gunned down Boy de Guzman, D’Ambra’s assistant, in the late 
1980s in Siocon. Second, someone who, for reasons unknown, did not wish to see the dialogue 
mission continue assassinated Fr. Salvatore Carzedda, PIME, one of the founders of the SDM, on 
20 May 1992.484 
In such difficult circumstances, faith came to give energy, strengthen, and renew D’Ambra’s 
commitment. He explained his situation as follows:  
I experienced powerlessness in the midst of so many problems, and began and ended 
the day with prayer: “O Lord, what am I to do?” My time, my energy, my material 
resources were not enough to answer all these needs. I was powerless and often felt 
frustrated. Looking back I realize(d) this was a beautiful beginning, because I started 
to surrender to God, accepting my human limitations, and relying more upon God’s 
will and plan for His beloved people. I began to understand deeply that this work is 
not primarily mine but God’s. 
This realization gave me energy to overcome discouragement and to be creative in 
responding to the challenges and call of situations as they unfolded.485 
 
When D’Ambra explained to me how complicated Mindanao’s problems were, including the 
poor security to protect the basic rights of the people in Mindanao, including the SDM activists, he 
confidently said this: “my trust in God enables me to overcome fears and to experience inner 
peace.”486  
Faith in God, in short, has been able to supply energy to strengthen the commitment of 
D’Ambra to keep working in the path of peace through promoting a culture of dialogue as a 
religious sacred mission. Challenges, and even death threats, were overcome by a strong belief that 
dialogue is a significant part of the sacred mission and religious duties.  
 
6.1.3 Faith: Broadening the Meaning of Dialogue 
In recent years, conflict resolution theorists and practitioners have paid greater attention to the 
concept and practice of dialogue to complement formal political encounters, such as negotiation, 
diplomacy, and workshops.487 I found that the SDM also contributed to broaden the concept of 
                                                          
484 Threats to the SDM activists continue to this day. When I was in a car with Fr. D’Ambra on our way from Harmony 
Village to Zamboanga Cathedral for the closing ceremony of “Mindanao Week of Peace” a police officer stopped our 
car and gave the latest intelligence report on a threat to Fr. D’Ambra. He used another car on his way back to 
Harmony village as a way to mitigate the threat.      
 485 D'Ambra, Call to a Dream: Silsilah Dialogue Movement, 22. 
486 Interview with Fr. D’Ambra, Zamboanga City, 21 November 2011. 
 487 Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and Global System  (London: Sage Publication, 
2002). 
125 
 
dialogue by emphasizing its spiritual dimension. D’Ambra, the founder and central figure in the 
SDM, also underlined that dialogue is more than simply a formal strategy to reach a political 
settlement between conflicting parties. It might lead to adversaries reaching a political agreement, 
but its additional purpose relates to a revised theological approach that foregrounds relations with 
others that they had not previously recognised. For approximately thirty years, the SDM has 
promoted dialogue as a spiritual journey and a way of life that should be practiced everywhere and 
at all times.488  
Real dialogue, according to D'Ambra, is supposed to originate from heartfelt sincerity and 
love. Ideally, in real dialogue, people do not only meet when problems arise within communities 
and part ways when the problem has been solved. D’Ambra wrote that 
[d]ialogue is love in action. Dialogue without love is nothing. It becomes a strategy 
and a dangerous way of relating when people do not see each other as having the 
same dignity. It becomes a new way of controlling and dominating others. The real 
dialogue motivated by love not only requires pain but also gives joy. Real dialogue 
only can be sustained by love. This is the spirituality that Silsilah promotes.489  
 
The spirituality of dialogue that SDM promotes means that dialogue should be 
comprehensive, including the process of personal and social transformation. Dialogue, according to 
D’Ambra, starts from God and brings people back to God. It requires a holistic understanding and 
approach to dialogue, which is supported by four pillars: (1) dialogue with God, (2) dialogue with 
yourself (3) dialogue with other people, and (4) dialogue with creation.490 Moreover, because 
dialogue is viewed as a spiritual journey, the eternal goal of dialogue is to develop a culture of 
dialogue at the grassroots level. This is how to help people achieve personal transformation and 
experience goodness, compassion, mercy, and forgiveness based on their religion in order to 
achieve a long lasting peace. D’Ambra explained this further: 
So, dialogue supposes to be experience of life or style of life. This style of life will 
help to overcome violence, work for justice, give services to the poor. So it becomes 
motivation as well. I understood to sustain any dialogue you don’t need (only) formal 
dialogue. You need (dialogue as) style of life. Just to say it’s not enough I become 
doctor only because I finished my dissertation and bring me to better job, but I have 
to have a passion. And inter-religious dialogue offers this passion.491 
 
                                                          
 488Interview with Fr. D’Ambra, Zamboanga City, 21 November 2011.  
489 D'Ambra, Call to a Dream: Silsilah Dialogue Movement. p. 10 
 490 Interview with Fr. D’Ambra, Zamboanga City 24 November 2011. The dialogue with creation specifically refers to 
endeavours to display positive attitudes towards the environment. The SDM involves, for example, organising farmer 
organisations to use organic farming methods. The SDM also researches and practices the use of herbal medicine. 
Recently, the SDM was involved in environmental advocacy by objecting to the operations of a mining company that, 
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Emphasizing the spiritual aspect of dialogue helped to foster personal transformation on the 
ground. Alih S. Aiyub, a Muslim leader in Zamboanga who is actively involved in the SDM, 
observed that the SDM offers a sustainable framework for human relations and interactions to its 
activists. This is possible because the SDM works for the process of personal transformation based 
on a renewed understanding of religion in its relation to other religions. According to Ayub, religion 
in the past  
was used, misused, and abused as a source of conflict. The SDM offers the process of 
reorientation of human person to rediscovering faiths, so that we [the SDM activists] 
want to reverse that; religion should be reason for peace rather than conflict.492  
 
The emphasis on personal transformation does not necessarily mean that the SDM ignores the 
importance of structural transformation. The SDM believes, according to Aiyub, that only through 
honest personal transformation, the true structural transformation can take place in Mindanao, “[you 
must] transform the person to transform the structure. You can’t have peace if you don’t have inner 
peace in your mind and your heart.”493  
More importantly, Aiyub finds that the idea of the importance of personal transformation 
through dialogue is in line with the early history of the Prophet Muhammad. Historically, the first 
period of Islamic da’wah (call to Islam), which was renowned as the period of Mecca, placed 
greater emphasis to personal transformation as a solid basis for building a just and egalitarian 
society. The Prophet Muhammad only initiated structural transformation and political reforms in the 
second period of da’wah, the period of Medina, where, in general, his followers went through the 
process of personal transformation.494  
My interviews with the alumni of the SDM courses found that the courses brought a new 
awareness about their own religion and its relation to others. Rowena J. Macapuji (a Muslim) is an 
alumna of the Silsilah basic and intensive courses in 2004. Besides the stigmatising of and the 
prejudice towards Christians that was found in her community, she had a negative experience when 
living with Christians. When she worked for a private shipping company, her boss, a Christian, 
forced her to eat pork, which Islam strongly prohibits. After taking the course in the SDM, she 
realised that not all Christians were as awful as her prior experience led her to believe. Recalling the 
course that she attended about six years ago, she noted that 
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we shared ideas with each other, ate together and slept in the same dormitory. I 
realised that is OK to be friends with Christians. Just like Muslims, not all Christians 
are bad...495 
 
After she completed the course, the SDM offered her a job as a midwives’ coordinator, to be 
in charge of a feeding programme, a health campaign, and dialogue formation in her community in 
Lower Calarian. For her, being involved in the SDM is about commitment to sustain the spirit of 
dialogue.496  
Esther de Compo, a Catholic, is another alumna of the SDM course who experienced great 
personal transformation. From the beginning, she found it difficult to erase her prejudices toward 
Muslims because she grew up in a Christian community that greatly stigmatised Muslims. Those 
prejudices were strengthened by the fact that her husband was a military officer who had to fight 
Muslim rebels and terrorists. Ester experienced a personal transformation when she attended an 
SDM course, which offered intensive interactions and encounters with Muslims that allowed the 
participants to share ideas, pains, and wounds, as well as revisit their religious understandings. This 
allowed her to improve her relationships with her Muslim brothers and sisters: 
....not all Muslim like that [bad Muslims]. Some are good, some are bad, also. The 
programme in Silsilah is to make us [Christians and Muslims] one [united]... it really 
changed [me]. If I meet someone from other religions, now, I know how to handle it. 
As a member of the Silsilah family, I realised whatever religion people have, we 
have to respect each other.497 
 
Having attended the SDM course, Esther became committed to sustaining the spirit of 
dialogue in her life. For the last four years, she has been one of the SDM’s “foster-parents.” In 
every course, the SDM sent participants to stay two to three nights with a foster parent from a 
different religious background to allow them to directly experience living with people from a 
different religion. For Esther, being a Silsilah family and a foster parent is an avenue for achieving 
peace through sustained dialogue:  
It is one way to promote peace. [When a Muslim participant is staying in my house], 
we are talking each other; asking some questions. Little by little, the negative 
thinking [about other religions] have been erased. I’m almost five years for being 
such foster parent.498  
 
At the end of my interview with her, she proudly mentioned that she still keeps in touch with 
her thirteen Muslim foster children after they stayed at her house and finished their course in the 
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SDM.499 This also shows how the spirit of dialogue can be sustained through personal 
transformation.  
In short, the SDM has been promoting dialogue that has a broader meaning and has been 
putting into practice a concept of dialogue that differs from the one that mainstream academics and 
conflict resolution practitioners promote. The SDM has included the spirituality of dialogue as a 
crucial dimension to facilitate personal transformation and strengthen the relationships among 
people from different religion. The SDM offers passion and endurance through personal 
transformation and by sharing lived daily experiences and sowing continuously the culture of 
dialogue at the grassroots level to overcome prejudices and stigma, build common ground, and 
develop the common good as essential requirements to achieve lasting peace.  
I now turn to discuss the role of women in peacebuilding. Women usually are a vulnerable 
group in conflicts. The case that I present below demonstrates the power that religion has in 
empowering women through SDM to become an essential part of peacebuilding in Mindanao. 
 
6.1.4 The Emmaus Dialogue Community: Women Peacebuilders 
The Emmaus Dialogue Community (EDC) is a lay association of Catholic women who have 
committed and dedicated their lives to the mission of dialogue and peace. The Archdiocese of 
Zamboanga officially recognised the establishment of the EDC in 1996, although the EDC was 
formed and began its mission in 1987. To be members of the EDC, the women must make two 
“vows of commitments”: they must be celibate and they must be committed to live a life in dialogue 
with people from different religions. The EDC members decided to be custodians of the mission 
and the vision of the SDM.  
One point that is relevant to my research question in the case of the EDC is that certain 
religious texts can inspire women to become “full-time workers” for promoting dialogue and peace. 
Specifically, the EDC founders used religious texts to inspire the formation of the EDC members 
who dedicate themselves to serve God through the dialogue mission for peace.  
The term “Emmaus,” which originates from the Gospel of Luke, Chapter 24 (“The Walk to 
Emmaus”), is the name of a city about seven miles north-west of the city of Jerusalem. In Chapter 
24, Luke, tells the story about two disciples of Jesus who leave Jerusalem because of the anger and 
frustration that they felt at what had just happened to Jesus of Nazareth. However, Jesus appeared to 
them as a stranger, accompanied them, and taught them about Scripture. While the two disciples 
were having dinner with the stranger, they suddenly realised that the stranger was Jesus Christ.500 
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The story of Emmaus is renowned in the Christian tradition. Numerous Christian foundations 
and institutions are called Emmaus. One example is Walk to Emmaus, a Christian foundation in 
Australia. It uses the interpretation and understanding of the Emmaus story in Luke 24 as the vision 
for  
the renewal of the Church as the body of the risen Christ in the world through the 
renewal of church members as faithful and committed disciples of Jesus Christ. 
Emmaus expands participants' spiritual lives, deepens their discipleship, and 
rekindles their gifts as Christian leaders in their churches and communities.501 
 
However, the EDC has interpreted Luke 24 in a slightly different manner. For the EDC, the 
experience of Emmaus is an extremely obvious example of the Christian spiritual journey. More 
importantly, Luke 24 also tells the Christian followers to follow Jesus’ way of initiating dialogue. 
Jesus came directly to the two disciples to initiate dialogue. Therefore, for the EDC, God is the 
source and fountain of dialogue. Dialogue is, in this context, a sacred religious mission. As 
followers of Jesus, according to the EDC, they should follow in the footsteps of Jesus as the 
initiator of dialogue, as found in Luke 24. Furthermore, the EDC, in line with the SDM’s vision and 
mission, utilises the Beatitudes and the SVC as the spirit that broadens dialogue, not only among 
Christians, but also with other religions, especially Muslims. 
Aminda E. Sano was 28 years old when she joined the SDM in 1984. Three years later, in 
1987, through a process of training, prayer, and reading and understanding the Bible, she formed 
the EDC with two other women, to which lay Catholic women were consecrated to promote 
dialogue through the SDM. Now, Aminda Sano serves as the president of the SDM. She explained 
why she chose to be involved in the EDC as follows:  
For me [to be a member of EDC] is a choice. There were many offers for better jobs 
at the time. But it is a call. It is God’s invitation to serve God and people through 
dialogue mission. Together with other two friends, we decided to consecrate 
ourselves for promoting dialogue. This [EDC] is a gift for Silsilah.502 
 
The EDC has seven members. Understandably, recruiting more women as EDC members is a 
difficult task because the membership “requirements” are challenging (i.e., holiness, celibacy, and 
full consecration to the promotion of dialogue). To accommodate the interest of individuals who 
cannot fully make the EDC’s vows of commitments, the EDC has formed the so-called the Emmaus 
Circle. The Emmaus Circle members could be single or married and continue their professional 
vocation, but they share the same charism and spiritual journey as the EDC members.  
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Despite being custodians and full-time workers in the SDM, the EDC established a concrete 
dialogue project in Santa Catalina, a barangay (village) in Zamboanga City with a mixed Muslim 
and Christian population that was prone to religious conflict. In this setting, small or trivial matters 
could trigger dangerous conflict. The EDC initiated dialogue and mediation within two 
communities. Because of the dialogue programme, for the last two decades, the misunderstandings 
that led to social unrest no longer occurred in that area.503 The EDC has also operated a social 
programme to help the community to provide for its basic needs. The EDC also built kindergartens 
and elementary schools in the community that enabled both Christians and Muslims children to be 
educated together. 
In numerous war zones around the world, women are among the most vulnerable and 
powerless groups. Whereas people also have been inspired and mobilise conflict by finding 
justification in the Holy Scriptures, this was not the case with the EDC in Zambonga City. Women 
play a crucial role as agents for peace. The women in the EDC who showed their ability to become 
involved in the process of the hermeneutics of peace (HoP), used religious texts as religious 
resources to inspire and motivate the EDC members and to dedicate themselves to working towards 
peace by promoting dialogue.  
To conclude, at least four significant findings emerged from the SDM case regarding the 
positive contribution of religious resources to the process of peacebuilding in Mindanao. First, the 
SDM activists demonstrated that a central element of the HoP is their interpretation and use of 
sacred texts as religious resources that justify their engagement in peacebuilding through the 
promotion of dialogue in Mindanao. Secondly, because the SDM activists believed that promoting 
dialogue was part of their religious commitment, they tirelessly worked for peace because 
promoting dialogue is not only a worldly matter but also a part of their religious sacred mission that 
will be rewarded in the hereafter.  
Thirdly, related to the second point, the SDM broadened the concept of dialogue that conflict 
resolution scholars and practitioners had developed. The SDM included the importance of the 
spiritual dimension to the dialogue process. In a religious society such as that of Mindanao, the 
spiritual aspect of dialogue facilitated the flourishing of a new understanding of religion and of the 
religion of others, which helped to create an environment that was conducive to building trust and 
fostering inter-personal transformation. Now, I turn to discuss my second micro-case, which I used 
to investigate how religion contributes to the establishment of the SPs in Nalapaan and what 
religious resources were used in the SPs. 
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6.2  Giving Peace a Chance: Nalapaan Space for Peace  
In this section, I present an example of grassroots initiatives for peacebuilding that were initiated by 
religious leaders and adherents, as well as non-governmental organisation (NGO) activists. This 
initiative is a concrete manifestation and contribution of religion to the peacebuilding processes in 
Mindanao. In the first part, I introduce the general concept of Space for Peace or Zone of Peace. 
Then, I introduce the SP, which the Nalapaan Community established, and how religion and 
religious leaders have used religious resources to facilitate the creation of the SP.  
 
6.2.1 Concept of Space for Peace  
The concept of a SP, which people often called Peace Zone (PZ), is not entirely new. Christopher 
Mitchell and Susan Nan defined a PZ as a place ‘where the fighting should cease or where certain 
people would be immune from attack (or from the other damaging effects of being “at war”.’504 
They argued that the idea of an agreed PZ has a long history and that it can be traced to the idea of 
rules of conduct during war, which provide limited safe places during hostilities. Furthermore, they 
explained that, anthropologically, almost all societies have developed a war ethic and codes of 
conduct during wars and conflicts, including identifying places where violence can or cannot take 
place, such as the prohibition of acts of war in market places.505  
In recent history, two types of PZs have emerged. The first are outsider PZs, which outsiders, 
such as U.N. peacekeeping missions, create to establish “neutral zones” aiming to save lives and 
deliver humanitarian relief. These types of PZs were established, at particular times, in Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, and the Southern Sudan. The second type consists of bottom-up PZs, where members of 
grassroots communities in conflict zones declare their territory to be a “conflict free area.” These 
can be found, for example, in Guatemala, El Salvador, and the Philippines.506 
In the Philippines, the idea and practice of a PZ is also not entirely new. The movement and 
mood for this type of societal action can be traced to the late 1980s. Through the spirit of “people 
power” that toppled President Marcos, people begun to think how the power of civil society could 
establish peace in divided societies that were trapped in prolonged wars. The idea of PZs in the 
Philippines was inspired by the Hungduan community, Ifangao, in the Northern Philippines’ 
Cordilleras, where the community objected to both the army and the guerrillas turning their town 
into a battleground.507 The declaration of the first PZ in Naga City, which was officially called a 
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Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), followed.508 Avruch and Jose differentiate PZs 
in the Philippines into two categories. The first wave of PZs occurred in the 1980s and the 1990s as 
part of Filipino civil society’s response to the war between the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) and the New People’s Army (NPA), the military wing of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines–National Democratic Front (CPP-NDF). The second wave of the PZ occurred between 
2000 and 2004 in response to the intractable conflict between the AFP and Muslim armed groups, 
especially the MILF. Consequently, most of the PZ in this second wave are located Mindanao, the 
Southern Philippines.509 
 
6.2.2 A Brief Introduction to Nalapaan 
Nalapaan is one the 42 barangays510in the Municipality of Pikit. It is a small barangay with 350 
households consisting of approximately 60% Muslims, 35% Christians, and 5% 
Manabos/Lumads—the indigenous people of Mindanao. Nalapaan is known as one of the worst 
conflict-affected barangays in Mindanao. This is because it is strategically positioned along the 
national highway that connects Davao City (the largest city in Mindanao) and Cotabato City (the 
capital of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao—ARMM). It is seven kilometres from the 
town centre, the home of the 40th Infantry Battalion of the Philippines Army, and close to Camp 
Rajahmuda, the third largest MILF camp. Historically, war has been affecting the area 
approximately every three years. In June 1997, a war, known as the Rajahmuda war, broke out 
between the AFP and the MILF, and displaced 30,000 persons. Three years later, in March 2000, 
after President Estrada declared an all-out-war policy, Nalapaan became the battleground of the 
AFP and the MILF, devastating houses and farms, causing civilian casualties and evacuating 40,000 
people to Pikit, including the people from Nalapaan.511 
In the aftermath of these two wars, the inhabitants of Nalapaan started to consider how to 
break the circle of war. After several consultations, formal and informal meetings, training, and 
negotiations, on 1 February 2001, the people of Nalapaan declared their barangay to be an SP. Key 
conflict actors, including the AFP and the MILF, respected this initiative. In 2003, when the war 
erupted again, people in Nalapaan did not evacuate to Pikit proper whereas other barangays did. In 
2008, when negotiating parties (the MILF and the Philippines government) failed to sign the 
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), Ameril Umbara Kato (an ex-MILF 
commander) waged war throughout Mindanao. However, Nalapaan remained calm. The barangay 
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was no longer a battleground; the inhabitants of Nalapaan did not evacuate and even built an 
evacuation centre for other barangays surrounding Nalapaan that the war had affected. 
The success of the Nalapaan SP became of a role model for other barangays around 
Nalapaan. On 29 November 2004, people from seven barangays (including Nalapaan) declared 
their barangays to be Spaces for Peace. They called this Space of Peace ginapalad ta ka, which 
literally means “I bless you;” the term is also an acronym that is derived from the first two letters of 
their Barangay’s names: GInatilan, NAlapaan, PAnicupan, LAdtingan, Dalengaoen, TAkepan, and 
KAlakakan.   
 
6.2.3 Re-diagnosing the Mindanao Conflict and Building Peace from Below 
One of the most critical roles that local religious people played in conflict resolution is their ability 
to understand situations in conflict-affected communities. This is possible because religious leaders 
live within communities, understand the culture and language of the people, and can recognize 
people’s hopes and fears. Specifically, they also are passionate about working for peace because 
they consider this a sacred duty.512 In the context of the Nalapaan SP, religious leaders have offered 
a new lens for re-diagnosing and redefining the problems within grassroots communities that should 
be resolved to achieve a sustainable peace. The new lens, as I explain in more detail below, helped 
to bring people together to resolve the problem that they faced.  
The religious leaders in Nalapaan have observed that conflict is more complicated than most 
people might think.513 The conventional perspectives is that the conflict in Mindanao is, largely, a 
political matter: it is a conflict between the MILF, the secessionist armed group that strives for 
justice and to redress the grievances of Muslims in Mindanao, and the AFP, which struggles to 
maintain the Philippines national territorial integrity. However, the religious leaders’ analysis of the 
conflict is far more complex. The deep process of instrumentalising religion that has accompanied 
the conflict has considerable negative effects on the community. After personal and communal 
experiences with suffering, violence, assassinations, and hostage taking, the people of Mindanao 
often think that Muslims are identical with the MILF and that Christians are associated with AFP.514  
Suspicions and prejudices divide Muslims and Christians. It is not difficult to trace how 
prejudices are deep-rooted among Muslims and Christians alike. Throughout my interviews in 
Mindanao, respondents repeatedly mentioned the age-old common perception among Christians 
that “a good Muslim is a dead Muslim.” Whereas among Muslim communities a common feeling 
and perception exists that Christian settlers in Mindanao are an extension of the Spanish and 
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American colonialisation of their homeland. These prejudices and suspicions spill over into the 
education system in which we find, for example, biased historical understandings of the existing 
culture and religion of the Philippines.515 
For many, the story of Ilagas in the 1970s, a Christian armed group that was organised by 
politicians and the military to kill Muslims, is still fresh in people’s memories. A Muslim armed 
group called the Barracudas was also organised to take revenge against Ilagas. Indeed, the conflict 
divided people along religious lines. In the current situation, a Muslim leader told me that his 
Christian fellows in Nalapaan suspected that he was a leader of the MILF. Muslims in Nalapaan 
also suspected that other Christians were military informants.516 The idea of SPs began in this 
social, cultural, and political atmosphere.  
According to Fr. Layson, one of the central figures who initiated the SP, ‘it is difficult to talk 
about peace and dialogue when there has been major armed conflict. It creates a “we and they” 
mentality. It resurrects old wounds.’517 Promoting the idea of peace in the context of a conflict-torn 
society is difficult. When Layson helped Muslim evacuees, for example, numerous Christian 
leaders got angry; some of them even resigned from the Parish Pastoral Council in protest. Many 
Christians were cynical about Layson’s efforts to reach out to Muslim communities. Some of them 
even started to call Layson, OMI (Oblates of Mary Immaculate), “Fr. Layson, OMILF.”518 In this 
context, building trust, opening channels of communication, and addressing the Muslim-Christian 
relationship, as well as healing trauma, is crucial yet difficult tasks that are necessary for building 
for a durable peace.  
In this regard, I identified two critical factors in the process of establishing the Nalapaan SP. 
Firstly, religious leaders offered a new lens on the root causes of the conflict at the micro-level. 
People cannot simply pretend that there is no problem between Muslims and Christians or deny its 
existence. Therefore, one should address prejudices, stigmas, and mutual distrust before it becomes 
possible to build a harmonious community. To establish a long-lasting peace, one must address the 
underlying problems within the communities, which means resolving, to borrow Fr. Layson’s term, 
the “unseen war” in the hearts and minds of the people.519 Secondly, and because of this, religious 
leaders convinced people in Nalapaan that peace should be built from below, that is, from and 
within the grassroots community. Throughout the history of the Mindanao conflict, the Government 
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of the Philippines (GPH), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the MILF signed and 
released numerous peace agreements, joint statements, and communiqués. However, people became 
tired of waiting for the conflicting parties to sign peace agreements. The local people suffered 
because of the intermittent armed conflict and were powerless to mitigate it. 
Therefore, religious leaders understood that the grassroots do not entirely rely on the elites to 
achieve peace. They have to “act now and here” for their own safety and security. Layson 
convinced the people that ‘peace should be everybody’s responsibility. By now, people should 
know that peace is too important to be left alone in the hands of the government and the armed 
opposition.’520 Layson offered an analogy: building peace is like building a house; it is never build 
from the top. It must start from below, by building a small and solid foundation.521  
In short, religious leaders have contributed to peacebuilding at the grassroots level in 
Mindanao. This was possible because, through their daily interactions with suffering people, they 
could diagnose that understanding the conflict required providing a deeper analysis than what had 
been offered so far. The intractable conflict, along with the process of instrumentalisation of 
religion, caused mutual distrust and animosity between Christians and Muslims. A long-lasting 
peace could only be achieved by addressing those problems.  
 
6.2.4 From Dialogue of Victims to a Culture of Peace  
The establishment of SP in Nalapaan, as one model of the grassroots initiatives for peacebuilding, 
took time, much effort, numerous activities, and the participation of stakeholders in dialogue, 
encounters, and communication between Muslims and Christians, including during difficult times in 
the evacuation centres when the wars broke out. The crisis allowed people in Nalapaan to become 
involved in the HoP process where they revisited their existing understandings of religion, which 
affected how they interacted with other religious adherents. At a time of difficulty and suffering, the 
shared sense of humanity, linked to religious sensibilities, motivates people to help each other, often 
overcoming barriers.522 The “dialogue of suffering in humanity” has developed an awareness for 
solidarity across religions. It has helped to start to build a bridge between the tri-people (Muslims, 
Christians, and Lumads).523  
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After several months in the evacuation centres, after President Estrada declared an all-out-war 
policy, Tabang Mindanao, an NGO operating in Mindanao, expressed its intention to facilitate the 
return of Nalapaan’s people to their barangay. Together, then, Tabang Mindanao, religious leaders, 
and the people of Nalapaan began to address the people’s physical and mental rehabilitation needs 
to cope with the effects of the war. 
One of the outcomes of the mental rehabilitation programme was numerous Culture of Peace 
and Inter-Religious Seminars (the CoP). The structure of the seminar is not entirely new. It consist 
of (l) understanding the Mindanao problem; (2) understanding conflict and peace; (3) conflict 
resolution skills; (4) cultural appreciation and sensitivity; (5) inter-religious dialogue; (6) visioning 
and commitment building; (7) healing and reconciliation; (8) evaluation and planning. The three-
day seminars, which were organised using a participatory approach, mainly involved small group 
discussion, case studies, presentations, and reflection. 
The CoP became an opportunity to the cultivate self-awareness among Nalapaan’s people that 
they needed to attain a HoP that could lead them to re-contextualise and rejuvenate their 
understanding of religion to overcome the crisis. One the most obvious principles that religious 
leaders and facilitators introduced was to raise awareness about the ambivalent nature of religion. 
The training helped the participants become aware of the tendency in religious communities to 
apply double standards when observing others who have different religious commitments. They 
look at their own religion on a normative level (the ideal level: what it is supposed to be or as is 
written in their Holy Book) and see other religions at the historical level (the actual level: what it 
has done or how it is practiced in daily life). This double standard might lead to a sense of moral 
superiority, which, at the end, poses an obstacle to dialogue for mutual understanding. Concerning 
this, Layson emphasised the following:  
And so in dialogue we begin by looking honestly at who we are. Whether we 
like it or not, we are not just ourselves, not just our own religious communities. 
We are in fact part of a faith community that we call Christians. As part of such 
community, we end up having to bear responsibility for its bad points as well as 
its good points. We are part of the communion of saints, but also communion of 
sinners. However good we might be personally or as a local community, we are 
somehow, connected with that whole history of colonialism, capitalism, military 
dominance, etc... like it or not, they are our Christian brothers and sisters.524 
 
By implementing the HoP in the context of a CoP, the Nalapaan community realised that it 
needed to transform its old attitudes and perceptions (overgeneralisation, stigmas, and prejudices 
rooted in double standards) through a new and fresh perception of other religious adherents. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
together to solve a common problem between these young people has created an environment that was conducive to 
mutual understanding. Layson, "Dialogue and Peacebuilding in Mindanao," 8. 
524Ibid., 1. 
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other words, one cannot make generalisations because a plurality of views exists within religious 
groups.  
One of the Muslim participants in the CoP seminar was extremely happy that the CoP seminar 
could provide a safe and friendly space for him to clarify that he is not the MILF leader that 
numerous Christians had accused him of being.525 Another Muslim participant expressed his 
personal feeling that he did not want to interact with Christians because they are “pig eaters.”526 A 
Christian participant, for example, apologised to his Muslim and Lumad participants for his deep-
seated perception that Muslims and Lumads are lazy and uncivilised people because he did not 
know about the discriminatory policies that marginalised them.527 From the intensive conversations 
in the CoP, Christians understood that Muslims and Lumads are native to Mindanao and that 
Christians are settlers. The Christians now understand why some Muslims are struggling for 
independence.528  
Based upon this spirit, participants built solidarity and awareness that all Nalapaan 
inhabitants, regardless of their religious affiliation, have been victims of the war. Therefore, they 
began to initiate peacebuilding within their own communities: peacebuilding from below that starts 
form everyone’s heart and mind.  
After the CoP seminar, religious leaders in Nalapaan continued to become further engaged in 
the HoP process whereby they revisited and contextualised their understanding of their respective 
religions to overcome the crisis. Religious sacred texts were central to the establishment of SP. Both 
Muslims and Christians engaged in a key element of HoP whereby they interpreted and used their 
sacred texts to support and strengthen their commitment for peace. In the Christian community, the 
Holy Scriptures, or, to be precise, the new interpretations of the Holy Scriptures, are crucial in this 
context. Specifically, the stories in Bible that highlight “how to be a good Catholic” in life, 
including during difficult situations, such as the stories of the Good Samaritan, Matthew, the lepers 
and the blind, and Mary Magdalene are the principal theological references that are used in the 
work towards peace.529 Christians in Nalapaan believe that the core teaching of Christianity is love 
and peace and, therefore, the establishment of the SP is in line with Christianity.530 
Unlike Catholics in Nalapaan, I noticed that Muslims do not have “religious leaders” that can 
give sophisticated arguments and explanations about the importance of developing a common 
                                                          
525 Interview with Andik. 
526Ibid. 
527 Interview with  Gamboa. 
528 Interview with KGWD. Romeo P. Iligan, Nalapaan, 9 December 2011. He is a Catholic community leader in 
Nalapaan. 
529ICP’s written documents on Church Teaching on Inter-religious Dialogue and Jesus Vision of Society: No Boundaries-
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platform of religion for peacebuilding. However, an honest and simple argument from an ordinary 
farmer is often enough to prove that the “unsophisticated” process of HoP can generate the idea of 
peace. Sanggulin M. Cassanova, a Muslim in Nalapaan, had a simple but deep personal experience 
that he shared with his Muslim brothers and sisters. He concluded that Muslims and Christians are 
brothers and sisters who should not fight one another because the Qur’an and the Bible teach the 
same narrative using different language.  
Cassanova explained the following:  
I have Bible and Qur’an. When I was reading the Bible and the Qur’an, I found 
out that in Christianity they believe in Abraham. Abraham in Islam is Ibrahim. 
Islam believes in Yusuf, which is Joseph in Christian. And then Musa is 
Moses. Also Jesus Christ is Isa; Maryam is Mary. So, why we are conflicting 
our belief. We believe in the same concept... There are similarities between 
Islam religion and Christianity.531 
 
In this manner, ordinary people develop a common religious platform by discovering 
similarities rather than dissimilarities among the religions. For him, identifying similar religious 
narratives between Islam and Christianity allowed him to be closer to his Christian brothers and 
sisters. The togetherness is not only a political choice but is also rooted in the history of the religion 
in which they believe. 
Additionally, different interpretations within a religious community that lead to diverse social 
and political actions demonstrate that a hermeneutical struggle is occurring in which the 
ambivalence of religion could serve as an opportunity to mobilise for peace. Therefore, no one can 
claim that his or her interpretation and actions represent a complete interpretation of religion to 
convince a believer to walk in the path of peace. Abdul D. Tibungcog, the captain of the Nalapaan 
barangay (Muslim), explained the following:  
There are plenty of understandings of jihad. People don’t really understand what 
the meaning of jihad is, so they go on for fighting the government. This is MILF’s 
teaching of jihad. I agree with the teaching that the first (prime) jihad is fighting 
against yourself not to commit sin.532 
 
Tibungcog was struggling to find a more suitable interpretation of the concept of jihad in 
Islam for him and his community in Nalapaan. He realised that some, if not most mainstream 
Muslim in Mindanao, equate the word jihad with war (qital). However, for his own and Nalapaan’s 
interest, he preferred to use the “soft version” of the interpretation of jihad.  
In Islam, in the Prophet’s tradition (hadith), the story of Muhammad and his followers who 
had just returned from the battle of Badr, one of the biggest battles in Muhammad’s era against 
                                                          
531 Interview with Sanggulin M. Cassanova, Nalapaan, 8 December 2011, He is a Muslim community leader in 
Nalapaan. 
532 Interview with Abdul D. Tibungcog, Nalapaan, 8 December 2011. He is Chief of Nalapaan village.   
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pagans and the ignorant people of Mecca, is well known. Muhammad said that the Badr is only the 
smallest jihad and that Muslims should face the biggest jihad, which is an “inner” jihad. This 
hadith is reputedly mentioned by “moderate” Muslims, as opposed to the declaration of jihad as 
holy war by the “radical” Muslim Ulama. Tibungcog referred to his efforts to establish the SP by 
using this understanding of jihad. In other words, for him, jihad not only consists of waging war but 
also of building a concrete peace project in Nalapaan.   
I have shown that religious texts and narratives are critical sources for peacebuilding in 
Nalapaan SP. They provide ample justification for religion being not only about violence and 
conflict but also about peacebuilding and peacemaking. Interpretations of the Holy Books have led 
local peace activists to understand that their work for peace is not only right in terms of the social-
political context but also correct in terms of religious teaching. This convinced them that they 
should keep moving forward toward peaceful resolutions by building a new vision of communal 
inter-relations.  
In the following section, I move to discuss the specific roles that religious leaders played. In 
addition, I discuss their ability to organise various activities and to mobilise support from across a 
range of institutions for the peacebuilding process. 
 
6.2.5 Religious Leadership, Networks, and Multiple Dialogues 
One of the critical qualities of religious peacebuilders in the Nalapaan SP was their ability to work 
with different types of people from across different sectors. Unlike the secular perspective, which 
includes a perception of religion and religious communities as static, dogmatic, and conservative, 
the religious communities in Nalapaan could demonstrate that they were extremely dynamic and 
flexible when coping with crises. Through the HoP, as discussed above, people in Nalapaan used a 
religious platform to unite rather than to divide. The religious moral ground that the HoP produced 
allowed them to become extremely flexible in organising “horizontal” and “vertical” forms of 
dialogue that laid the foundation for establishing the SP. The term “horizontal dialogue” refers to 
the dialogue between Muslims, Christians, and Lumads in the Nalapaan, which is different from the 
type of dialogue that is commonly practiced in other places around the world because it involves 
multiple forms of dialogue. 
 Conversely, vertical dialogue is dialogue of life or the daily dialogue of ordinary people in 
ordinary places, such as farms, marketplaces, evacuation centres, and neighbourhoods. This type of 
dialogue has no complicated agenda. The dialogue of life consists of encounters that are more 
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personal in nature and that help to present opportunities for building trust among Nalapaan’s 
people. In Nalapaan, these types of encounters occurred intensively.533  
Muslims and Christians in Nalapaan also practiced the dialogue of action. This form of 
dialogue includes the aim of uniting people from different religious backgrounds for the common 
good of all people. The ideas that emerge from dialogue are implemented subsequently as concrete 
social and political actions. Muslims and Christians worked side by side to initiate and sustain an 
SP in Nalapaan and to build a bintana.534 The tri-people also participated in the process of 
renovating of the Catholic Chapel.535 
Contemporarily, the dialogue of discourse also took place in Nalapaan. Here, dialogue of 
discourse does not refer to the academic and intellectual dialogue that is usually used in conferences 
or symposia. Rather, it is an endeavour to discover suitable and productive meanings of religious 
narratives and traditions, as well as Holy Scriptures that can utilise and strengthen the intention to 
reach a peaceful conflict resolution. Part of the dialogue of discourse is the culture of peace (CoP) 
training that occurred numerous times in Nalapaan, as I illustrated above.536 
Finally, the dialogue of religious experiences also allows the Nalapaan community to 
strengthen the commitment to living side-by-side, as brothers and sisters. They share and learn 
about each other’s religious experiences that help to understand the other religions. Every year, for 
example, people in Nalapaan organise three duyogs: Duyog Ramadhan (celebrating the end of the 
month-long fast in the Muslim tradition), Duyog Pasco (celebrating Christmas) and Duyog 
Samayaan (thanksgiving in the Lumad tradition). People come together to the duyogs respecting 
people who are celebrating them. The duyogs are also an avenue to renew their commitment that 
they are three people that cannot be separated by war and conflict.537 
In addition to horizontal dialogue, religious leaders in Nalapaan can also conduct vertical 
dialogue, which has two forms. The first form of vertical dialogue is the ability of religious leaders 
to engage in dialogue with national and international agencies. Although Nalapaan's religious and 
community leaders are the frontrunners in establishing of the SP, the contribution from local and 
international NGOs, such as Tabang Mindanao, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam, UNDP, and 
CIDA, cannot be ignored. Nalapaan has obtained support for integrated peacebuilding efforts from 
these NGOs.538  
                                                          
533 Interview with Fr. Robert Layson, Colaman, 20 December 2012. 
534Bintana is the house of worship of Lumads. Interview with Ramoz D. Sayarsan, Nalapaan, 8 December 2011, He is a 
leader of Lumad in Nalapaan.  
535 Ibid. 
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537 Ibid. 
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The second manifestation of vertical dialogue is the ability of religious and community 
leaders in Nalapaan to establish channels of communication for dialogue with the MILF and the 
AFP. They realised that the success and failure of the SP depends substantially on the commitment 
of the armed groups (the MILF and the AFP). My interviewees in Nalapaan had difficulty recalling 
the details of the communication and negotiation processes with the AFP and the MILF. In short, 
after returning from the evacuation centres around the end of July 2000, while they were organising 
the integrated rehabilitation programme, including the CoP seminar, they nurtured the idea of 
declaring the training as the SP. From approximately July 2000 to February 2001, the religious and 
community leaders became engaged in intensive communication with the AFP and the MILF. Two 
of these leaders, Andik (a Muslim) and Iligan (a Christian), recalled that they went together to the 
MILF headquarters to meet and discuss with the MILF leader the possibility of creating an SP in 
Nalapaan. They chose the term “space for peace” instead of “peace zone,” as commonly used in 
Mindanao, to reflect the idea that Nalapaan is an area where the people can live normally and 
peacefully. Whereas PZs in other parts of the Philippines involve very formal regulations and rules, 
such as the requirement for armed groups to disarm before entering a PZ, the concept of SP is more 
informal and grounded in the morals and the commitment of the parties and involves refraining 
from using the Nalapaan area as a battleground. The word “respect” becomes a key word for morals 
and commitment in the SP.539 A MILF field commander540 and a central committee of the MILF541 
expressed his great respect to the people’s decision of the people of Nalapan who declared their 
barangay as an SP. On 1 February 2001, people in Nalapaan formally declared their barangay an 
SP:  
We, the Moro, the IPs, and Christians of the Tri-people living in barangay Nalapaan, 
Pikit, Cotabato, for several years experienced severe hardship due to the unending 
violence in Mindanao, of which the latest was on May 2, 2000. Many of us left our 
homes including our lands and means of livelihood. We lived at the evacuation 
centres for more than three months. 
Amidst all these, we still believe in PEACE and we are hopeful that we could still 
restore and rebuild our barangay through our unity and fellowship. 
...As participants to the attainment of genuine PEACE, we, the three tribes living 
here, declare our stance, on this day, that barangay Nalapaan is as SPACE FOR 
PEACE where we live freely and peacefully, far from any violence. 
We pray to Allah, to our Lord God, to “Magbabaya”, that everyone will respect our 
DECLARATION and that our SUCCESS will be the SUCCESS of everyone...542 
 
                                                          
539Ibid.  
540 Interview with Commander Sabre, Pikit, 9 December 2011. He is commander of 108th  Base Command of 
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces.  
541 Interview with Mohagher Iqbal, Cotabato, 12 December 2011. He is the Chairman of the MILF Peace Panel. 
542Cited from the ICP archive. 
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This declaration has been a foundation for a peaceful Nalapaan. Because of the mutual respect 
of the parties involved in the declaration, the prospect of a peaceful Nalapaan is not an illusion.  In 
the 2003 breakout of violence, the people in Nalapaan managed to stay in their barangay, although 
there was an “internal evacuation.” Interestingly, during this difficult time, great and memorable 
stories emerged about Muslims protecting their Christian brothers and sisters, and vice versa.543 In 
the 2008 war, Nalapaan was no longer a battleground of the AFP and the MILF, and even they 
managed to build shelters for refugees from barangays surrounding Nalapaan. 
With the establishment of the SP, according to a municipal agriculturalist in Pikit, Nalapaan 
has better opportunities than other barangays in Pikit to implement agricultural programmes, such 
as diversification of agriculture commodities, seed distribution, fertilisation, post-harvest facilities, 
which were provided by the government and the international funding agencies (e.g. the UNDP, 
FAO, and JICA).544 
To sum up, the case of the Nalapaan SP provides ample evidence that religion contributes 
substantially to peacebuilding in Mindanao. One of the significant contributions of religion is the 
ability of religious leaders to instil hope among the victims of war that peace has a chance and that 
it is real and achievable. Thus, religion in Nalapaan-Pikit was used to re-diagnose the root causes of 
the conflict in a manner that transcends the mainstream perspective. According to religious leaders 
in Nalapaan, although religion is not the root cause of Mindanao’s conflict, the deep process of the 
instrumentalisation of religion in the conflict has caused people to live in mutual distrust, hold 
prejudices, and stigmatise others, and has caused them to become divided along religious lines. This 
should be the first thing to be resolved, if people really want to establish a durable peace. 
Furthermore, the religious communities in Nalapaan have been involved in the HoP process, 
whereby they have been re-reading their own religion in the context of the crisis. Using their sacred 
texts and religious narratives, they concluded that religion unites people and should not divide. This 
new understanding of religion allowed people in Nalapaan to build solidarity across religious lines. 
Finally, the people of Nalapaan showed that the religious communities were extremely dynamic and 
progressive rather than static and conservative. Based on strong the religious conviction that 
religion unites and should not divide, they could organise practical and multi-level dialogues with 
various stakeholders in the Philippines, creating a secure environment that was conducive for 
establishing the Nalapaan SP.  
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544 Interview with Susan R, UY, Pikit 12 December 2011. She is a senior staff of Municipal Agriculture Department of 
Pikit. 
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6.3  Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Religious Resources for Peace in a Rebel Movement  
As I elaborated in Chapter 2, the nature of the conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) and the GPH is an ethno-nationalist struggle. However, the conflict dynamics have evolved 
from time to time in ways that include a strong instrumentalisation of religion. In this context, it is 
broadly accepted that the MILF is an Islamic militant group or an Islamic terrorist cell that uses 
violent means that are justified by appealing to Islam. Closer observation generates a more complex 
and nuanced understanding of the MILF and an understanding of how it uses religion to justify its 
objectives and practices. In particular, for approximately 15 years, the MILF has participated in 
peace negotiations with the GPH. Religion, undoubtedly, is central to the peace negotiation process.  
Aside from political disagreement and ethnic tensions among the MNLF leaders, one obvious 
reason for the establishment of the MILF was the perception that the MNLF leaders and leadership 
were considered too weak in their commitment to Islam. Therefore, according to McKenna, with 
the formation of MILF, the armed separatist movement is widely believed to have refashioned itself 
in Mindanao into a mass-based and self-consciously Islamic movement guided by Islamic clerics.545  
Specifically, in his book, which is extremely simple, but also essential among the MILF’s 
mujahidin, Sheikh Salamat Hashim, the founder of the MILF, explained: “the ultimate aim of our 
jihad is to make supreme the word of Allah.’546 In the subsequent pages, he explained that this is (1) 
to establish a true Muslim community; (2) to establish a genuine Islamic system of government; (3) 
to practice the application of a real Islamic way of life in all aspects of people’s lives.547 These 
goals can only be achieved through the right to self-determination, including independence or 
meaningful autonomous government. The MILF, thus, has an extremely strong commitment to 
Islamic teachings and understandings as the primary base of their revolutionary movement.  
Based on such deep religious commitments to struggle, one can perhaps easily conclude that 
the MILF is an Islamist peace-spoiler group, a terrorist cell such as Al-Qaida, Jama’ah Islamiyyah 
(JI), or the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which use religion to justify violent means to achieve their 
objectives. However, a closer examination reveals more complex and nuanced relations between the 
MILF and Islam. The complexity can be found, most strikingly, in how the MILF’s religious 
discourse does not only motivate its members to wage holy war (jihad) but also encourages 
employing peaceful means to address the problems that people face in Mindanao. The MILF’s 
discourse readily exemplifies the ambivalence of the sacred: religion is not only about war and 
violence but also presents opportunities for peace.548  
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The prime example of the ambivalence of the sacred in the MILF is use of the concepts of 
jihad and da’wah in its religious discourse. Specifically, the manner in which the MILF interprets 
central theological concepts of Islam, such as jihad and da’wah, is also a demonstration of the HoP 
process, where the MILF has used specific verses in the Qur’an and narrations in Islamic history to 
theologically justify its attempts to resolve Mindanao’s problems peacefully.  
Despite using jihad, which the MILF commonly translated as “armed struggle,” the MILF 
also used da’wah. The word da’wah, which originates from Arabic, literally means Islamic call, or 
proselytising of Islam. In practical terms, the concept of da’wah covers numerous aspects of 
religious activities that are related to encourage doing good deeds and preventing evil, including 
education, building mosques and Islamic centres, and feeding the poor. These are part of the da’wah 
obligation. However, according to Mohagher Iqbal, the Chief of the MILF Peace Negotiation 
Committee, in the context of the MILF’s struggle for self-determination, the da’wah could be 
loosely translated as a diplomatic approach.549 Therefore, the process of peace negotiation, to seek 
peaceful political settlement between MILF and GPH, is justified by Islamic teaching as the 
principal source of the MILF’s ideology.550 
A key question concerns the socio-political circumstances where da’wah or jihad could be 
used as a means to achieve objectives. Salamat Hashim, the founder and spiritual guru of the MILF, 
has explained that  
it is highly probable that adverse external elements may obstruct the natural course 
of development of an Islamic community, and, in such case, jihad will then become 
obligatory. However, if the conduct of da’wah is not obstructed or repulsed by 
oppressive elements, justification for armed struggle does not exist.551  
 
The MILF, according to Iqbal, still uses the religious guidance of the late Salamat Hashim 
who, as the above quote demonstrates, inspires and guides the MILF to pursue a diplomatic 
approach (da’wah) to resolve the conflict in Mindanao, as long the government is similarly 
committed.552 The use of jihad (armed struggle), therefore, only applies in extremely specific times 
and conditions, where, for example, the government unilaterally breaks its commitment to reach a 
peaceful settlement of the conflict.553 
The MILF believes that the understanding of the concept of da’wah as negotiation with an 
adversary to resolve a conflict peacefully is based and permitted explicitly in the Qur’an. As a rebel 
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movement that deploys Islam as an ideology, the MILF must obey what is written in the Qur’an.554 
For example, in Surah Al-Anfal, Verse 61-62, Allah says the following: 
But if they incline toward peace, do you (also) incline toward peace, and trust in 
Allah: for He is One that hears and knows (all things). Should they intend to deceive 
you—verily Allah suffices you: He is that has strengthened you with His aid and 
with (the company of) the Believers.555 
 
This verse of the Qur’an, according to Iqbal, is an explicit encouragement of Allah that, for 
Muslims, attaining a peaceful resolution to conflict is possible. Furthermore, historically, the 
Prophet Muhammad had given examples of negotiating with Jews and Christians and with the 
pagan tribes in Mecca. The Treaty of Hudaibiyah was a clear example of how the Prophet 
Muhammad could reach political settlement with his adversaries.556  
The MILF leaders have used consistently the religious arguments that I outlined above in 
justifying their decision to attend peace negotiation with the GPH. More importantly, I found the 
MILF elites did not only use these arguments as part of a political and tactical strategy but also that 
they are well accepted as a religious perspective by MILF’s military cadres and civilian 
sympathisers. For example, a MILF field commander, whom I interviewed, demonstrated that he 
knew that the MILF was in the process of da’wah.557 As a MILF field commander, he had to ensure 
that all his military personnel should act in line with the peace negotiation process, including 
complying with ceasefire agreements that they and the GPH had signed. The field commander 
worked closely with the International Monitoring Team (IMT) committee to ensure that conditions 
on the ground were conducive, whereas da’wah (diplomacy) was an ongoing process.558  
My conversations with anonymous civilian supporters of the MILF in Pikit and Cotabato also 
showed that they fully understood the concept of da’wah as a diplomatic means to achieve MILF 
objectives. They were familiar with the Qur’anic verses that allow Muslims to negotiate with 
enemies under certain conditions; for example, ‘if they [your enemy] incline toward peace, do you 
(also) incline toward peace.’559  
However, internal friction exists within the MILF about the effectiveness of the da’wah. The 
interpretation and application of the concept of da’wah as a diplomatic approach is highly 
contested. This constitutes a demonstration of the ambivalence of the sacred: the “hermeneutics 
struggle” to seek the “the righteous interpretation” of religious texts that can be used for peace or 
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conflict. An example of this is the emergence of the so-called “lost commanders” or even the 
establishment of splinter groups, such as the Bangsmoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), who are 
led by Ameril Umbra Kato. Kato initially abided by the wider MILF da’wah-inspired participation 
in the peace process. However, the BIFF emerged as a protest and in reaction to the MILF 
leadership and the GPH, which failed to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Ancestral 
Domain (MOA-AD) because of the decision of the Philippines Supreme Court that the MOA-AD 
was unconstitutional. This fact led Kato to perceive the da’wah strategy as a failure and to believe 
that jihad should be declared as an alternative strategy. According to Kato, the MILF leaders wasted 
time negotiating with the GPH, while the root causes of the Muslim grievances were never 
confronted in the negotiation process: ‘we’ve been going around and around wasting money and 
look where the peace talks have brought us. The roots of the conflict have not been solved.’560 
Subsequently, Kato added that his newly established armed group, the BIFF, is the only 
revolutionary group that applies true jihad.561 This shows how in the interpretation of religion, the 
concept of jihad and da’wah, are contested as an action and a reaction to local-national political 
dynamics.   
To conclude, the ambivalence of the sacred can be found among armed rebel groups, such as 
the MILF, which used religion to sustain the war with the GPH for decades. In the meantime, it also 
became involved in the HoP process where it found theological justification, in particular the 
concept of da’wah, to validate their attempts to pursue peace negotiations. In other words, the 
ambivalence of religion offers an opportunity to use religion for mobilising support for peace. The 
religious approach together with the rational-calculative approach allows the MILF to continue their 
efforts in seeking political settlement with the GPH. In the HoP process, which is the endeavour to 
engage and utilise sacred texts to support the cause of peace, the MILF also utilised the Qur’an’s 
(Al-Anfal: 60-61) and the precedents in the Prophet Muhammad’s history as theological ground to 
interpret the concept of da’wah as a diplomatic approach to end conflict peacefully.  
 
6.4  Conclusion  
Overall, the three cases that I presented in this chapter demonstrate that the widespread assumption 
that religion is correlated primarily with violence is unwarranted. The SDM and the Nalapaan SP 
case show that religion can mobilise people at the grassroots to take active roles in the 
peacebuilding process. Religion has inspired grassroots communities to become actively involved in 
peacebuilding because building peace in divided communities is perceived as a sacred religious 
                                                          
560 For more detail, see http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/44309/rogue-milf-commander-forms-splinter-group. Accessed on 
1 January 2012. 
561 Ibid. 
147 
 
mission. It is a religious obligation and a spiritual path that should be pursued by individual 
adherents because building peace will not only benefit their lives “here in Mindanao” but also 
because they will be rewarded and redeemed in the hereafter. This belief becomes the energy and 
power of religious communities in Mindanao to keep working on the path to peace, on overcoming 
barriers and addressing problems. The case of the SDM and the Nalapaan SP also shows the 
importance of the religious narrative and the Holy Scriptures that the local peace activists used as a 
theological justification to build peace in their community.  
The SDM and Nalapaan SP confirm that a sustainable peace cannot only rely on formal peace 
negotiations between the GPH and the MILF. Numerous goals must be achieved at the societal 
level, including restoring the human relations that the politics and instrumentalisation of religion 
have wrecked. Religion, in the context of the SDM and the Nalapaan SP, has provided “tables” for 
dialogue and negotiation on the ground, where people can express their mutual fears, stigmas, and 
prejudices and move forward with new awareness to build a common platform to develop peaceful 
communities. 
Whereas the SDM and the Nalapaan SP were grassroots peacebuilding initiatives that used 
religion as resources to mobilise peace constituencies, the case of the MILF was rather different. 
Here, religion also played a pivotal role; in this case in the rebel movement’s decision to engage in 
peace negotiations. Citing the narration in the Holy Scriptures allowed the MILF to be a religious 
and pragmatic revolutionary group simultaneously. The MILF case also showed the ambivalence of 
religion where religion provided opportunities for peace. Using specific interpretations of the sacred 
religious texts, the MILF, interpreted the concept of da’wah differently from the manner that it is 
commonly understood in the Muslim community. The MILF interpreted da’wah as a diplomatic 
approach to resolve the conflict in Mindanao through peaceful means. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Advancing Understandings of Religious Peacebuilding 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to enrich the understanding of religiously driven peacebuilding by 
extending upon the foregoing analysis of the Maluku and Mindanao case studies. Specifically, its 
aim is to more fully consider how religion contributes to peacebuilding and how peacebuilders use 
religious resources. This requires an explicit focus upon the hermeneutics of peace (HoP), which, as 
revealed in previous chapters, is central to the role of religious peacebuilders in Maluku and 
Mindanao. The challenge remains to provide a more adequate conceptualisation of the HoP to 
account for its complex operations and to build upon it to advance both peacebuilding analysis and 
practice, including perhaps beyond Maluku and Mindanao.  
Religion, I argue, contributes to peacebuilding as it undergoes four complex inter-related 
processes through the HoP, which involves the interplay of four elements: (1) the belief that God562 
and sacred texts have a central position; (2) the dialogue between external context, external values, 
and sacred text; (3) the conviction in common and shared religious values; (4) the recognition of 
religion as a source of energy and motivation to organise concrete peacebuilding activities. In 
complex interrelated processes, religion can be approached as an interpretive community where 
religious adherents perceive peacebuilding as a sacred duty because they interpret sacred texts, 
doctrines, and narratives dynamically and inclusively, and according to external contexts and 
values, to create a durable peace. The HoP, moreover, contributes to concrete peacebuilding efforts 
by engaging flexibly and pluralistically through various social forces at three levels of leadership: 
grassroots, middle-range, and top-level leadership. Through the HoP, religion also plays a pivotal 
role in promoting peace locally, nationally, and internationally. 
 I divide this chapter into two parts. In the first part, I expound the complexity of the process 
of the HoP by discussing the four inter-related elements. By disaggregating the HoP in this manner, 
it becomes possible to understand it more fully and to consider the possibility of applying it in other 
cases. In the second part, I demonstrate that through the HoP, religion can flexibly play a crucial 
role in peacebuilding in all levels of society. This further helps to move beyond the secularist 
perspective to show that religion can work suitably with other efforts to advance peace.  
 
                                                          
562 I use the concept of God refers to two Abrahamic religions, Islam and Christian, that employed in the two case 
studies. I am aware that not all religions, for example Buddhism, refer to the concept of God to describe “supreme 
being” or “the creator.” See Cathy Cantwell, Buddhism: The Basics  (Florence: Routledge, 2009), 42-46.  
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7.1  Religious Peacebuilders and the Process of the Hermeneutics of Peace  
As I discussed Chapter 1, Scott Appleby’s notion of the ambivalence of the sacred (AoS) and David 
Little’s notion of the hermeneutics of peace (HoP) are useful theoretical approaches to reconsider 
the role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding that is undertaken in this thesis. In highlighting the 
ambivalent effects of religion, Appleby refused to perceive that religion could only be used to 
mobilise violent conflict and other forms of religious extremism. Appleby also highlighted that 
religion could be used for justice and peace. Furthermore, Appleby argued that religious leaders 
play pivotal roles in the AoS, in appealing to religion to invoke either “holy war” or “sacred 
peace.”563 That religious leaders are key players in determining religious and political perspectives 
and the actions of religious adherents is commonly accepted. However, this does not explain how 
and why religious leaders use religion to exert positive influence.  
Little, in turn, offered the notion of the HoP to produce an argument that, I want to suggest, 
can be used to explain in detail how the AoS could be utilised to mobilize for peace. Through the 
HoP, Little emphasized the pivotal role of sacred texts, doctrines, and practices that could be used 
as moral justification and theological conviction to motivate religious followers to engage in 
peacebuilding activities as part of the sacred duty and religious vocation.564 However, Little did not 
elaborate how sacred texts, doctrines, and practices are used and how the process of using them 
contributes to peace.  
The two case studies of Maluku and Mindano help to further elucidate the HoP by showing 
how Muslims and Christians use religious resources to contribute to peacebuilding. There is a need, 
though, to answer further analytical questions, such as how religious believers come to ‘the 
conviction that the pursuit of justice and peace by peaceful means is a sacred priority’,565 and what 
types of processes religious adherents pursue as they use religion as a resource for peacebuilding.  
I argue that the HoP is even more complex than Little’s proposition. The HoP is a necessarily 
continuous process that involves inter-related elements. The process, in turn, determines whether 
religion could be used for peacebuilding and helps to describe the manners in which religious 
resources are used to contribute to peacebuilding.  
The flowchart below is one way to describe the complex operation of the HoP in the context 
of Maluku and Mindanao. It should be noted that illustrating the HoP as a flowchart does not mean 
that the HoP is a linear or mechanical process. Rather, it is a process that simultaneously and 
continuously involves inner emotional debate and spiritual struggle to discover a “truth” that cannot 
                                                          
563 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, 281 - 83. 
564 Little, Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution, 438. 
565 Ibid. 
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be empirically observed. The aim of the flowchart, therefore, is only to simplify and evoke the HoP 
rather than to fully capture or describe it as a phenomenon. 
In the chart, I subdivide the process of the HoP into four inter-related elements: the 
recognition of the central position of God and of the sacred texts of the monotheistic faiths that are 
considered in this thesis; the interaction between external context, external values, and sacred text; 
the conviction in shared and common religious values; and religion as a source of energy and 
motivation to organise concrete peacebuilding activities. The four elements are not hierarchically 
organised, and often operate simultaneously because the HoP principally operates as an 
intrapersonal psychological process. 
 
                                                  Hermeneutics of Peace 
 
7.1.1 Belief in Central Position of God and Sacred Texts 
In broad alignment with the discourses on modern hermeneutics, a core issue of the HoP concerns 
the tripartite relationship of author, text, and reader.566 However, the problematic of the HoP 
                                                          
566 Robinson, Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Interpetive Theory, 3. 
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exceeds the complexity of the “normal” relationships between author, text, and reader because God 
is central and essential to any religious community. God is a primary source of inspiration and 
motivation that determines and directs the orientation of people’s lives. Therefore, the notion of an 
absent, erased, or inconsequent author567 does not apply in the context of Maluku and Mindanao. As 
I have shown in the two case-studies chapters, I found that religious peacebuilders in Maluku 
believe that God is “alive” and is “present” in the daily life of people to inspire, motivate, and orient 
them to working for peacebuilding. All my in-depth interviews with religious peacebuilders have 
demonstrated that faith in God played a critical role in shaping their decision and commitment to 
become involved actively in peacebuilding activities, and that God’s blessing was the ultimate goal 
and orientation of all peace initiatives that they conducted.  
In the HoP, the text is also an extraordinary one: a sacred text that corresponds to the words of 
God, representing God’s presence and will in the world. The religious histories, narratives, and 
traditions, as practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, or by Jesus Christ’s 
disciples, are incorporated into sacred texts. (In Mindanao, the Vatican Council decisions take on a 
similar sacred quality). These texts are essential parts of the foundation of religiosity and spirituality 
in both Islam and Christianity. This is the case for Fr. D’Ambra (Silsilah Dialogue Movement) 
(SDM), Fr. Layson (Nalapaan Space for Peace), Ustadz Polpoke (the Council of Indonesian Ulama) 
(MUI), and Rev. Hendriks (the Protestant Church in Maluku) who gave the sacred texts a central 
place to theologically justify their engagement in peacebuilding. In short, God and God’s words and 
sacred texts are crucial for religious peacebuilders in conducting their mission. Peacebuilding, in 
this context, is more than simply a tactic or strategy. Rather, peacebuilding is perceived as a holy 
duty or sacred mission. 
 The question remains, then, as to how and in what circumstances faith in God and the sacred 
texts become manners of personalizing and mobilising peace, to ensure that peace is perceived as an 
obligation that will provide reward and redemption, and as something that can be genuinely 
pursued. One cannot deny that, throughout human history, God and sacred texts have also been 
resources that people have used to support and sustain violence and gross violations of human 
rights.  
One avenue for expanding understanding of how religion might consider a peacebuilding 
resource is to analyse how faith and sacred texts could be interpreted flexibly by accounting for 
social and political contexts. This is central to the second element that appears in the HoP flowchart 
above. The interaction process between external contexts, external values, and selected sacred texts 
provides one manner to explain how religious texts could be employed for peaceful purposes. 
                                                          
567 See, for example, Duncan S Ferguson, Biblical Hermeneutics: An Introduction  (Atlanta, Gorgia: John Knox Press, 
1986), 3 and 6. 
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7.1.2 “Continuous Dialogue”: External Contexts, External Values, and Sacred Texts  
Having learnt from the Maluku and Mindanao cases, I argue that religion is fundamentally public 
and thus never wholly private. Although the relationship of the individual with God in both 
Christianity and Islam receives considerable attention, it never stands alone. It always relates to 
other norms and values, and requires that believers interact with social forces. The complex process 
of the HoP operates in social, cultural, and political settings. In Maluku and Mindanao, I found that 
the interpretation of religion occurs always in response to public dynamics. I argue that the HoP, in 
this context, might be viewed as the continuous process of dialogue and communication between 
three elements: external contexts, external values, and sacred texts.  
Firstly, external contexts in Maluku and Mindanao forced religious adherents to rethink and 
re-contextualize their understanding of religion to respond to crises and emergencies. The key factor 
is the devastating reality of the effects of “religious conflicts,” including deaths, injuries, refugee 
flows, depression, and the destruction of physical and social infrastructure. My interviews with 
religious peacebuilders in Maluku and Mindanao showed that their involvement in various 
peacebuilding activities through both official and unofficial religious institutions was a religious 
moral response to the devastating effects of the conflict. Crisis, in other words, provoked religious 
adherents who were previously involved in conflict to change their theological and political 
positions to engage in peacebuilding as part of their moral and spiritual responsibility. 
Secondly, external values568 also substantially influence the HoP process. As I demonstrated 
in the Chapters 4, 5, and 6, religious peacebuilders in Maluku and Mindanao were extremely 
flexible in adopting and using “non-religious” values or “secular” norms and incorporating them 
into their religious understanding as part of their efforts to build sustainable peace. As I also 
elucidated in the previous chapters, religion worked in tandem with secular perspectives, such as 
human rights, local adat (customs), pluralism, feminism, nationalism, solidarity, and 
multiculturalism. The religious actors’ flexibility in using those perspectives allowed them to 
broaden their perspectives on the issue of peacebuilding and gain greater support from non-religious 
communities.  
Thirdly, together with the process of interpreting external contexts, and understanding and 
adopting external values, believers, as the readers of sacred texts, also became involved in selecting 
particular verses in sacred texts (the Bible and the Qur’an), and traditions within these religious 
narratives, that complied with and supported the idea of peacebuilding. As I discussed in previous 
                                                          
568 I realise that it is difficult to claim that human rights, for example, are purely part of external values. Religion is 
involved, to a degree, in discussions and implementations of human rights as a global norm. In this context, external 
values can be defined as values that are largely or predominantly driven by non-religious discourses.  
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chapters, the sacred texts are a source of the ambivalence of religion. Believers could interpret and 
use some verses in the Gospels to foment war and violent conflict. Conversely, they could use some 
sacred texts and religious narratives to promote peace and harmony. The religious peacebuilders in 
Maluku and Mindanao reinterpreted and reread verses that people, in their view, had been 
previously misused to promote the use of violence. Meanwhile, the peacebuilders selected verses in 
the Holy Books that they could employ to theologically argue for and justify their engagement in 
the peacebuilding process.  
The Maluku and Mindanao case studies also demonstrate the importance and ongoing reality 
of dialogue between external context, external values, and sacred texts. For example, immediately 
after his election as the Chairman of the GPM Synod and during the peak of religious conflict in 
Maluku, Rev. Hendriks began the HoP process by questioning how the GPM as the Church, both as 
the religious organisation and a sign of the Kingdom of God, understood the conflict. From there, 
he explored the possible resolutions in the specific situation (the external context) that he faced, 
which, at that time was a terrible condition, where thousands of people were killed, while another 
100,000 were displaced because of the prolonged religious war. People also lived in villages were 
they were segregated based on their religion.569  
Hendriks and his colleagues in the GPM Synod kept asking questions such as ‘is it true that 
Jesus wants Christians to be involved in this religious war? Does God want the destruction of His 
own creations?’570 The GPM utilised and interpreted specific verses in the Old Testament (e.g., 
Amos 5: 4-6) that emphasise the importance of defending life to justify their pursuit of theological 
reforms in the hope that they would empower the GPM network to become involved in 
peacebuilding. 
 The integration of external values, such as pluralism and multiculturalism, into the GPM’s 
religious theology was part of the theological reforms. Another external value, which was used and 
influenced the process of the HoP within the GPM, consisted of using the local customs (pela and 
gandong) that were part of the ancestral beliefs to promotes peace, harmony, and mutual assistance 
among the orang basodara (brotherhood) across religious lines. 
The history of Fr. Layson’s involvement in the creation of Nalapaan Space for Peace in Pikit, 
Mindanao, also provided an illustration of the dialogue between external context, external values, 
and sacred texts in the HoP process. Layson started his HoP journey through dialogue between 
external factors, external values, and sacred texts. In 1997, after a group of Muslims assassinated 
his superior, the late Bishop Benjamin de Jesus, in Jolo, he wanted to stop working with the Muslim 
community. ‘I developed hatred not only against the perpetrator of (the murder of) Bishop Ben, but 
                                                          
569 Interview with Rev. I.W.J Hendriks, Ambon City, 14 January 2013. 
570 Ibid. 
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towards all Muslims,’571 he wrote. He accepted to work in Pikit because he wanted to work and take 
care of Christians only. However, the external context, i.e., the crisis, “forced” him to engage in 
self-reflection to reconsider his religious mission in Pikit. Only 12 days after he arrived in Pikit, the 
Rajamuda war erupted. Thirty-thousand people were displaced from their villages. This forced him 
to rethink his religion and religiosity.572 In my interview with Layson, he told me that the war in 
1997 was his “second baptism.”573  
Moreover, because Nalapaan, which was the barangay that was most affected by war, is not 
the only village was populated by Muslims and Christians but is also a home for the Lumads (the 
indigenous people in Mindanao), Layson had to consider the external values that influenced the 
HoP process that he had undertaken. He found that the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, which has been 
widely promoted throughout the world, advocated respecting the rights of minorities or indigenous 
people, and concluded that such rights should also be upheld in Mindanao.574  
The continuous dialogue between external contexts and values led Layson to reread the sacred 
texts. Eventually, he found some religious texts575 that obliged him, as a religious leader, to 
contribute to solve the problems that people faced on the ground, regardless of their religious 
affiliations. The reading of sacred texts in conjunction with external contexts and values led Layson 
to decide to do something concrete to overcome the bitter reality on the ground. For example, he 
strove to declare Nalapaan as a Space for Peace. 
The third element of the HoP process, which is the belief in the universal values of religion, is 
the focus of the next section. This stage is crucial because it concerns the establishment of a moral 
standard, whether believing in God, understanding the external context and values, which 
specifically led to interpreting selected sacred texts, are truly inclusive and meet universal values 
that can be accepted by people across religious lines.  
 
 
 
                                                          
571 Fr. Roberto Layson, "Promoting Inter-Religious Dialogue in the Midst of Conflict and Violence," in the 8th 
Franciscan Dialogue Program (the Mother of Perpetual Help Shrine in Binoligan, Kidapawan CityJuly 5, 2008). 
572 Ibid. 
573 Interview with Fr. Roberto Layson, Colaman, 20 December 2012. 
574 Ibid.   
575Ibid. Among verses in Bible that inspired and motivated him to engage in peacebuilding are Luke 2:14, "Glory to 
God in the highest and peace to his people on earth;" Matthew 5:9 "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they 
will be called children of God;" John 20:21 "Peace be with you. As the Father has sent me, so I am sending 
you;" Romans 14:17 "The kingdom of God is not matter of food or drink; it lies in justice, peace and joy in 
the Holy Spirit."; Mark 12:31 "You shall love your neighbour as yourself..."; Matthew 5:43 "Love your 
enemies and pray for those who persecute you."  
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7.1.3 Conviction of Common and Shared Religious Values  
The third element of the HoP, the belief in common and shared religious values, such as mercy, 
compassion, justice, solidarity, love, and peace, is crucial in the HoP process because it becomes the 
moral ground and standard for the HoP process that transcends particular religious faiths. Most of 
the Muslim respondents in Maluku and Mindanao referred to the fundamental mission of Islam as 
being a religion that brings compassions and blessings not only for Muslims but also for 
humankind. Similarly, Protestants in Maluku and Catholic respondents in Mindanao often stated 
that the core mission of Jesus Christ on earth is to promote compassion, love, and peace.  
The fact that the interpretation of religion is extremely subjective is commonly accepted. In 
fact, no one can claim that his or her interpretation of the sacred texts is the interpretation that 
captures most closely God’s intended meaning. However, by establishing common and shared 
religious values as moral standards it becomes possible to judge subjectively whether a certain 
interpretation of sacred texts truly belongs to the HoP. In this manner, it becomes possible to judge 
that declaring and supporting holy wars, killings, torture, and spreading hatred and prejudices is not 
part of the HoP because doing so contradicts the common and shared religious values.  
Throughout my fieldwork in Maluku and Mindanao, I also often listened to religious people 
who believed in those common and shared religious values. Those religious people were pious 
religious adherents: practicing religious rituals, believing in shared religious values, and in not 
harming others. However, the difference between religious peacebuilders and ordinary religious 
people is that the former use religious values as part of their convictions that are connected to the 
lengthy and deep processes of the HoP. While the “ordinary” religious people tended to use religion 
only as religious identity, religious peacebuilders tried to relate their understanding of religion to 
reach other religious communities. A common feature in both Mindanao and Maluku religious 
peacebuilders engaged in interfaith groups or inter-communal organisations where they could 
exercise deeper shared religious values. Moreover, because of the process of the HoP religious 
peacebuilders became more eager than ordinary religious people were to implement those shared 
religious values to ensure that they would become a concrete reality. In other words, concrete and 
transformative actions to solve problems on the ground are, thus, an additional and critical 
component of the HoP.  
 
7.1.4 Sources of Energy and Motivation, and the Organisation of Peacebuilding Activities 
The interplay between the belief on God, sacred texts, external contexts, external values, and the 
belief in the universal religious values in Maluku and Mindanao allowed religion to energise, 
motivate, and encourage believers to work assiduously for peace. Working in conflict zones is a 
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difficult task that often involves experiencing terror, including risking one’s life. However, the 
lengthy and complex HoP process led the religious peacebuilders in Maluku and Mindanao to 
become deeply committed to peace.  
Whereas Juergensmeyer, as I discussed in Chapter 2, coined the term “cosmic war” to 
describe the manner in which religion motivates people to wage holy wars, the cases that I discuss 
in this thesis show that religion can produces an apparently opposite outcome through the process of 
the HoP. I found that religious people in Maluku and Mindanao are the principal actors who 
organise around what might be called “cosmic peace,” which I define as the process of attaining 
peace that is deeply rooted in religious motivations. My interviews and interactions with religious 
peacebuilders in Maluku and Mindanao led me to conclude that religious peacebuilders perceive 
peace as holy. In addition, they believe that working for peace is a sacred journey that not only 
furthers the short-term goal of establishing peace on earth but that it also has the long-term goal of 
attaining God’s reward and redemption in the hereafter.  
In other words, the HoP process does not end with the realization that religion promotes 
compassion, mercy, peace, love, and justice. For religious peacebuilders, the central position of 
God, the continuous dialogue between external context, external values, and selected sacred texts 
allowed believers to re-embrace the fundamental divine teachings that religion is for peace, mercy, 
love, and compassion. They become the point of departure to work seriously and tirelessly to 
materialize those principles into concrete actions and activities that bring peace on the ground.  
To summarise, in this section, I developed further David Little’s theory of the HoP by 
investigating how religious peacebuilders arrive at ‘the conviction that the pursuit of justice and 
peace by peaceful means is a sacred priority.’576 My analysis of the Maluku and Mindanao case 
studies demonstrates that religion could play a critical role in peacebuilding because it underwent 
the complex HoP’s process, which I elaborated. Those processes generate belief, motivation, and 
energy in believers, leading them to become involved in fostering “cosmic peace,” which is 
believed to be a sacred duty, through concrete and diverse peacebuilding approaches activities, and 
programmes that are based on the contexts within which they are implemented. In the following 
section, I discuss the immediate implication of the HoP process to demonstrate how religion or 
religious leaders contribute to peacebuilding flexibly and dynamically.  
 
7.2  Religious Leadership in Peacebuilding  
One of the critical lessons that can be taken from the complexity of the HoP process, is that the 
manner in which Muslims and Christians in Maluku and Mindanao use religious resources and 
                                                          
576 Little, Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution, 438. 
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contribute to peacebuilding is extremely dynamic and flexible. Whereas I have already discussed 
the capacity of religion to link with external forces and values, including local custom and 
feminism, a further dimension of this flexibility that becomes visible by comparing the case studies 
is the capacity to operate and, indeed, move across different levels of peacebuilding activities in 
society and politics. 
John Paul Lederach, a prominent peacebuilding scholar-practitioner (a member of the 
Mennonites, a Christian group that promotes and practices pacifism) who closely engaged with 
religious matters,577 argued that religious leaders could be placed among a range of others 
peacebuilding actors. Lederach illustrated his understanding as a pyramid of actors and approaches 
to peacebuilding (PAAP) which could be classified as three levels of leadership comprising specific 
and strategic tasks and approaches that could be executed to contribute to peacebuilding in an 
affected conflict population. According to Lederach, Level 1 of the PAAP corresponds to top-level 
leadership, which consists of the key political and military leaders in conflict. Level 2 corresponds 
to middle-range leadership, which comprises the key academic institutions and humanitarian 
organisations. Lederach explicitly mentions religious leader as part of this level of leadership. Level 
3 represents grassroots leadership, which comprises members of indigenous non-governmental 
organisation, health officer, refugee camps leaders, and so on.578  
However, the religious leaders making use of the HoP in Maluku and Mindanao do not fit 
neatly Lederach’s model. I found that the position of religious leaders in peacebuilding was fluid 
and flexible and could not be confined to one particular level of leadership. Rather, they 
dynamically shifted from the grassroots to the middle-range and top levels of leadership, which 
Ledearch conceived as the PAAP. In other words, having learned about the extensive work that 
religious leaders conducted in Maluku and Mindanao, as I explained in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I can 
conclude that the positioning of religious leaders at the middle level risks obscuring the critical 
roles that they play at other levels.  
Religious leaders in Maluku and Nalapaan (Pikit) can be placed in the grassroots leadership 
category, given that they are part of the community that conflict had affected and that they lived 
with and within the community and experienced the misery of the conflict. Religious leaders and 
lay people alike were victims of the religious conflict. However, at the grassroots level in both 
Maluku and Mindanao, religious leaders not only delivered spiritual and religious services but also 
provided humanitarian aid (e.g., food, medicines, and education). They played a critical role during 
the height of conflict.  
                                                          
577 In one of Lederach’s seminal boosk, he often uses verses in Gospel to build his arguments on the importance of 
taking part of peacebuilding processes. See John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building 
Peace  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
578 Building Peace: Sustainable Reconsilaiation in Divided Societies 38-45. 
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Religious peacebuilders in Maluku and Mindanao also played a significant role in the middle 
range of leadership and, to this extent, my fieldwork does not contradict Lederach’s PAAP model. 
The religious peacebuilders in both case studies conducted activities such organizing workshops 
and training in conflict resolution, organising peace commissioners, and leading insider-partial 
teams, which were part of the middle range of leadership in Lederach’s approach to peacebuilding. 
The SDM in Mindanao, for example, organises formation programmes that could be perceived as 
conflict resolution training. Religious leaders in Nalapaan, before establishing the Space for Peace, 
conducted intensive training through the Culture of Peace and Interfaith Seminar, which included 
basic skills of conflict resolution. In Maluku, the Live-in Programmes that the GPM and LAIM 
organised, according to Lederach’s criteria, fall into the middle-range leadership category. 
Activities such as Peace Sermons can also be included in this category.  
In short, religious leaders are part of both the grassroots and middle-range levels of 
leadership. Religious leaders cannot fit into only one category of leadership, in the manner that 
Lederach’s PAAP envisaged in his model. Rather, they move from one level of leadership to 
another. Furthermore, religious leaders can also play a role at the top-level of leadership—if one 
adopts the categories of Lederach’s PAAP model—which comprises elites that engage in high-level 
peace negotiations. In the context of Maluku, religious leaders played a critical role in ending the 
conflict because they participated in intensive meetings to prepare for peace negotiations. In 
February 2002, in Malino, Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic leaders signed the Malino II Agreement 
that stopped the overall conflict. Similarly, Fr. Layson and the religious leaders in Pikit were 
involved in intensive negotiations with the high-ranking officials of the Armed Forced of the 
Philippines (AFP) and the central committee of the Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
before they declared Barangay Nalapaan a Space for Peace.  
To summarise, having learned from the Maluku and Mindanao experiences, religious leaders 
contributed to peacebuilding in extremely flexible and dynamic manners through the HoP process. 
Their role cannot be limited to a fixed category of leadership, in the manner that Lederach suggests. 
They are part of the grassroots, middle range, and top-levels of leadership, which involve assuming 
various approaches and conducting activities at each leadership level.  As I mentioned, Lederach’s 
PAAP is useful in identifying a range of people and programmes within each of the three levels of 
leadership that are involved in the process of peacebuilding. In reality, the illustration of the 
peacebuilding process as a pyramid comprising hierarchy and divisions does not fully reflect the 
reality on the ground. Whereas I cannot provide a specific “picture” or “drawing” as an alternative 
to Lederach’s pyramid, I argue that conflict resolution scholars and practitioners, and especially 
religious peacebuilders, should not consider the peacebuilding process as linear; rather, they should 
view it as flexible and fluid.  
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In addition to the role of religious leaders in the three levels of leadership that were discussed 
above, the case of Maluku and Mindanao also demonstrated that religious peacebuilders could 
contribute to peacebuilding at local, national, and international levels. I found that in Maluku, for 
example, aside from the religious leaders’ concrete work at the grassroots level, the religious 
leaders also played roles at the national level. Several meetings with ministers and with Presidents 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarno-Putri were organised in both Jakarta and Maluku. 
The aim of those meetings was to identify possible solutions to the religious conflict, including 
urging the national government to take a decisive role in terminating the conflict.579  
I found religious leaders could also influence the process of peacebuilding at the international 
level, in addition to their involvement in peacebuilding at local and national levels. Inter-religious 
leaders in Maluku established communication and contact with international communities during 
the conflict. In 2001, for example, Yusuf Ely (Muslim), Rev. Jacky Manuputty (Protestant), and 
Bishop Petrus Mandagi (Catholic) went to the French Parliament. In 2002, the same religious 
leaders and Mahfudz Nukuhehe, who is the Seith King and the Chairman of Latupati, on the Hitu 
Peninsula, attended the annual conference of the UN High Commission of Human Rights in 
Genève. From there, they went to the British and European Parliaments and to the European 
Council (Belgium). In the same year, 15 religious and adat leaders went to the British and European 
Parliaments.580  
They conveyed at least two messages to every international meeting that they attended. First, 
they asked the international communities to urge the Indonesian government to take determined 
action to terminate the bloody conflict immediately. They believed that in an interconnected world, 
international pressure was critical in resolving the conflict, especially in exerting pressure on the 
Indonesian government to take responsibility in ending the conflict. After their visit to the European 
Parliament, for example, the Parliament released an extremely “strong statement” condemning the 
Indonesian government for being slow to address the conflict in Maluku and urging it to dissolve 
the religious civilian-military groups as an avenue for resolving the conflict.581 Secondly, the 
religious leaders called on the international communities to provide humanitarian aid to the victims 
of the conflict. Since then, numerous international humanitarian relief agencies conducted their 
missions in Maluku. For example, after a meeting with the British government and Parliament in 
                                                          
579 Interview with Rev. Jacky Manuputty, Ambon City, 10 January 2012. 
580 Ibid. 
581 Ibid.  
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London, the British government, created a special task force that was named the “Maluku Desk,” 
which delivered aid in response to the religious leaders’ recommendations.582  
In Mindanao, Fr. Layson truly contributed to peacebuilding at the grassroots level by 
organizing salters for refugees and basic needs for the people who were affected by the wars in 
Pikit. However, he simultaneously played a considerable role in changing policies at the national 
level. During the height of the Buliok War in April 2003, President Arroyo went to Pikit and invited 
Layson to meet her. Layson used the opportunity to prove to the President that the war was not the 
solution. He presented and provided detailed data on the impact of the war. President Arroyo was 
extremely shocked and saddened to apprehend the reality on the ground because she did not receive 
such a report from her staff.583  
Layson and some Pikit community leaders were also invited to meet the President at 
Malacanang Palace approximately one month after the meeting in Pikit. Layson also appeared on a 
national TV channel to urge the government to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Mindanao. 
Soon after the meeting, President Arroyo issued a directive to the national defence officials that 
they must consult with her first before taking any military action against the MILF.584 In 2006, in 
Midsayap, Major General Pajarito, the commanding officer of 6ID in Awang, declared war against 
the MILF, thus violating the ceasefire agreement. Layson who had direct contact with Manila 
complained to the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) that the general 
had violated the ceasefire agreement. According to Layson, the OPAPP asked him if they could use 
his name in asking Malacanang to remove the general from his position. He agreed. Two days later 
the general was transferred to Zamboanga City.585 This incident highlights that Layson, a grassroots 
leader, had considerable influence on defence policies at the national level.  
Fr. D’Ambra, the founder of the Silslah Dialogue Movement (SDM), who was originally from 
Italy, had significant access to the international community especially in Europe. D’Ambra 
regularly travelled to Europe, especially to Italy, to raise awareness among the European public 
about the problems that the people of Mindanao faced. During his travels, D’Ambra was not only 
able to raise money to sustain the SDM programmes but also raised the awareness of Europeans 
about the importance of dialogue as a spiritual journey. A small core group in Italy has subscribed 
to and followed to the SDM’s spiritual journey of dialogue within their Italian context. As I wrote in 
Chapter 6, the participants of the SDM formation programmes also came from various countries in 
the region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka.  
                                                          
582 Ibid. 
583 Interview with Fr. Roberto Layson, Colaman, 20 December 2012. 
584 Ibid. 
585 Ibid. 
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The discussion in this section demonstrates that the HoP and the activities of religious 
peacebuilders can work together from the international to the local levels and back again to local 
level in powerful ways. As I elaborated in Chapter 6, D’Ambra’s dialogue mission largely 
influenced the “global discourse” on the importance of dialogue, which was an outcome of the 
Second Vatican Council. D’Ambra brought and contextualized “the global discourse” for the local 
level in Mindanao, and subsequently used local experiences to influence the international 
community.  
In short, the complex process of the HoP requires that religious peacebuilders in Maluku and 
Mindanao contextualise their religious understanding in relation to external contexts and values, as 
well in relation to other social forces that lead religious leaders to contribute to peacebuilding 
flexibly at local, national, and international levels. Religious leaders can be categorised as sub-state 
actors that influence peacebuilding at the local and national levels, but they also act as transnational 
actors who play an international role. 
 
7.3  Conclusion 
Drawing from the analysis of the Maluku and Mindanao cases, I argue that the HoP is a complex 
process that shows that religion is not necessarily absolutist, inflexible, and dogmatic. Religion can 
lead to the formation of interpretive communities that create new meanings through their 
interpretation of sacred texts in response to new social, cultural, and political developments. 
Arguably, religion is fundamentally public: it never operates in vacuum socio-cultural and political 
context. 
  The notion of the HoP is not a simple process. I have identified four elements of the HoP that 
produce interpretations of religion that favour peace and that could be used for peacebuilding. The 
first element is a belief in the central position of God and sacred texts, which interact with the 
second element, namely, the dialogue between external contexts (the negative effects of war and 
conflict), as well as the external values, such as human rights, pluralism, and local customs, that 
lead to selecting sacred texts. The process of dialogue between external contexts, external values, 
and selected sacred texts, leads to the third element of the HoP, namely, a conviction in shared and 
common religious values, such as compassion, love, peace, mercy, justice, and blessings for all 
humanity, which is used as for guidance and as a moral standard. These three elements in 
combination produce interpretations and theological justifications that favour peace and that can be 
utilised by religious actors to engage in peacebuilding. Finally, the HoP is not an abstract process. 
The HoP involves concrete and practical transformative actions that generate changes on the 
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ground. In this regard, religion, through the HoP, is a powerful source of energy, motivation, 
commitment, and courage that could be used to realise peacebuilding in a concrete manner. 
 In the second section, I discussed the immediate and practical implications of the complex 
process of the HoP. I considered Ledarach’s PAAP model, which suggests that religious 
peacebuilders belong to the middle-range of leadership, to show that the case of Maluku and 
Mindanao reveals a different reality. Religious peacebuilders contribute to peacebuilding using 
various resources at the grassroots, middle range, and top levels of leadership, simultaneously. 
Furthermore, the Maluku and Mindanao case studies revealed that religious peacebuilders acted 
dynamically to contribute to peacebuilding at the local, national, and international levels.  
 Overall, the complex processes of the HoP could provide a framework for understanding the 
role of religious peacebuilders beyond the Maluku and Mindanao cases. The focus on the four 
interrelated processes that has been discussed here might provide a useful guide for engaging 
religion in the process of peacebuilding in other parts of the world. Through an inclusive process of 
the HoP, religion could contribute to peacebuilding in dynamic, fluid, and pluralistic manners. 
Avoiding an exclusive process of rereading sacred texts could allow religious people to work for the 
holy mission of peacebuilding at the grassroots, middle range, and top levels of leadership. 
Moreover, through the HoP, religion could contribute to peacebuilding at the local, national, and 
international levels.  
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 CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion  
 
 
This thesis contributes to a relatively new body of research that is developing arguments about the 
role that religion can play in peacebuilding. To do so, I have adopted a critical orientation to the 
tendency in mainstream research in international relations (IR) and conflict resolution and peace 
studies (PCRS) to ignore religion in their analyses. In Chapter 1, I laid the foundation for this thesis 
by discussing the issues relating to Southeast Asia and forming my research question: How do 
Muslims and Christians use religious resources to contribute to peacebuilding in conflict-torn 
societies in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to the conflicts in Maluku, Indonesia, and 
Mindanao, the Philippines? Asking this question is necessary, given that the secular paradigm 
dominates the social sciences, including the fields of IR and PCRS, in which religion is perceived as 
irrational (even metaphysical and superstitious), rigid, dogmatic, inflexible, regressive, and 
incompatible with development and modernisation. Worse, religion has been cast, by some, as a 
principal source of terrorism, extremism, and fundamentalism, violent conflict, and gross human 
rights violations. 
Although critical of the influence of the secular paradigm, I do not deny that religion does 
contribute to conflict. We should not ignore the fact that the suicide bombers who attacked the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta, for instance, were religious, and that they used religious 
understandings to motivate and justify their cruel and inhumane actions. I also do not adopt the 
stance, sometimes taken by religious people, of simply claiming that those who mobilise religion 
for violence are not fully or authentically religious, or that they did not really understand religion. 
Finally, whereas my focus is on the role of religion in peacebuilding, it is not possible to fully 
separate religious motives from economic and political interests in the conflicts of Mindanao and 
Maluku. Other researchers contribute crucial analyses on these factors, and whereas, as I argued in 
my literature review, some analyses are problematic for the manner in which they cast religion as 
fully instrumentalised in the service of economic and political interests, the traditional political 
economy arguments do contribute powerful analyses.  
In this thesis, I have approached religion as a “normal” socio-political phenomenon. The 
notion that religion is “normal” originates from an understanding that religion is not exceptional, 
vis-à-vis secularism, in its relationship with violence. I can, crudely and, yet, with some 
justification, claim that secular actors have been at least as problematic as religious ones in igniting 
conflicts and violence, and in generating gross human rights violations. Scott Appleby’s notion of 
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the ambivalence of the sacred (AoS) helps to develop further my assumption of the neutrality or 
normality of religion. For Appleby, religion has two faces: one positive and one negative. Religion, 
throughout human history, has facilitated normatively ambiguous actions: it can be utilised to 
justify violent conflict and, conversely, it can be utilized to mobilise support for peacebuilding. In 
the thesis, I used the concept of the ambivalence of the sacred as a point of departure to explore the 
role of religion in peacebuilding the two “religious conflicts” of Maluku and Mindanao. 
In conducting fieldwork in Maluku and Mindanao, I found that the significant role that 
religion plays in peacebuilding could not be ignored. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I demonstrated that 
religion and religious actors played pivotal roles in peacebuilding. Informed by David Little’s 
notion of the hermeneutics of peace (HoP), my findings challenge the assumptions that are 
commonly held within the secular paradigm, which positions religion as irrational, monolithic, 
inflexible, rigid, dogmatic, and with a propensity towards violence. I argued that religion 
significantly contributed to peacebuilding through the HoP; I also outlined how the religious 
resources that were used to contribute to peacebuilding were extremely flexible, varied, and 
pluralistic.  
In Chapter 3, I showed how religion, which had previously played roles in the conflict in 
Maluku, became a pivotal agent for peace. In this context, I discovered the different manners in 
which Christian and Muslim official religious organisations contributed to peacebuilding. In the 
Christian community, the Protestant Church of Maluku (GPM) played a critical role of initiating 
peacebuilding as a well-organised and recognised local church. The GPM used its religious and 
moral authority, structure, and networks to conduct theological reform, reformulate church theology 
in the context of the peacebuilding effort during the conflict and post-conflict periods, and empower 
Christians to become involved in peacebuilding. The GPM Synod not only developed theological 
justifications for peacebuilding but also became involved in operationalising them into practical 
activities on the ground. In contrast, the Muslim community, which did not have a similar tradition 
of having a single, strong, and hierarchical religious organisations, developed different processes to 
become involved in peacebuilding. Alliances of courageous, charismatic, and respected leaders 
from official Muslim organisations, namely, the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI), Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah, engaged in rereading and contextualising the understanding of 
the Qur’an, the Hadith, and the history in Islam. They used these understandings as religious 
arguments to convince Muslims at the grassroots level that terminating the conflict was in 
accordance with Islamic teaching. Notwithstanding some limitations concerning their religious and 
moral authority and funding, Muslim organisations were practically involved in peacebuilding 
activities, for example, by establishing a School for Reconciliation.   
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 The unofficial religious institutions in Maluku, which I discussed in Chapter 4, contributed to 
peacebuilding in flexible and pluralistic manners. Whereas official religious organisations tended to 
use formal approaches to engage in peacebuilding, for example, by using religious structures and 
charismatic leadership in theological exegesis and reinterpreting sacred texts through a HoP, the 
unofficial organisations tended to operate more informally. The three micro-cases of unofficial 
religious institutions that I explored in Chapter 4, namely the Maluku Interfaith Foundation 
(LAIM), the Concerned Women Movement-GPP, and the cases of two peaceful villages (Seith and 
Wayame), show that religion can be part of peacebuilding through different channels (interfaith 
organisations, women’s movements, and building peace at the community level). Moreover, the 
three micro-cases demonstrated that religion had the flexibility and ability to adopt and adapt to 
non-religious resources in peacebuilding efforts. LAIM, for example, aside from using an inclusive 
theology as a platform for their interfaith dialogue mission, also used approaches and techniques 
that were commonly used by secular non-government organisations, such as participatory and 
bottom up approaches. The interplay between inclusive theology and the secular approaches 
allowed LAIM to reach a larger number of interfaith stakeholders in interfaith dialogue. Traditional 
and non-religious perspectives such as pela-gandong, feminism, and nationalism were also utilised 
in peacebuilding in the cases of the GPP, Seith, and Wayame. 
 Four decades of intractable conflict in Mindanao involved Christians and Muslims at the 
grassroots level enduring mutual distrust, animosity, prejudices, and stigmas. Meanwhile, the peace 
process that the government and rebels had initiated only produced intermittent peace. These 
phenomena led religious leaders in Mindanao to take concrete steps to build “peace from below.” 
The first of the two micro-cases that was examined in this thesis was the Mindanao case study, 
involving the Silsilah Dialogue Movement (SDM) and Nalapaan Space for Peace, which 
demonstrated the significant role that religious leaders and institutions played in initiating 
peacebuilding at the grassroots level. Religious understandings, such as the teachings of Lumen 
Gentium and Nostra Aetate from the Second Vatican Council, informed the peace activists in 
Mindanao who initiated interfaith dialogue as an avenue to establish durable peace.  
Religion has inspired and motivated SDM activists since the establishment of the organisation 
Mindanao. Furthermore, grounded in religious traditions, SDM broadened the meaning of dialogue 
beyond the formal dialogue approaches that were commonly practiced in conflict resolution. The 
SDM programmes have helped foster personal transformation among the participants, especially for 
rebuilding trust among Christians and Muslims, and by eradicating prejudices that have been 
transmitted from generation to generation since the colonial period. The second micro-case, the 
Nalapaan Space for Peace, demonstrated that peace could be established in Mindanao among the 
devastation of wars that produced frustration and pessimism. The Catholic Church in Pikit, 
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Cotabato, instilled a hope that peace was not illusive, but real and possible. Through multiple 
internal and external dialogues, the people in Nalapaan, a barangay (village) that was gravely 
affected by war, declared a Space for Peace. Internal dialogue, such as their Culture of Peace and 
Inter-faith Seminar initiatives, allowed the people of Nalapaan to become engaged in the HoP 
where they found how their own religious traditions and the traditions of the others could be used as 
a common ground to build peace in their barangay. Through external dialogue (communication and 
negotiation with the government and the MILF), the people of Nalapaan, the Tri People (Christians, 
Muslims, and Lumads), gained support from the combatants to respect their decision to declare their 
barangay a Space for Peace.  
In the last micro-case, I argued that religion could also operate to instil peace in a rebel 
military organisation, the MILF. My research with sympathizers, as well as regular members of the 
MILF, during fieldwork demonstrated that the peace process that the MILF leaders are currently 
undertaking with the Philippines government is not merely a political strategy. More than that, the 
peace process is grounded in theological decisions that are based on their understanding of the 
Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s traditions (Hadith). The case of the MILF, again, demonstrated 
that the process of the HoP occurred even among those in the liberation front, where the MILF tried 
to find justification in religious traditions to solve the problems in Mindanao through peaceful 
means. 
Aside from using the HoP as my theoretical framework, the fieldwork in Maluku and 
Mindanao allowed me to advance the HoP theory to understand the role of religion in peacebuilding 
in more nuanced fashion. As I discussed in Chapter 7, I discovered that religious adherents in 
Maluku and Mindanao were not as dogmatic and rigid as commonly assumed. They belonged to 
interpretive communities that are often vibrant, dynamic, pluralistic, and open to the creation of 
new meanings and understandings of religion that could be used as moral arguments to drive the 
conduct of concrete actions for peacebuilding. The HoP was a continuous process that began, in the 
monotheistic faiths that are considered in this thesis, with a strong belief in the central role of God 
and the sacred texts, be they the Gospel, the Qur’an, the Hadith, religious narratives and histories, 
or the documents of Second Vatican Council. The HoP, then, involved interaction between external 
contexts, such as suffering, injustices, displaced persons, orphans, “external values and norms,” 
(i.e., secular norms such as human rights, feminism, humanism, and nationalism), and traditional 
values, such as pela-gandong. The interchange between external contexts and external norms 
influenced the manner in which people interpreted and constructed sacred texts. The HoP also 
mobilised some of the universal values of religion, such as mercy, compassion, justice, love, and 
peace, as moral guidance and standards in the HoP process. Overall, the HoP process produced 
motivation, energy, and courage to engage in peacebuilding in practical manners. Religious actors 
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believed that their engagement in peacebuilding was part of their religious convictions and that such 
service would result in redemption and rewards on Judgment Day. Because they also believed that 
their involvement in peacebuilding was part of spirituality and sacred duty, the religious people in 
Maluku and Mindanao were extremely strong in their peacebuilding convictions. Because peace 
was viewed as sacred, some were even ready to sacrifice themselves in this holy mission. 
As all other research, of course, this research has limitations. Maluku and Mindanao are 
extremely complex and diverse regions. Within the limited time and resources that I had to 
complete this thesis, my research was limited to Ambon Island in Maluku, consisting of Ambon 
City and a small part of Central Maluku. Because the conflict did not occur only on Ambon Island, 
future research might be extended to other areas of Maluku, such as villages in municipalities that 
are distant from the “epicentre” of the conflict. Furthermore, , comparative studies on Maluku and 
North Maluku (the religious conflict first occurred in Maluku then spread to North Maluku) should 
be conducted to acquire a superior understanding of religious peacebuilders. This comparison 
would be interesting because the two neighbouring provinces have different social, cultural, and 
religious structures. The people in North Maluku, for example, do not have the customary pela-
gandong system. Furthermore, the largest official Christian organisation is a Protestant 
congregation called Gereja Masehi Injil Halmahera (GMIH). This fact raises the question, for 
example, as to what similarities and dissimilarities exist between GMIH and GPM in using religious 
resources to contribute to peacebuilding. With the absence of the pela gandong system in North 
Maluku, one might also investigate the non-religious resources that GMIH could use to contribute 
to peacebuilding. 
 As I mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, Mindanao has numerous extremely vibrant civil society 
organisations (CSOs), including the CSOs that religious leaders lead, and both local and 
international organisations. The three micro-cases that I presented in Chapter 6 could be enriched 
by providing greater amounts of data on how religion contributes to peacebuilding in different 
religious institutions, and with different leadership in other parts of Mindanao that have specific 
local problems. The Nalapaan Space for Peace, for example, was only one of numerous Spaces for 
Peace or Peace Zones in Mindanao. The SDM is also only one of numerous interfaith initiatives that 
exist in Mindanao. Many other religious leaders and organisations could be interviewed to 
understand religious peacebuilders in Mindanao.  
The two case studies that I have employed in this research also cannot be taken to represent 
the entire phenomenon of peacebuilding in Southeast Asia, given that the region is extremely 
diverse with different political systems, cultures, languages, and religious affiliations. In addition, 
the case studies of Maluku and Mindanao that I have chosen for this thesis only presented religious 
peacebuilders in two Abrahamic traditions: Christianity and Islam. The research on religious 
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peacebuilders in Southeast Asia might be developed further by employing case studies involving 
the role of non-Abrahamic religions, such as that played by Buddhism in peacebuilding in the long-
standing conflict in Southern Thailand or in Burma, where Buddhists are the majority.  
Aside from the foregoing limitations, the fieldwork that I conducted in Maluku and 
Mindanao, and its presentation and analysis in this thesis make is possible to conclude that ignoring 
religion in peace and conflict analyses leads scholars to draw erroneous conclusions. Moreover, the 
influence of the secular paradigm can lead scholars draw conclusions that do not help to address 
conflict situations. As the notion of the ambivalence of the sacred implies, religion relates not only 
to war and conflict but also to peace. The cases of Maluku and Mindanao provide ample evidence 
that religion played critical roles in the process of peacebuilding. The two case studies demonstrate 
that religion is not dogmatic, static, or conservative. Through the process of the HoP, the religious 
communities in Maluku and Mindanao were extremely dynamic and flexible in interpreting and 
using their Holy Books and religious narratives and traditions to form the moral foundations that 
would enable them to work tirelessly for peace. There is little doubt, then, that the pursuit of 
sustainable peace in the two religions could benefit from further efforts to understand and draw 
upon religion as a valuable resource for peacebuilding.   
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Attamimi, Mohammad. Ambon City, 28 July 2011. He is Head of the Department of Religious Affairs in 
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Ely, Tamrin. Ambon City, 5 August 2011. He was a Muslim leader who attended the Malino II Peace 
Agreement. 
Hatarie, Abraham. Ambon, 14 January 2013. He is Coordinator of Bureau for Publication and 
Documentation of the GPM Synod. 
Hataul, Mahfudz. Seith, 24 July 2011. He is one of the respected elders in Seith. 
Hendriks, Izaac Willem Josias (I.W.J.). Ambon City, 11 July 2011, 14 January 2013 and 15 January 2013. He 
was the Chairman of the GPM Synod from 2001 to 2005. 
Hendriks, Margaretha. Ambon City, 12 July 2011 and 15 January 2013. She was co-chair of the Gerakan 
Perempuan Peduli (GPP), representing Protestants. 
Hidayat, Syarif. Ambon City, 27 July 2011. He is Secretary General of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Maluku. 
Latuconsina, Zuliana. Ambon City, 2 August 2011. She was one of the Muslim leaders in the GPP. She is also 
sister of the Governor of Maluku at that time. 
Luhulima, Abdurrahman. Liang, 31 July 2011. He is secretary of Liang (a Muslim village). 
Mailoa, Novadyette. Ambon City, 27 July 2011. She is currently a pastor at UKIM. 
Mandagi, Petrus. Ambon City, 18 July 2011. He is the Bishop of Diocese of Amboina. 
Manggala, Irwan Tahir. Ambon City, 15 July 2011. He is a Muslim youth leader in Jalan Baru area. 
Manuputty, Jacky. Ambon City 7 July 2011, 2 August 2011 and 10 January 2012. He is currently the 
Chairman of the Department of Research and Development of GPM and is the former executive 
director of LAIM. 
Musanef, Imam. Wayame, 15 July 2011. He is a Muslim leader in Wayame. 
Pesiwarisa, Hengki. Ambon City, 20 July 2011. He is the head pastor of Silo Church. 
Polpoke, Abdul Wahab, Ambon City, 15 July 2011. He was co-Chairman of the MUI in Maluku during the 
conflict. 
Polpoke, Abdul Wahab. Ambon City, 15 July 2011. He is senior Muslim leaders and was formal Co-Chairman 
of MUI during the conflict. 
Rahawarin, Natsir. Ambon City, 15 July 2011. He is former Secretary General of BIMM. 
Renyaan, Brigitta. Ambon City, 14 July 2011. She was Co-Chair of the GPP (Catholic). 
Ruhulessin, John. Ambon City 12 July 2011. He is the Chairman of the GPM Synod from 2005 to 2015. 
Ruhulessin, John. Ambon City, 12 July 2011. He is the Chairman of the Synod of the GPM.  
Sahalessi, John. Wayame, 15 July 2011. He is a former pastor at Pniel Church, which is located in Wayame. 
Tala, Yusuf. Seith, 24 July 2011. He is Youth Coordinator of Seith. 
Talakua, Lenny. Ambon City, 10 January 2012. She is a pastor at Rohoboth Church.  
Tapilatu, M. Ambon City, 16 July 2011. He is senior lecture in Universitas Kristen Maluku (UKIM). He 
teaches, among other things, the history of the GPM. 
Tatuhey, Idrus. Ambon City, 18 July 2011. He is former Chairman of Muhammadiyah in Maluku and of the 
signatory of Malino II Agreement. 
Tukan, Idrus. Ambon City, 19 July 2011. He is the Chairman of the MUI in Maluku. 
Wakano, Abidin. Ambon City, 8 July 2011. He is current executive director of LAIM. 
 
 
Quoted Interviewees, Mindanao (Total Interviewees 43) 
Aiyub, Alih S. Zamboanga City, 28 November 2011. He is Secretary of National Ulama Council of the 
Philippines (NUCP) in ZamBaSulTa (Zambonga, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi). He is also actively 
involved in the SDM. 
                                                          
586 Quoted interviewees are listed here. Other interviews that were conducted during fieldwork are relied upon, along 
with participant-observation, for general and background information.  
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Andik, Kadtong T. Nalapaan, 8 December 2011. He is a Muslim inhabitant in Nalapaan. He is also a 
volunteer of Bantay Ceasefire, an independent ceasefire network established by civil society groups 
in Mindanao. 
Cassanova, Sanggulin M. Nalapaan, 8 December 2011. He is a Muslim community leader in Nalapaan. 
Commander Sabre, Pikit, 9 December 2011. He is commander of 108th Based Command of Bangsamoro 
Islamic Armed Forces. 
D’Ambra, Sebastiano. Zamboanga City, 21 November 2011 and 24 November 2011 
de Compo, Esther. Zamboanga City, 27 November 2011. She is alumna of the SDM’s formation programme. 
Emmanuel, Jovie. Zamboanga City, 30 November 2011. She is Coordinator of the SDM Formation/Training 
Programme. 
Gamboa, Gerardo. Pikit, 9 December 2011. Toto is Peace Education Officer of Immaculate Conception 
Parish and the President of Parish Pastoral Council (1997–2001). 
Iligan, KGWD. Romeo P. Nalapaan, 9 December 2011. He is a Catholic community leader in Nalapaan. 
Iqbal, Mohagher. Cotabato City, 12 December 2011. He is the Chairman of the MILF Peace Panel. 
Layson, Roberto C. Colaman, 20 December 2012. 
Macapuji, Rowena J. Zamboanga City, 27 November 2011. She is Coordinator of Midwives Programme, in 
the Silsilah Center in Lower Calarian. 
Pinol, Emmanuel. Kidapawan City, 20 December 2012. He is the former Governor of Cotabato, one of the petitioners 
to the Supreme Court to oppose the MOA-AD. 
Sano, Aminda E. Zamboanga City, 28 November 2011. She is currently President of the SDM and one of the 
founders of the EDC. 
Sayarsan, Ramoz D. Nalapaan, 8 December 2011, He is a leader of Lumad in Nalapaan. 
Tibungcog, Abdul D. Nalapaan, 8 December 2011. He is Chief of Nalapaan village.  
UY, Susan R. Pikit, 12 December 2011. She is a senior staff of Municipal Agriculture Department of Pikit. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
